DRAGON

DRAGON is the SCOS journal, so that it will deal mainly with the subject of Organisation Symbolism. It will give priority to articles - case-studies or theoretical expositions - which consider the organisation as a human and social group within which we see the development of phenomena outside the precincts of classical systems analysis; beliefs, myths, rites, heroics, sagas, and so on. These new concepts usually coincide with the introduction to organisation study of disciplines formerly remote from it: linguistics, history, psychoanalysis, anthropology, etc.

DRAGON publishes working papers, consonant with a research area that is constantly evolving and which emerged simultaneously in several different conceptual "broths". Its aim is the rapid circulation of concepts and factual material. An important goal is to assist in formulating a common approach to the organisation enabling comparison between different cultural perceptions. At a later stage, DRAGON will provide other services: lectureship invitations, researcher exchanges (working and living accommodations to accompany research assignments), and so on.

DRAGON is a vehicle for instant communication, between members of SCOS and their associates. By publishing in first-draft or working-paper form, the authors indicate that they will welcome comment as to content, style, references, and so on. Therefore, DRAGON should be used by contributors, readers and commentators alike with this in mind. Increasingly greater space will be set aside for readers' letters and comments. Consonantly with this, amended versions of earlier articles may be published at short notice. It is also understood that contributors remain free to publish revised versions of their papers in other journals of more established academic reputation.

JOIN SCOS BY CONTACTING BARRY TURNER AT EXETER
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Any researcher who has sufficient practice of empirical work and has set up observation devices within companies is aware of the link between these devices and the nature of their product. DRAGON can be considered as a device "connected" to the activity of research on organizations.

What the characteristics of DRAGON?
- First, DRAGON is associated to the Socio network which is, at this time, the most structured and the most important as concerns research on Organizational Symbolism.
- Then, DRAGON publishes quickly.
- DRAGON publishes working papers, in other words papers which do not necessarily satisfy the standards of such and such a journal.
- DRAGON publishes abundantly, i.e., about a hundred articles a year, whereas quarterly reviews edit around twenty at the most.

How do they affect the content of DRAGON?

To my mind, there are two things which characterize the market-appearance of DRAGON:
- authors can publish what can be called emerging thoughts: in other words, what P.O. Berg called "old thinking" in the call for papers for the Lund Conference - hypotheses which may be audacious but which are nevertheless presented with rigor.
- moreover, the same authors may explore subjects in a form which, by its very nature, makes their work difficult to publish in more conventional journals (see, for example, the article by F. Bharvasteva in issue n° 1 of DRAGON).

Thus, the content of DRAGON aims at being at the vanguard of current research, to a certain extent fulfilling the role of the Physical News Letter or other reviews of the same type in other disciplines.

These formal characteristics imply a new epistemological approach to the study of Organizations.

Firstly, what indicates the "value" of a contribution in this field, is the internal rigor in setting forth observations and their conceptual presentation, more than the operationalistic treatment of variables through vast statistical surveys. To-day, we know only too well the low probative nature of statistics due to the impossibility of adequately mastering variables in order to create worthwhile replicas. This does not mean, in anyway whatsoever, that one should restrict oneself to local surveys and clinical observations methods. But the generalization of results is based on their standing in the scientific community and on the fact that appropriate concepts make the world intelligible.

Secondly, the subjects of our studies (companies, civil services, various institutions, or their "transversal" components: professional skills, status, etc.) irreversibly evolve in time. Without trying to find the sense of this history (with all the meaning of the word "sense"), it must be recognized that it relativizes the "results", unless these are integrated into a dynamic analysis accounting itself for the emergence of new concepts (for instance "corporate culture" or "organisational symbolism"), and thereby for the evolution of the view on a given subject. This is the reason to recourse to various disciplines which up to now have been of little concern to corporations. Not to borrow their concepts without necessary precautions but because, in their time, these disciplines have raised questions which concern us (history, anthropology, linguistics, etc.).

For these two reasons, rallying the scientific community appears to be a decisive condition for progress. But this increased collaboration, over a larger geographical area, leads to practices somehow different to those sometimes recommended by the institutions in charge of spreading results such as the "conventional" journals.

- First of all, it seems necessary to define a certain number of concepts, not at the abstract level of their restitution in a paper, but at the level of their implementation in empirical work.
- There is no real usefulness in trying to create a pseudo-scientific field by quoting notions with the only indication of a name and a date. This leads to a quick dilution of the sense of these notions to which heterogeneous observations are piled up.

Thus, we take the standpoint of a return to sources, in other words the definitions in the terms used by their authors (as usual in more literary sectors of sociology).

- Then, and we could say reciprocally, the abuse of "ritual" quotations should decrease. We are all aware that different socio-cultural traditions exist in our various countries and this significantly modifies the hierarchy and even the meaning of the concepts we use. Thus, it seems more judicious to define precisely the meaning we attach to these concepts than to refer to an author who has written on the same subject.

This would be simple realism, blurring our writing.

In other words, we wish - but this is an open point for discussion - to take enough distance with:

- a paradigm derived from the sciences of the nature were concepts have an unambiguous meaning;
- a paradigm strongly oriented by the habits of North-American publication (as regards quotations, mainly).

We hope that our North-American colleagues will not be offended by the last remark, which is not aiming the individual quality of their work but rather the "production mechanism" within the field of Organization studies. It is not because in a few countries the appointment to academic positions depends on obtaining a score in the Citation Index, which is childish, that the presentation of scientific works should be concerned. Refusing to enter this "system" could ultimately benefit the researchers and teachers currently subjected to it.

If we want to progress in a discipline which has accumulated a lot of observables, it seems necessary that researchers, because of the norms imposed on them and that they have internalized, cease reassessing themselves by thinking they are all writing about the same things only because they are using the same words. To reach the level of Science, it is time to stop doing "as if" and acting like "scientists" (physicists, biologists, those who are confident in their scientific-ness), even if it turns to be less comforting.

Vincent Dégot
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The role of Images in changing Corporate Culture:
The case of A.T.& T.

Susan SCHNEIDER
Ellen FOXLEY

INTRODUCTION

Dramatic environmental change often necessitates a fundamental change in corporate strategy. Successful implementation of that strategy requires a compatible corporate culture. However, the old culture may be poorly suited to the demands of the environment. Such may be the case of AT&T on American Telephone and Telegraph as it attempts to reconcile its 100 year old corporate culture with its new environment. One year after deregulation of the telephone industry one can observe numerous change signals from the foremost communication giant as it prepares to enter a new arena.

On January 1, 1984, AT&T put into effect a federal court order which deregulated, in part, the company's operations. The court order signified the end of an era - the monopoly of the American domestic telephone service. This monopoly had provided, according to some, the best service in the world under the mission of "One System, One Policy, Universal Service". However, the American free market mentality, antitrust climate, suspicion of monopolies, protests from would-be competitors and AT&T's interest in diversifying into information systems were some of the forces driving that decree. As a result, seven regional telephone communications
companies were dismembered from AT&T in an operation as painful to the employees as it was confusing to the public. A family of 1 million employees was torn apart and sent to one of seven new regional companies or remained with the diminished parent. Employees not only suffered emotional shock but the aftermath of divorce proceedings. "Ma Bell" doesn't live here anymore" proclaimed CEO Charles Brown prior to the decision heralding a change not only in structure, mission, and strategy but also in corporate culture.

Changing culture would be no small feat with a 100-year history and several generations having worked for Ma Bell where one overriding value shaped the culture: SERVICE — above and beyond the call. Linemen testing circuits in blizzards, repairmen working to restore service in hurricanes, and operators resolving crises embody the service value and were corporate heroes. The spirit of service is codified in stories, rewarded in rituals, and physically visible in hallway portraits and statues. This spirit survived in a benign, protected, regulated environment. What changes are needed to survive in the new competitive, high technology environment? Is this change possible?

This paper will document the changes or attempts to change the corporate culture through analyzing changing images. These images will be organized by domain, i.e., the company's view of itself or identity; the view of its environment — government regulators, technology, competitors, customers and the financial community; and the view of its leaders and employees. Images, representations of the organization, are expressed through symbols, sayings (slogans), metaphors and analogies, and descriptions. These images will be gleaned from advertisements, internal communications and newsletters, speeches, media reports and interviews to demonstrate the cultural change. The role of images will be evaluated and the mechanisms required for culture change discussed. (Is it merely a facade while the underlying architecture remains unchanged?) Implications for successful strategy implementation in newly deregulated firms will be drawn that are particularly relevant given the recent trends in the international telecommunications industry.

Corporate Images

"Generations have grown up thinking of American Telephone and Telegraph simply as Ma Bell" (Jesp. 7/19/83). AT&T was best known to the public as the Telephone Company or the Bell System. While everyone could identify the telephone with Bell, requesting the identity of AT&T would most likely have drawn blank stares from those asked, except perhaps from the investment community. The Bell System was named after Alexander Graham Bell, the inventor of the telephone. Thus the emphasis on invention has been a long established tradition. The readily identified logo was a bell within a circle (picture I). This linked the company with U.S. history and tradition in its association with the Liberty
Bell which symbolizes U.S. independence and the basic tenets of the constitution — life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In adopting this symbol AT&T was closely tied to the U.S. government and acted as a quasi-governmental agency (Business Week, 12/3/84). AT&T in fact patterned itself after the governmental structure with local/federal responsibility. "The Bell System contained all the necessary attributes of a nation — territory, diplomatic language, history, culture and government." (Tunstall, 1984).

The domestic image was strengthened when in 1925 Walter S. Gifford (then President) chose America over the world as he sold off its International Western Electric Co. controlling 47% of the world's telephone equipment business outside of the U.S. to a then small company, I.T.&T. The basic split remained until 1984: BT&T — American and I.T.&T. — International (Corpus, 12/19/83).

Two strong images are connected to "American": apple pie and mother. AT&T, or the Bell System, was known as Ma Bell. Mother of course was traditionally taken care of by father — Uncle Sam — the symbol of the United States government, and in turn takes care of the children, i.e. the customers, who were to be treated fairly. Everyone should have a phone, which should be affordable (the universal service doctrine) in keeping with the national ideology that all men were created equal, have unalienable rights and opportunities.

The competitors claim now that AT&T is acting in an un-American fashion by denying them equal access to the phone lines.

Uncle Sam took care of Ma Bell by giving her the monopoly (although not without many years of litigation over patents and antitrust suits). No need for competition in this big happy family. (Although in the 1930's father tried to take over and nationalize the system.) The household budget was set to reflect operating costs. Dad kept a tight fist as pay phone rates were kept to 10 cents for a local call for 32 years. Now had to get by. Cost for services, like other utilities was unknown. Flat rates per month regardless of usage kept local service charges too low and were subsidized by higher long distance charges (Business Week, 9/5/83).

Ma Bell knew what it was that her children needed regarding telephone service — it should be reliable, dependable and last forever. "Ma Bell was not just a name. AT&T truly was a Ma — it was dependable, familiar, it took care of all aspects of communications decisions..." (Elon, Business Week, 12/3/84). Equipment was built to last forever. Several ads now attest to that durability. You could always count on a dial tone and an operator — someone to talk to. Fancy gadgets, sophisticated accessories were unnecessary for us plain folks. Just keep it plain and simple. In 1969 a corporate identification program determined that AT&T was viewed as a "civil service sort of employer....(if they) were a portrait it would be by Rockwell, if a state, they would be midwestern — probably
Iowa— and if a tree, a huge utilitarian Douglas fir, not a sequoia and certainly not a dogwood" (Von Avn., 1983).

Doing one thing right sensibly reflected the price of an idealistic heritage (Tunstall, 1983). Ma knew best and Ma got fat and lazy. But Ma Bell kept the family together. The advertising campaign for long distance service was primarily aimed at friends and families staying in touch.

Then on November 21, 1974 Charles Brown, CEO of AT&T, said "Mother doesn't live here anymore", to signal a change in its comfortable Ma Bell image to that of a technology driven firm. To Bell employees, the symbolic abandonment of Ma Bell meant the abolishment of the spirit of service (Von Avn., 1983). The final decree of divestiture sent shock waves through the system—triggering both personal grief, a sense of loss, confusion and concern not only in its one million employees but in customers and stockholders alike (New York Times, 12/28/83). "Bell System people spoke in metaphors of personal grief, almost as if they had been deserted or there had been a death in the family" (Tunstall, 1983, p.17). The media stories reflected this image in headlines such as "When Ma Bell passes away in January, her stockholders from Connecticut may be too busy to attend the funeral" (Fortune, 11/14/83).

By federal decree of Judge Brodsky, similar to that of King Solomon, the company was split into eight pieces: corporate headquarters and the seven regional companies, dividing $148 billion in assets and one million employees.

(Business Week, 9/5/83). No hand stayed the sword. The aftermath was written about in divorce proceedings: who went where, who would be let go and who had rights to what properties. Family work groups were split, some went back to join the regionals. Others stayed home at headquarters. Although given choices regarding which parent to live with, often decisions had already been made and some employees found out their new assignments via their new payroll checks.

Transfers, layoffs, attrition, "mass"-management incentive (to leave or retire early/programs—thinned the ranks at all levels of the corporation (40,000 in 40 months), although higher levels thought they would be spared. Corporate staff was reduced from 12,000 to 2,000, 3,000 were offered early retirement, and 11,000 jobs were cut at AT&T technologies (Business Week, 12/3/84). Confusion over job titles and responsibilities and concern over job security led to a 3 week strike in August 1983 wherein one pocket tear "Ma Bell abuses her kids" (Time, 8/22/83). The new AT&T (with the exception of AT&T Communications) moved out of Ma's palatial estate in Beekman Ridge, New Jersey. He had to give up her name and logo to the newly divested offspring (New York Times, 3/7/83). According to the chairman, "The order to drop the Bell name is the most troublesome part, but there is nothing we can do about it. We'll just have to come up with a new one." (Time, 7/18/83). Assets went from $148 billion to $34 billion and alimony and child support had to be paid in the form of hefty access charges paid to the local companies.
The diversified regional companies were described as floundering offsprings: "A Bell System scandal cuts loose" (including the Bell name and tradition) a two-edged sword and learning painful lessons the other children could profit from (Economist, 11/14/82): "How one bell baby struggled to its feet" describes it in terms of sibling rivalry - a Cinderella story with the image of Pauletta as princess or scullery maid (Business Week, 9/26/83). While some thought that AT&T emerged from the breakup with the "family jewels"-Bell Labs, Western Electric and long lines - these had little sparkle as profits have fallen short of expectations (Business Week, 12/8/84).

The New AT&T

In the same speech that noted the demise of Ma Bell, Chairman Charles Brown proclaimed in a manner similar to that of "The Queen is dead! Long live the Queen!"; "There is a new telephone company in town... a high technology business applying advanced marketing strategies to the satisfaction of highly sophisticated customer requirements." (1/21/83). The old logo, the bell within a circle, so closely linked with domestic identity and representing a closed system, was replaced by a "blue globe crossed with white wavy lines" (Page 13 of the New York Times, 8/4/83) a world symbolically pirated by electronic communications (Tunstill, 1985). Thus emerged an international identity, not only in the sense of network and connection but as a key business player by forming joint ventures with Olivetti and Philips, N.V. (AT&T Technologies Division has threatened that in order to cut costs and stay competitive it will consider going overseas for production, hereby at a company once proud of its status as a U.S. flag carrier in telecommunications (Business Week, 12/3/84). The new mission was "to attain or retain leadership in the universal information marketplace" (Brown, 1/1/83).

The new AT&T moved from the town suburbs to smalltown Manhattan (pictures). The construction of the new building was described as a major "urban event". AT&T's pink granite, 35 story sky scraper with its Chippendale decal in the tower and ground level triumphant Roman arch and huge outdoor public space was designed by Philip Johnson and Burdick and cost $500 million. This demonstrated the concern with identity and external image. For while a framework or logo can reflect the broader mission, the building as corporate symbol can help focus the company's identity. Stanley H. Smith, President of 195 Broadway Corporation, AT&T's construction arm, "I was looking for a building that would express to the people that there is a business deeply rooted in history, with a great sense of tradition, yet as up-to-date as any of the high technology companies (Business Week, 10/4/83). The building's design is thought to convey strength, innovation
and solidity yet was also seen as highly risky and extravagant. Here, AT&T did not choose the safe route. However, with the popular success of the building, feelings of risk have been replaced with feelings of pride.

With respect to the competition, AT&T and I.B.M. back to back on Madison Avenue are "...high profile buildings enveloped in the sameness of their over-personalized individuality...[They vie for attention without establishing a sense of community....Buildings can be so competitive that they fight with one another." (New York Times, 1/20/82). Thus the intense competition between these two giants was even represented architecturally. Yet one observer commented, "IBM is sleek and futuristic. AT&T is right next door but it looks like a grandfather clock" (Business Week, 10/4/82). The Echocentaur pediment atop attests to the sense of history and tradition while the grand 35 story marble staircase and foyer at the top reinforce the fact that corporate power rests at the top" (New York Times, 1/20/82).

Organizational Structure and Design

The changes in the external, architectural structure and design were accompanied by changes in internal, organizational structure and design. AT&T will bear little resemblance to the old M.E. Bell. The new AT&T will be lean and mean, sleek and aggressive instead of fat, wasteful and compliant (New York Times, 12/4/83). The large pyramid, a solid functional design with staff direction from the top, crumbled into the separate operating companies with staff serving as a supportive foundation below (see figure 1). What was left of AT&T is a divisional structure with market segments lines of business, that are self-contained and decentralized, with profit and loss responsibility (Business Week, 5/23/83) (see figure 2). With this, the old mission statement "One system, one policy, universal service" with one to one responsibility requiring integration and unification, disintegrated. The new government mandates will mean the disaggregation of the Bell System as the nation has known it. This, of course, strikes at the heart of Bell's historical legacy - its sense of unity over the course of a century" (Fonseca, 1983, p. 17). However to reframe the sense of unity Charles Brown emphasized that "The new AT&T is one business. We have three sectors, seven lines of business, a corporate headquarters, Western Electric, Bell Labs, American Telephone - however these may develop over time. But we are one business. We may be 120,000 businesses but we are one business, and we will be managed as one business." The manufacturing strengths of Western Electric and the innovation capacity of Bell Labs were merged to form AT&T Technologies in order to strengthen the R & D, manufacturing link and to speed the availability of new products to the customer.

Where there had been a clear sense of mission, the new
mission was confused and unclear due in part to its broader scope. With no clear identity, AT&T had not conveyed a clearcut image to the outside. Market research indicated that the public simply knew them as the telephone company, not as a firm with technological or international capability. Divestiture by creating competition compounded the problem because AT&T was no longer The telephone company. The loss of the Bell name and logo meant that the equity inherent in the Bell System had to be transferred to AT&T (New York Times, 11/28/84). Yet the new image had to be created as well. This caused confusion instead of consolidation as images portrayed in AT&T advertisements were diverse and often fragmented. With an advertising budget of $300 million it was proclaimed, "We're in the knowledge business." "Reach out and touch someone long distance campaigns because "We're reaching out in new directions". Familiar familial scenes faded out and were replaced by high technology, business oriented ones, e.g., "when you've got to be right" and "Watson watch us now!" Other ads ran without reference to a particular product in an attempt to build the corporate image ("We're into music"). A full page in the New York Times (4/4/85) headlines "Hello, AT&T Could You Give the Statue of Liberty a Perm?" This was followed by copy on an AT&T corrosion scientist who was on loan to the United States National Park Service every Friday for six months to contribute to the exterior repair work.

Corporate Culture

It was recognized that change in structure alone would not accomplish the new mission. That all pervasive yet elusive concept of corporate culture would have to shift in order to implement strategies in line with mission. Lifetime careers, up from the ranks management succession, emphasis on operational skills, consensus management, team consciousness, and the overall maternal bond would have to change (Tungstall, 1985). "AT&T stands ready to mortgage its future if it doesn't reshape its culture to meet the new competitive battles ahead" (Wall Street Journal, 2/20/84). "The primary task for AT&T leadership is to redefine its values...while certain bedrock values would have to be discarded, or at least reassigned and redirected, old values need not be abandoned wholesale. Certain aspects of culture need to be nurtured and protected: AT&T's distinctive vision of fairness to employees, owners and customers, its dedication to the service ethic, its mutually reinforcing sense of loyalty and unity, its operational and technical skills and concern for safety standards. However values cannot retain their validity in the new environment unless they are reinterpreted in the context of the customer and the marketplace." (Pascale, A.T.T. Magazine, 1984). For example, the Bell System's devotion to customer service exemplified in placards and pictures honoring the memory of Angus McNabola, a lineman who trudged through a Massachusetts snowstorm 55 years ago looking for downed phone lines may have little
commercial value in a competitive market. The tradition of
treating all customers equally means nothing to the buyer of
a million dollar PBX switch who demands special service
(Fortune, 11/14/83). But some symbols don't change. The 1917
vintage 12-foot bronze statue—the Spirit of Communications—
was moved from atop the old headquarters to the lobby of the
new building a shared symbol of excellence bridging past and
future (Tunstall, 1983) (see picture).

"A well entrenched culture is being sculpted into
something new." (New York Times, 12/28/83). AT&T needs to be
market driven as opposed to service oriented. Customers
calling the shots requires an aggressive sales approach.
Archie Nobill who was along with many I.B.M.ers recruited to
make this switch had his doubts about the degree to which
marketing was embedded at the time of his departure. Success
according to him will be determined by the ability to shift
culture (Business Week, 9/26/83). "One outsider likened AT&T
to a giant oil tanker: It takes 30 minutes to complete a 180
degree turn, but once it turns, everybody had better get out
of the way." (Business Week, 12/3/84).

Yet according to Tunstall (1983), no formal mechanism,
manager, committee or task force was charged directly with
addressing culture change. Finally, in December 1983,
Chairman Brown charged then AT&T President Ellingshaus to
report on the impact of divestiture on the culture and people
on February 15, 1984. This sent the signal that attention to
culture change was a high order priority. The interviews

with top management, outside consultants, internal surveys
yielded "amazing results". Ellingshaus ended his 44 year
career on the day he presented his findings to the board. A
fitting and demoralizing his concern for the welfare of the
people. In summary there was an overwhelming sense of shock
both physically and emotionally taking, a concern for the
ability to provide high quality service in the face of price
war competition, a collective confidence shaken as people
were less secure about jobs and career opportunities, concern
about the ability to compete, yet a recognized need for new
priorities, e.g. market aggressiveness, technological
innovation, profitability, and fast response to customer needs
while there seemed to be a corporate identity crisis, there
was a pervasive excitement and anticipation about the "new
call game", "we do have the feeling of being a kid in a candy
shop.....we're used to being successful and we're not going
to get out of that habit" (C. Brown, New York Times, 12/4/83).

The environment

Government regulation

The 107 year old culture was molded by a regulated
monopolistic environment which protected the company from
competition. At one point in time (1920's) the government
was considering nationalizing the phone system similar to
what was being done in Europe, yet AT&T convinced the
government to retain its independence. "All monopolies would
be regulated. Government ownership would be an unregulated monopoly" (Annual Report, 1910, p.36). The watchful eye of the FCC would regulate interstate and international communications (Communications Act of 1934). Nevertheless, AT&T had a long history of legal battles with regulators (the Federal Communications Commission and the local public utility commission) and competitors, over patents at first and antitrust suits later. For example, the Justice Department of the United States sued AT&T charging that telephone rates were kept artificially high because AT&T required equipment to be purchased from their manufacturing arm (Western Electric) by the local telephone companies. The government sought to have AT&T divest itself of their manufacturing arm. The suit was settled without divestiture in 1956 when it was agreed that AT&T would limit its manufacturing operations, would not enter new markets, would restrict itself in common carrier communications and grant licenses to those who applied for technical information. (Consent decree, 1967)

Prior to 1968, AT&T as a monopoly carrier, held that no one could connect equipment to the AT&T network because of potential harm to the network. Therefore AT&T provided the communications service and equipment. However, in 1968 the FCC decided in favor of Carter Electronics Corporation of Dales in their petition to connect their equipment to the AT&T network. The 1968 Carterphone decision though required that "protective" equipment be installed between the network and the non-Bell device which by 1977, was no longer required. This enabled consumers to buy and use telephones from other suppliers than Bell.

The above actions began an erosion of the Bell monopoly that culminated in divestiture of the twenty two operating telephone companies as settlement of yet another antitrust suit brought by the Justice department in 1974 ending on January 1, 1982. The divestiture agreement which went into effect on January 1, 1984 left AT&T corporate and long distance (which remained regulated despite the fact that their competition wasn't), Western Electric (manufacturing), and Bell Labs (research and development).

AT&T was thus required throughout its history to keep a strong focus on regulatory matters. Regulation had been a mixed blessing for while it limited competition it also limited business expansion. Now while partially deregulated, the government is seen as controlling and restricting. "The FCC, Justice Department, and Congress have made the task a nightmare. Pulling together business plans we are caught constantly in a time war implementing a plan on a certain set of assumptions and developing another plan on a different set." (Business Week, 9/26/83). Now AT&T is taking a "hard nosed attitude towards regulators" by direct attack through fierce lobbying to reduce limitations imposed (Business Week, 9/5/83). Chairman Brown accused the FCC of overspending the subsidizing of the competition (Business Week, 12/3/84).
Technology

Technology also opened AT&T into the open. AT&T was
prohibited from entering the data processing arena following
Computer Inquiry I, conducted from 1966 – 1971, which
determined that data processing and data communications were
two distinct functions. However, technological innovation
reduced this distinction and as a result of Computer Inquiry
II concluded in 1980 AT&T was allowed to enter the arena via
a separate subsidiary, American Bell, known as Baby Bell, on
January 1, 1983. AT&T already had the new data processing
technology available for in house use but could now
commercialize it. Thus before the major divestiture, part of
AT&T had already entered into the competitive environment.

The breakup of the giant AT&T set the stage for a
telecommunications upheaval (Time, 1/8/82). This also
reestablished the earlier driving forces of AT&T the emphasis
on innovation. But then innovation resulted from pushing new
technology not the dull of customer needs. Bell Labs had won
several Nobel prizes for creating new technologies, e.g. the
transistor and silicon chip. What was needed was to reduce
the time between development and production as well as to
focus on customer needs rather than pure basic research.
Many lamented this unnecessary constraint on Bell’s
scientists’ freedom and the restriction on publishing what
before was public information but was now proprietary
(Business Week, 12/3/84).

Competition

Prior to divestiture, AT&T existed in a regulatory
environment in which they were given a monopoly and protected
from competition. Vail convinced government regulators as
well as his management and employees that competition was
inefficient, wasteful, and would not allow achievement of
“universal service”. “Aggressive competition means
duplication of plant and investment” (Bell Annual report, 1973,
pp.60). The courts defined AT&T’s business and therefore
its competitors. AT&T was virtually without competition
until 1968 Carterphone decision. Yet the 1956 Consent Decree
severely restricted AT&T ability to compete outside a
narrowly defined range. The divestiture decree was a result
of competitors wanting a piece of AT&T action and AT&T wanting
a piece of theirs.

The new environment however is highly competitive
although some parts of AT&T remain regulated while the
competition is not: telephone equipment is completely
unregulated; long distance AT&T remains regulated while all
competitors are not; computers and other products are
unregulated. For example, the long distance market is
currently a mixed bag of monopoly and competitive players.
AT&T is subject to old monopoly regulation while others
operate without restriction. Competitors, while sharing the
cash, support their position as unregulated and AT&T as
regulated by citing the power of AT&T’s huge market share (90%-
they say) and vast resources which would crush fledgling
competitors. AT&T protests a market share between 60-65%
gaining to play the game by the same set of rules as its
competitors. However, with MCI having 5% market share and
GTE Sprint 4% (Wall Street Journal, 5/31/82), one wonders
about the missing piece of the pie. Regulation continues to
attempt to balance this out by ruling to absorption customers
that do not choose their long distance company based on
percentages of those that did (New York Times, 6/8/82).
According to reports, AT&T has lost market share in
equipment and long distance while it has increased market
share in international sales and automated office equipment
(Business Week, 12/8/84).

The architects of divestiture promised that competition
in the telecommunications industry would benefit users
through lower prices and new technologies. The major issue
or concern is AT&T's ability to compete. "To gain the
attention of phone users, the would-be Davids will be
flinging a variety of marketing weapons at Goliath AT&T."
Business Week, 2/13/84). Their major weakness is seen as
the lack of proven experience in a competitive environment.
Marketing under the old concept, "we're the only one in the
market and you've got to do business with us," has got to
change (Business Week, 9/5/83).

Customers

Given competition, the image changed as a service
oriented company to a market driven company. The customer
who was previously taken care of (if not somewhat passively)
was now calling the shots, making demands. Yet for some
customers there is a gap in the connection between service
and satisfaction. The array of options is bewildering, and
they are refusing to choose (New York Times, 6/8/82). One
customer said, "we've got all this choice, but I'm not sure I
wanted it" (Wall Street Journal, 12/17/84).

"It has already been a month since we passing out
Americans still miss Ma Bell" (Business Week, 12/8/84). Of
those surveyed, 64% compared with 25% thought the divestiture
was a bad idea -- a classic example of fixing something that
wasn't broken. Confusion reigns as thousands of customers
walked into AT&T offices thinking that they had to return
rented phones, up to 265,000 callers a day dialed AT&T toll
free number to find out "what's happening?" Waiting periods
for service were up to four months. Non-working phones posed
another problem as customers were expected to know whether
the problem was in the phone (and therefore AT&T) or in the
lines (the local companies' domain). The customers, like
kids in a divorce, were confused as to who was to take care
of what and were often caught in the middle of hostile
exchanges (e.g., "well they are supposed to take care of that", and
"It's not my job!"). The psychological impact of lost
done service which had been taken for granted ranges from
anxiety to panic and isolation -- not being able to reach or
be reached.

Most customers see the cost of service as more expensive. Cost of local service doubled as long distance rates no longer subsidized it. The cost of the breakup, $1.3 billion, is expected to be passed to the consumer. Revenues will also decrease with equal access and the ability to bypass AT&T and local facilities (e.g., via satellite dishes) resulting in higher rates to consumers. The final costs have not yet been tallied. Service seems worse and it costs more, so where is customer satisfaction? (see picture).

The Financial Community - Investors & Stockholders

The investment community, investors and stockholders were also confused and concerned. The stockholders in particular liked Ma Bell as one was. Besides, the new outfits did not sound like a phone company (What's NYNEX?). The once comfortable, minimum risk stock characterized by predictable earnings was known as the stock of widows and orphans. Even in the Great Depression AT&T continued to pay its dividends. This image of stability and reliability meant that "when it comes to trading, that classic stock of widows and orphans hasn't been a splashy performer." (Fortune, 11/28/83). Given divestiture Chairman Brown conceded, "...AT&T will likely never again be the reliable stock that it was for much of this century...as long as the company enters new, volatile business and faces an uncertain regulatory environment (New York Times, 12/27/84). In fact, the divested regional companies now directly compete for investment and are seen as "good places to park the widows and orphans funds that no longer belong at high-risk AT&T" (Business Week, 12/3/84).

For the investment community, divestiture was the largest corporate event in history, likened to the Hajj as the greatest divestiture story ever told. So while AT&T stock was approached with caution and uncertainty in its ability to perform, it was also seen as creating terrific opportunity for arbitrage and investment bankers to share in the financial feast brought by divestiture. Special trading costs were created to handle the anticipated trading activity. Special trusts and mutual funds (Fighting Dusty funds) were created to put the pieces back together again - to make it easier on stockholders to manage the paperwork as they now held stock in AT&T and the regionals as well (Fortune, 11/28/83; Time, 11/21/83).

Thus the legendary stability was replaced by the need to prove high earnings growth (New York Times, 12/4/83). "Earn well to serve well" belonged to the past - it was no longer sufficient. "Now the aim is to maximize long-term value of our share owners assets via stable growth, increasing asset turnover, reducing debt, lowering break even points by making hard choices re market opportunities" (J. Brown, 3/1/83). The "street" was uncertain about AT&T's ability to adjust to the newly deregulated competitive environment. AT&T lost triple A ratings from Moody after 20 years because of the perceived
risk of managing the split up and entering new markets (Wall Street Journal, 3/11/83).

Although financial results were disappointing for 1984, future prospects are thought to be good due to the end of the disruptive effects of divestiture, huge economies of scale affording efficiencies, strong financial resources and an assumption that regulatory barriers should be removed (Wall Street Journal, 12/13/84). Analysts are hopeful. They were pleased by pay freezes, employee layoffs and plant closings—signs that the excess fat was to be trimmed. Chairman Brown summarized the necessary steps taken in the 1984 Annual Report: "One of the principal adjustments we have had to make is to lower our cost structure and improve our margins. We had to come to grips with the fact that not all the work done when we were "the telephone company" has a place in this new business environment—and that we could operate with a much smaller management force. As a result, jobs have been eliminated through attrition, voluntary and involuntary layoffs." The steps necessary to formulate a new positive financial image were starkly at odds with the former benign image of the paternalistic employer.

Leaders and Employees

Employees

"The essence of this organization is not found in corporate names or boundaries. It is found in the people and the spirit of the aggregation...as vital and dynamic as ever." (Charles Brown, 9/83). Over one million employees had to adapt to a new external and internal environment. All employees were divided among AT&T and the seven regional companies. Those remaining with AT&T saw the pillars of their culture crack and the walls come tumbling down. Every change in the firm's external posture affected the employee from the high tech image presented to the financial community, to the market driven competitor portrayed to customers in advertising campaigns. Employees saw job stability vanish with layoffs, plant closings, salary freezes and inducements to retire. The spirit of service eroded as work groups previously highly interdependent in facilitating customer transactions were no longer permitted to talk to one another by rules of divestiture. Bewildered customers were told that they had to deal with the other groups themselves. Care taking was replaced by risk taking—"And as we begin to move the enterprises in new directions, there has emerged within the company a spirit of managing more aggressively and of coming to decisions faster—a spirit of being on the move." (AT&T Annual Report, 1984). Consensus and deliberate decision making were discouraged as a bias for action was promoted.

Those valued previously were engineers with operating and technical skills. The new company needed high powered marketers and sales skills. The company needed to recognize and reward entrepreneurial types. Out of the Bell System
sense of family, a salesman had been promoted from the ranks and assigned new jobs based on seniority (on union demand). The results were disastrous (Fortune, 11/14/83). Up from the ranks promotion was confronted with accelerated hiring of marketing and sales people at management level from the outside, initiating a tough new national sales school and requiring both old and new sales people to pass a certification test weeded out the nonconformists. The image of the Bell jeansed person, a conformist, sat in the company ways, wearing polyester leisure suits was a company man. They were team players not streetfighters, not General union risk/nignt reward individualists (Maccoby, 1976). The dowdy order taken was replaced by the professional sales consultant, initiating the IBM look down to dark suits, white shirts and wingtips. The reorganization has created political infighting - a dog eat dog environment - where there had been before one big happy family (BUSINESS WEEK, 9/26/83).

The ground rules, the old culture had changed, replaced with ambiguity and uncertainty. At a recent reunion, former AT&T employees complained that management by obfuscation seemed to be the rule; the new direction was unclear; uncertainty was delegated; there was an overwhelming inability to decide and a lack of accountability. Leadership was missing - "no Iacocca feeling" - as the chairman was seen as a silent not charismatic leader. Many felt that they were doing the company a favor by leaving. Someone asked, "Is all this B.S. our new culture?"

Leaders and heroes

An important and clearly visible image for analysis is the firm's corporate hero. Rewarding, idolizing and encouraging the maverick entrepreneur or the straight and narrow bureaucrat reveals much about the firm's values and beliefs and provides role models for employees to follow (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). The image of the AT&T hero has almost come full circle - from entrepreneurial hero to bureaucratic hero to seeking (but not yet fully accepting) entrepreneurial heroes again. AT&T was born through the efforts of an entrepreneur Alexander Graham Bell and the survival of the firm today may very well depend on AT&T's ability to again accept an entrepreneurial hero. Recent efforts at establishing one failed as Archie McGill recruited from IBM was offered up as an idol but left as a fallen god. The heroes between Bell and McGill were bureaucrats.

Theodore Vail joined in 1878 leaving the U.S. Post Office. Vail provided the needed business direction or mission as a natural monopoly focusing on service, high quality, low cost, easily accessible telephones and an extensive telephone network. Others saw a financial mission focusing on returns to stockholders rather than reinvestment for extension. Vail left in 1887 but returned in 1907 initiating the six word mission statement "One System, One
Policy: Universal Service*. Much of the bureaucratic structure prior to divestiture bears his stamp. The spirit of service was his contribution as well. During this time, multiple heroes personifying this spirit emerged. Norman Rockwell was commissioned to illustrate John J. Toolan, a linesman at work on the telephone pole. The portrait of Angus McDonald at work in a blizzard is another example. Service as encouraged beyond the company walls. In 1971 AT&T employees founded the Telephone Pioneers, who continue to provide community service as volunteers.

The hiring of Archie McGill in the 1970s was a clear signal of the desire to resuscitate an entrepreneurial nerve thought necessary to ready AT&T for the new competitive environment and to break the bureaucratic crust. His 10 year tenure ceased when he was removed as head of AT&T Advanced Information Systems, a newly competitive venture. Although offered another position he left. His demise is attributed to his being a threat to the “old guard”. McGill was described as having a “confrontative, adversarial style, the antithesis of the traditional Bell shaped man” (Business Week, 10/27/80). He was an innovator, an entrepreneur, not a team player. Despite management’s stated desire to change from being bureaucratic to entrepreneurial, the new subculture headed by McGill was not strong enough to overcome the hidden agenda, or the underlying assumptions which remained bureaucratic.

Another example of a failed attempt to provide entrepreneurial leadership is that of William Beulher, an up from the ranks 19 year AT&T veteran. Inspired by In Search of Excellence (Peter &Watson, 1984), Beulher replaced the “spirit of service” with “The customer is king”, “reward results not process”, and “keep it simple”. Operating under a “bias for action” meant cutting through red tape, making decisions without undue delay. Beulher eliminated “...Bell’s patronage of endless memos, interminable meetings and strict chain of command. Instead discarded planning manuals, threw out employee tests, and salespeople on the highest commission-based compensation plan in AT&T history and fired those who couldn’t meet his tough quotas” (Wall Street Journal, 12/16/83). Although his sales rose far in excess of objectives and was described as “the kind of guy you’d want to kill for” by his employees, within 12 months he was transferred to an obscure corporate planning position. Two reasons for his demise circulated: a necessary consolidation of staff and his being a menace to the Bell culture. “As a result the new corporate culture that he created has been weakened, if not snuffed out” (Wall Street Journal, 12/16/83).

McGill and Beulher pushed the mainstream culture. The newly espoused values and beliefs were incongruent with the underlying assumptions. Although tolerated as a minor subculture, once they crossed the invisible boundaries of the old guard they were shot down. “For years AT&T had developed an organization of almost consciously average, low key,
likeable people called Bell smacked men." (Deal & Kennedy, 1963). Mobil and Eunther were neither average nor low key.

While simultaneously clinging to the bureaucrat and spirit of service hero and searching for a new entrepreneur, AT&T lacks a strong cohesive new image today. This void may be symptomatic of the underlying assumptions or values in flux.

Evaluating the role of images in enhancing corporate culture

At AT&T, starting in 1976, the culture that was planted has developed and been passed along to generations creating a strong, cohesive culture. Although some consistently link strong culture with success (Peters & Waterman, 1984), it may not be correlated with effectiveness (Schein, 1984). The strong culture that served AT&T so well prior to divestiture, is now a potential roadblock to future success. If successful strategy implementation requires matching the strategy and culture (Schwartz & Davis, 1981; Davis, 1982; Turanski, 1985), then the culture that facilitated implementation in a regulated environment may become a barrier to implementation in a competitive environment.

Culture change is a difficult and lengthy process recurring changes in beliefs not just behavior to achieve long term results (Sabo, 1983). AT&T needs to change from a comfortable, protected and protective, benign organization with a stable rate of financial return (Ma Bell image) to an entrepreneurial risk taking, profit oriented organization (? image). It is not an easy task to change attitudes, beliefs and actions that have been based on for generations of AT&T employees.

According to Schein's (1984) model, culture can be analyzed on multiple interrelated levels: artifacts, values and basic assumptions. Basic assumptions represent the underlying world view, the manner of perceiving and interpreting the environment. They are difficult to verbalize as they become taken for granted. Artifacts are the most visible aspects of culture and include dress, architecture, stories, behavior and images. Understanding the symbolic meaning of images can reveal a firm's values and beliefs and lead to uncovering the basic assumptions. The current images are not consistent with the basic assumptions of the old culture. The change in images before and after are shown in Table 1.

The essential question remains as to whether change in corporate culture can be created by changing images or whether changing images merely reflect change in culture. Changing images may facilitate culture change by creating new models or heroes, new visions and by reinforcing this in speeches, internal and external communications, advertisements, etc. Thus images could serve the same purpose as myths which can be created to facilitate change and can be diagnostic of the change process itself (Boje et al., 1976).

It is also possible, however, that while the images have changed, the facade altered, the underlying assumptions have
not. This is similar to the argument that while behaviors can change through compliance, the underlying beliefs and values remain static (Sathe, 1983). This issue was raised at last year's conference in the case of BAS - did increased selling signify that the culture had changed? How is it possible to measure whether new values and beliefs, or underlying assumptions regarding views of self, world and others have truly been incorporated? The Kilsman & Sexton Culture Gap Survey (1984) does not resolve the issue as its focus is behavioral. It also measures what is and what should be but neglects to measure what was.

The research project planned by the author (E. Powley) intends to develop a culture rating to measure what was, what is and what should be in order to include some measure of change, albeit perceived. This method however also relies on self-report and does not access the issue of culture change at its service - compliance or wishful thinking - as opposed to reality. Other indications are necessary such as market share, financial performance, number of new products and markets entered and success of strategy implementation. This study will measure the gap between those market strategies planned and implemented - the intended and the emergent (Mintzberg, 1978), as related to the perceptions of culture change. This hopefully will shed some light on whether the hidden underlying assumptions necessary for dealing in a new environment - highly competitive and technological - have evolved. One can suppose that the amount of resistance encountered or failed implementation hints at the tenacity of the old assumptions. Truly changing the culture at AT&T is expected to be a slow process.

There remains however the lurking suspicion that although behavior may change in terms of performance at the individual as well as organizational level, change in culture still needs to be demonstrated. Can one act differently yet remain unchanged? Could AT&T gain market share, develop new products and markets, perform spectacularly and still be Ma Bell or will there indeed be a new company arisen from the ashes? The behaviorists and the psychoanalysts have been battling this one out for the last century. Does change in character structure precede behavioral change or vice versa? What is real change?

Changing images is most likely important but not sufficient - "...a glossy new image is only a thin veneer over the mass of problems" (Business Week, 12/3/84). For change to occur, other mechanisms are necessary. Reward systems need to be restructured (Sethia & Von Glisch, 1985). At AT&T salaries are now based on a commission-type structure i.e. tied to group performance. Part of salary has been made "at risk", i.e. can be earned back only by performance. Incentives exist as more can be earned beyond that level. Stock option plans are being offered for the first time (Business Week, 12/3/84). These policies undo the previous civil service system.

Hiring and firing are other mechanisms (Sathe, 1983).
AT&T hired Mr. Gill and other ex-IBMers to bring in new blood yet the system initially rejected the "foreign bodies". Continued new hiring is difficult given the present efforts to cut costs through layoffs, attrition and M&As. Turnover can result in good people leaving while the "deadwood" remains having nowhere to go. Several who had left have returned as consultants at half pay (Wall Street Journal, 12/17/84). The old paternalism expressed as guilt over getting rid of deadwood has resulted in more chairs at higher levels (too many chiefs), slowing positions, and people assigned to work that they have no background or training for. Middle managers complain that they were being asked to do what upper management wasn't doing - laying off. Thus problems firing interfere with new hiring. Marketers are needed to be developed and positioned in high places to influence strategy. To bring in a marketing pro from a high-technology company (from the outside) as CEO or COO is unusual as AT&T is notoriously inward. "If the company asked ballerinas it would take some telephone operators and train them" (Wall Street Journal, 2/28/84).

New socialization practices include specialized training and new dress codes - from polyester leisure suits to IBM dress for success uniforms. Bias for action and hands-on management is demonstrated by Randall Tobias, president of AT&T Consumer Products Division. At a consumer electronics show he pushed onto the sales floor a director of engineering, a product manager and an AT&T lawyer (Wall Street Journal, 2/28/84).

Change in structure can also facilitate culture change. The former functional structure with its rigid hierarchy, strict chain of command and centralized decision making has been replaced by divisional lines of business with profit and loss responsibility. "AT&T must push down decision making to give more people and ideas a chance and then reward for such input" (T. E. Bolger, former EVP and now CEO of Bell Atlantic Corp., Wall Street Journal, 2/28/84). These mechanisms will reinforce new values. The primary task for AT&T leadership will be to redefine its values and make them. Strong charismatic leadership is necessary yet there is an apparent vacuum as the next CEO is in the wings.

How will AT&T manage the change? The Chinese symbol for crisis signifies both danger and opportunity. The ability to turn threat into opportunity is the mark of a successful company strategy. AT&T's ability to integrate past strengths with new capability and skills while it limits its weaknesses to avoid pitfalls will determine how the Phoenix arises.

"When one door closes, another opens. But we do often look so long and so regretfully upon the closed door that we do not see the one which has been opened for us." (Alexander Graham Bell in Bell Telephone Magazine, 1903, 43/4).

Given recent trends in the international arena towards deregulation (Japan AT&T) (Business Week, 6/10/85) and privatization (England) of the phone system, AT&T's painful lessons should serve as a warning and as an example. With
competition the major concern in the international arena as is the case in the U.S. is the fragmentation of services.

In some countries in Africa it is impossible to call from one side of the country to the other because the telephone systems are not interconnected. This warns of potential inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Barriers to integration exist as host countries are concerned about national security, personal information disclosure and profit drained out of their countries. This has resulted in restrictions on international data transfers, and protectionism. Another issue is raised in the transfer of high technology to developing countries without the necessary skills and knowledge for use. International joint ventures and cooperation raise the potential for synergy and the hope for truly universal service, new products and technology that can bring the world the opportunity for better communication.

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<th>CHANGING IMAGES</th>
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| | street fighter |
| | individualists |
| | sales skills |
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| | entrepreneurs |
| | outsiders |
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ORGANIZATIONS, IMAGE AND SUBSTANCE: SOME ASPECTS ON THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF CULTURAL MANAGEMENT RESEARCH

Introduction

Needless to say, the management and organization research of the 70's express a tremendous interest in cultures, symbols, symbolic operations, myths, stories, organization's images and identities and similar phenomena, concepts and aspects.

The focusing on these aspects and the broad gathering of scholars and other interested persons in the culture/symbolism field(s) has led to some interesting illuminations of new phenomena or phenomena earlier studied but far from extensively understood and aspects of organizations and life in organization. It has also contributed to some development of methodological/metatheoretical nature while pointing at the shortcomings of quantitative research for a number of problems and aspects of organizations and showing the appropriateness of qualitative methods.

In this sense, the culture/symbolism orientation might be seen as a part of the theoretical development of organization analysis and a contribution to the ongoing, neverending academic work with the creation of more and more advanced theoretical models for the understanding of reality. This is a reasonable view, but to understand the current vague of culture/symbolism studies, externalistic aspects must be included. These concern the societal context of these studies. Researchers in the field seem to view their work solely as governed by internal scientific determinants (in opposition to non-scientific, i.e. societal factors) and as a part of a trend towards more and more elaborated, complex, deeper, broader and more accurate and (perhaps) useful models, descriptions and theories (e.g. Berg, 1982 b; Dandridge et al., 1985). This is a too simple and a too idealistic view on how the "progress" of science takes place. Disciplines like the sociology of science and knowledge, theory and philosophy of science have shown that the development of theory is much more complex. External determinants for not only what is being researched and how this is done, but also for the content of theories are considered very important (e.g. Braine, 1980; Elzinga & Jamison, 1984). The external factors are probably particularly important when a certain research area or tradition very rapidly is growing and gaining academic respectability, which is the case for the orientation and research field here being discussed. The culture/symbolism research and theory can be assumed to be heavily influenced by the particular societal context around it (Alvesson, 1984 a).

People engaged in social research (and probably other types of research as well) provide a better contribution to theory and knowledge if they in their theoretical work take into consideration the context of the intellectual situation they are in, and account for this in terms of its implications for the understanding of the objects under study. This means that the researchers texts should express an awareness of how the social level provides a background and force of impact on what empirical data and theoretical analysis brings about. A problem is of course that most researchers, in a field, are not aware of the overall frame of reference and the origin and the determinants of this. That insight is perhaps the most important from the debates on "paradigms". However, reflection on these matters and ambitions of researchers to look not only at their theories and the empirical objects being studied, but also at the social and cultural context of themselves and their worlds, should increase that awareness. Through that, a better understanding of theories and results could be achieved. The characteristics of a "critical theory" might be seen as an ideal for how this aspect could be treated.
"Critical theories ... are claimed to be 'reflective' or 'self-referential,' a critical theory is itself always a part of the object-domain which it describes; critical theories are always in part about themselves." (Geuss, 1981:155)

It seems reasonable to expect that research on organizational culture should express a particular high degree of awareness of the social and cultural conditions in its context, affecting the intellectual work being done and the present popularity of the research orientation. However, such an awareness does not normally characterize texts on organizational culture/symbolism and similar topics.

In this paper I try to contribute to such an awareness, and to the interest for self-reflection within that field (and indirectly to organizational analysis and similar disciplines in general. More specifically, my purpose is to illuminate how the recently "discovered" theoretical views on organizations and life in organizations could be seen as not primarily or at least not solely part of science's progress, but as theoretical responses "triggered off" by problematic features of present society, culture and the type of psychology characterizing man of today. In doing so, I shall give particular interest to two topics: Organizational image and ideology in organizations (and in academic thinking about organizational.

Business problems - and societal problems

The popularity of the organizational culture topic is of course closely connected to some problems in Western corporations. Productivity decline, motivation problems and hard competition in the growing field of Japanese companies are factors that open the way for the culture aspects in management and organization. The success of the book "In Search of Excellence" (Peters & Waterman 1982) might also contribute to explain the interest. Basically, however, that book's success depends on the mentioned factors, although it might have strengthened the interest and the trend by some qualities of the book.

The economic problems of some Western corporations do not explain why organizational culture/symbolism became so popular, not why Peters & Waterman's book (of all the potential bestsellers) is being sold in millions of copies. There were probably a number of topics in management that could be chosen as a salvation theory, but culture/symbolism was the lucky one. How come?

One way to answer this question is to point at some characteristics of the late-capitalistic/post-industrial society and its general culture. I suggest that some features of the latter provides a ground for the apparently felt "needs" for dealing with the culture and symbolism aspects of organizational life and the managerial control of people in organizations.

A brilliant study trying to capture the last decades' development and present situation of societal culture has been conducted by Ziehe & Stubenrauch (1982). The focus of this study is on the rise of a "new culture" and the new psychological aspects of younger people, but the analysis is valid for late-capitalistic culture in its totality. Ziehe & Stubenrauch start by pointing at two related tendencies in the development of late-capitalistic societies: the increasing technocraticization of different life areas and a destruction of traditions. By increased rationalization, they mean the growth of goal rational organizational structures and a functional division of labor in a society that is divided into two parts: the industrial and the service sector. This fragmentation of social totality, both on a societal and an individual level, is the major driving force behind the "new culture." 

The destruction of (earlier) integrated cultural patterns is a consequence of various trends in society: decreased importance of religion and religious morality, reduction of the significance of generational and sexual roles, changing relationships to authority, to class issues and to sexual morality, the retreat of the traditional work ethic, the expansion of massmedia, the institutionalization of a hedonistic consumption life style and so on.

These tendencies are a result of changes in the economy. The capitalist economy has earlier left the cultural sphere a certain degree of autonomy, Ziehe & Stubenrauch claim. During the latest 10-15 years, the "modernization process" has affected the cultural patterns and disrupted the continuing development of these. The cultural sphere has been invaded by mass society and exploited by it. Ziehe & Stubenrauch talk about "Kulturelle Fremdungs", the rather sudden appearance of a cultural vacuum. While fifty years ago we lived in a strong, coherent, integrated culture, which formed a well-integrated sense of identity, the social situation of today is characterized by a weak, disrupted and fragmented societal culture. This seems to be reflected in the characters of the people. Today, the psychic suffering dominating in Freud's time, with conversion hysteria, obsessive-compulsive neurosis and other expressions of psycho-sexual conflicts has been replaced by psychic problems of a more diffuse nature, and normally labeled as character disorders, in which identity problems and a distorted sense of the self are prevalent (Alvesson, 1984; Kohut, 1977; Lasch, 1979).

Ziehe & Stubenrauch suggest that the cultural changes bring about a character with, in relation to the earlier common character, an identity that is in certain sense weaker, more vulnerable but also more flexible and less prone to disciplination under repressive social conditions (like in boring and hastily controlled work). A "heating up" of the need for "subjectivity", for feeling involved, for meaning and gratification as a condition for psychic well-being, characterizes most people of today in a much higher degree than people just twenty years ago.

Other social psychologists, sociologists and historians describe in a similar way the cultural development and present situation. Lasch (1979) talks about "The narcissistic culture" and gives the picture of a fragmented society and fragmented individuals, with weak moral, ethics and superego where the sense of a coherent self is tried to be achieved through compensatory acts in consumption, of people and relations as well as products and therapies, and in a passionate hunt for gratification and grandiosity. Baudrillard (1985), drawing on an analogy with physics, suggests that the rapid change of present society brings about a lack of meaning, integration and an ability to distance oneself from the rapid changes taking place.

...we experience, in all our societies...an acceleration of all bodies, all movements, and all processes in every direction... Every fact, every political, historical and cultural characteristic gets in power of its extension through the mass media a climatic force, that for ever takes it away from its own space and forces it to a hyper space, were it totally loses direction while it never well return from there." (Baudrillard, 1985:26)

The general societal fragmentation, the loss of integrated cultural patterns, the "anomic" character of social life and the loss of the traditionally internalized work ideology, a "motivation crisis" toward traditional work conditions, and the rapidly changes in those conditions during the latest time might be seen as a general cultural background of greatest significance for a number of intellectual streams, not only organizational culture/symbolism research but also the narcissism debate, post-modernity, post-structuralism etc.
A response to cultural fragmentation: Organizational culture

One of the most important aspects of management and organizational analysis as a practice and as an academic discipline is that they deal with problems of social integration, that is to ensure the smooth cooperation of the people and group involved in the project and the subordination of these under the (more or less) sovereign regime of management. Various forms of organization and management practice have different abilities to bring about social integration. Some, which can be labelled "hard" methods draw on Tayloristic-bureaucratic ideas, aim to direct control and high productivity are probably less effective in terms of integration than "soft" theories, like human relations ideas, which are ideologically more appealing (Alvesson, 1985a). It might be argued that the latter theories are mainly used for providing social integration and not primarily for attaining technical efficiency (Alvesson, 1985b).

The organizational culture approach might be seen as a rather extreme way of dealing with the social integration problems. Organizations are here normally viewed in a way that heavily stresses the integrative aspects. Scholars are talking about "a system of shared and meaningful symbols" (Allaire & Firmin, 1984), "a shared system of values, norms and symbols" (Louis, 1981), symbols functioning as sources of "system maintenance" (Sandridge et al, 1980) and so on. The disintegrative aspects of organizations, loosely couplings, conflicts, contradictions and the heterogeneity of the people involved in the organization are heavily downplayed. The basic idea is to see organizations as (at least potentially) united, homogenous, well-integrated, consensual entities, and to produce knowledge that can be used to strengthen those qualities.

The present pluralistic situation in organization theory provides good opportunities for researchers to choose perspective and metaphors from a very large sample. Organizations apparently can be seen as social organisms, political systems, machines, psychic prisons, theatres, cultures, cultural products, arenas of social interests and conflicts, psychological defences, emotional fields, strategic games etc (Berg, 1982; Morgan, 1990). The present popularity of cultural perspective and metaphor should be understood as an answer to the appearance of particular problems in the social order. The manifestation in organizational life of the societal and individual problems with cultural unity, integration, coherent cultural patterns and identity is the base for the current interest in organizational culture.

The focusing of the cultural aspect of organizations can be understood as an effort to concentrate on the particular problems in society. The "strong" organizational culture thus becomes an appealing "solution" to problems with fragmentation, anomic and weakened and vulnerable identities. It is the felt needs and wishes of people that account for the tremendous sales of books like "Corporate Cultures" (Deal & Kennedy, 1982) and "In Search of Excellence" (Peters & Waterman, 1982).

The general cultural fragmentation in society is to a large extent caused by the development of corporations. Modern productions are characterized by extensive division of labor, low degree of task identity and experienced social significance of a particular person's job, of large-scale organization forms and high social mobility. This partly explains the attractiveness of the culture idea in organizations. To increase cultural integration appears as an achievable objective.

There certainly is a relationship between social integration and effectiveness in a more technical sense (productivity, innovativeness) but this is rather unclear. A too high degree of integration creates problems (rigidity, conformism, lack of new ideas) as does a too low degree of integration (disorder, coordination problems, opposition, conflicts, turnover), too inappropriate, from an instrumental (effectiveness) point of view, of increased social integration and, thus, efforts to deal with the culture dimension of organizations depends on an organization's specific situation and the specific situation of the societal context. During the 1950s and 60s there did not seem to be any "needs" for doing so. It is not coincidental that it is not until now that the link between organizational culture and performance have been fully "discovered". Probably there didn't exist any such link significant enough to be found and considered to be a key one before the end of the 1970s. This connection is valid only in a particular historical and cultural situation, at least when the connection is formulated in the way it is today.

The specific linkage between culture and performance is also badly understood in a large part of the literature in the field of today. Assumptions that decision making becomes better due to values/systems that clearly what ideals work strongly for or that people are more satisfied and work harder in a "strong" cultural context, because this satisfies people's need (Deal & Kennedy, 1982) might be questioned. A strong or particular valued and belief system might be a source of "irrationality" (Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1989), motivation research suggests that increased satisfaction does not cause better performances (Schwalb & Cummings, 1970).

Probably the most certain assumption we can make on the relationship between culture and organizational functioning is that a more powerful culture in organizations can solve or reduce problems of social integration, for example increase the willingness to subordination, the acceptance of the present order, loyalty, feelings of similarity and satisfaction, a sense of connection between self, work and the organization, the "covering" over a alienation in regards of work content and control over work, and decrease conflicts, frustrations, employee turnover, sabotage and other forms of lloval behaviour (including "egoism" and loyalty to subgroups in opposition to management), union problems and so on. Certain cultural forms in organizations, like the strong working class might of course result in the opposite effects, but this aspect of organizational culture is normally neglected in the integration oriented research and does not account for the present interest in organizational culture.

From substance to image

The general cultural situation explains the present preoccupation with issues like culture, identity, profit and image in organizational analysis. The elaboration of these concepts are grounded in a rapidly changing and more and more problematic social order - and a potential disorder - which makes the mentioned aspects perceived as important. An example of this is the concretization of organization culture to a concept of "corporate identity" (Berg, 1985). The analogy suggests that strengthening of the organization identity environment of the individual's identities. Berg is also actually talking about "identity", which is defined as the process through which a social system develops its potentials, and is generally indicated the similarities in functioning between individuals, e.g. organizational members, and collectivities, i.e. organizations.

In a society or an organization where the identity of the individuals was clearly based in the substantial activities of the collective, the need to focus on the "identity" of the corporation as a specific topic idea to be treated would hardly appear. It is the identity problems in our general culture (including the parts of it that exist in corporations) that accounts for the preoccupation with corporate identities. In the same way it is real problems with the meaning of work that accounts for the latest "innovation" in leadership theory, stressing the advantages of "management of meaning" (e.g. Smircich & Morgan, 1983). It is the loss of meaning or at least such a lack of clarity of what the individual's work related tasks and organizational work really is supposed to be, that the question becomes a task for managers. In a society and in organizations where tasks
correspond to a whole and the utility (social significance) of the products were self-evident, the need for a particular actor communicating the meaning would be obscure.

Something similar can be said of the image of the organization. Image can be defined as the aggregated view of a particular object being held by a specific public. It might also be viewed as a tool for management (Normann, 1983). The latter opinion expressed an extremely instrumental definition of the subject, which is probably significant for our present time. A key word to understand the interaction between people involved in “image creation” or, to use business language, “image management”, is distance. It is of course possible to use the term in all of the contexts, to talk about the image of one’s wife, dog, work or oneself, but to use the word in that sense is rather pointless. An image is primarily a picture of something developed by a person or a public about an object in the absence of frequent interaction with a deep relation with, good knowledge of or close contact with the object. An image is something we get primarily through coincidental, infrequent, superficial and/or mediated information, through mass media, public appearances, from second hand sources etc., not through our own direct and lasting experiences and perceptions of the “core” of the object upon which we have an image. This view is at least the most reasonable one to use when it comes to the types of images of relevance for this paper.

It is very problematic to talk about “objective reality” in social science and normally I do not, but for sake of clarity I shall do so in some sentences. An image differs always more or less from the “objective reality” it is assumed to cover. The difference does not necessarily have to be a matter of the image being false, but more a question of selectivity, inadequacy, uncritical attitude towards it or something like that. A too large difference might be problematic for a corporation, but no management is interested in image management which equally stresses the positive and negative sides of the business. Image management’s objective is to produce an appealing picture of the company for various publics.

An interesting and significant issue is that not only external groups, with normally far from perfect knowledge of the corporation in question, but also employees have become viewed as an important audience for the image issue. Image management and internal marketing, whose target groups are employees are hot topics in today’s management theory. Again, I believe, we can understand this better if we consider changes in the historical-societal context. I shall describe these changes as a development from substance to image.

This formulation of development in modern society tries to capture some important, interrelated, tendencies. These concern the very nature of society and culture, its socio-structural and socio-material characteristics which have changed from having formed a unity, in which social relations, the material aspects of existence and the cultural patterns were well integrated and easily understandable to becoming more and more fragmented and “artifical” (for example automation, information technology, professional people employed for taking care of human services etc.). In a certain sense, we can say that society’s “substantial nature has been reduced. This is indicated in the writings of many of the cultural sociologists of today (Baudrillard, Lasch, ziephel). Instead, the “imaginary” nature of today’s society is dominant. The impressions and pictures we get of political and organizational leaders, people we interact with (on an often short-time and superficial basis), the objects (like commodities) we are dealing with (in and outside work) and the general view of the total world as it appears to us are, as said above, often superficial. We live in a complex world, characterized by interaction between a lot of different people (of whom most are barely known), production processes where the relationship between the single employees efforts and tasks and the final product is very hard to recognize, and where most people and situations we have knowledge of are heavily mediated by mass media, P R and so on. In short, we get a large number of pictures and
Most organizations are of course neither "substance" or "image" in the terms here mentioned. These are analytical concepts. Historically, I believe we can talk about organizations that ever could be characterized as belonging to a social order, that is, which a person works, its top management, the purpose ("identity") and other (or perhaps how the visibility becomes very ambiguous) for the person.

It is in this context we can understand the preoccupation with the image of an organization, a preoccupation that not only includes external groups but also the employees in the organization. We might of course talk about the image of an object even if the person who holds the image of an object holds an object. But this is rather pointless and of limited interest from an instrumental (management) point of view. It is when an organization becomes difficult to perceive by its members that the organization becomes an interesting topic.

**Final words**

The interest behind "image analysis" and "image management" can be defined negatively or positively. The negative aspects concern the evolving problems getting a clear picture of the context of one's work situation, of understanding the organization the corporation to the employees might be viewed as a small group of modern enterprises. In a positive sense, the evolving for larger groups to control other people's definition of reality - have been improved. Is now seen, not as a subordinate aspect of instrumental, supportive, participative, democratic, etc leadership, but as an important topic in itself. A critical way of formulating the issue is to say that it is weakened possibilities of that are the basis for the present campaigns of managers, supported by researchers and consultants, to anchor their views of the organizational reality in the minds of the that forms the basis for the potential success of managers in using mass media as internal means (like top managers making themselves visible and saying/doing the "appropriate" definitions of reality for the employees of the corporation).
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In the study reported here, we were concerned to discern the possible outlines of the culture of an abortion clinic. This was a small pilot study intended to yield qualitatively rich data quickly and inexpensively to guide the design of a larger programme of research.

We would define a 'corporate culture' as an ordered set of practical values, themes and routines originating in, and providing solutions for, problems directly encountered in the work process. The corporate culture of the clinic is not separable from the work itself. It is "part of the same setting that it makes orderable". We distinguish below between the corporate culture of an organisation and the various segmental cultures e.g. professional and managerial, which serve to crystallise the interests of various groups within the organisation.

In the study we sought to elicit the intimate reflections of a doctor and a nurse on the everyday encounters in which they accomplish their actions and realise their projects. The problems of managing this type of work stem from the powerful feelings and values which surround the issue of abortion. The study sought to engage these values and feelings by eliciting native reflections on 'critical' events in the work process. It was felt that the distinctive culture, centred on the particular character of abortion work in a Francophone, Catholic community in Canada would be disclosed, at least in shadow relief, in these native reflections.

By eliciting native reflections on 'critical' events within the work process, the corporate culture supporting that process is made more visible. By critical events we mean those events (selected by the
researcher a priori or discovered in the course of a preliminary investigation) which render the accomplishment of the work most problematical, or which are central to the resolution of fundamental problems.

A fuller description of the method has been presented elsewhere. It involved treating our two subjects as (potentially) skilful informants on the lived experience of the work process, capable of making their ongoing thoughts, feelings and perceptions, in the very process of imaginatively re-living events in their work, fully visible to us.

We did not interview the subject in the normal way but utilised a technique which we felt would better permit the sense of her lived experience to determine the content and form of the utterance. We asked each subject to relive imaginatively certain real, historical events that had occurred in the course of her work. We asked her to treat these events as though they were happening right now and to run a commentary on them, to tell us everything that occurred to her, all her thoughts, feelings and perceptions, everything that would enable us to know as much about what was happening as she did. We asked her to make these events present to us and we required that she use the present tense throughout her commentary. This latter constraint was considered essential and was more or less strictly adhered to.

The culture that we see shadowed in these reflections is what we would term the 'corporate culture' of the clinic. It is important to distinguish, however, between the corporate culture of an organisation as an ordered set of solutions to the problematic aspects of its principle day-to-day encounters, and the various cultures which co-exist within an organisation but which are extr-organisational or cross-cut many organisations or which are centred on identifiable groups within the organisation. Members of an organisation may belong to a professional culture or a union culture, to a bureaucratic or a managerial culture, to a national, religious or a local culture and so forth. Any or all of these may support the identity of an organisational member and affect his actions within the organisation. As Gregory (1983) has pointed out, these cultures should not be seen as subcultures of an overall corporate culture. We propose to designate these cultures, co-existing within the organisation, 'segmental cultures'. Although they will not concern us here, it is necessary to distinguish them from the corporate culture which they undoubtedly influence.

Segmental cultures may be seen as influencing the formation of corporate culture in two ways. In the first place, they constrain the solutions available to actors in the organisation's principal encounters. If the member of an organisation is a doctor, a nurse or an official, than professional or bureaucratic segmental cultures will certainly constrain the options that members can take up in the realisation of a corporate culture. Secondly, segmental cultures frequently give rise to ideologies presenting, in a more or less abstract and one-sided way, particular conceptualisations of the organisation's problems together with proposed solutions. These are distinguished by being higher-order, theoretical and prescriptive formulations.

What we call the corporate culture, on the other hand, is a practical set of values, actions and arrangements-in-use, which may be more or
less theoretically articulated. Thus, the corporate culture is seen as a normative articulation of actual practise, of the flow of events, of happenings, of changings and continuings, in which the sinewy and sensuously experienced day-to-day world is lived.

The Selection of Critical Encounters

In the present study we selected two situations as 'critical' in the work process of the abortion clinic. One situation was selected because we felt it was the situation which rendered the work process most problematical. By problematical, we do not mean something which merely obstructs or frustrates the work process, but something which engenders a crisis at the most fundamental level, i.e. the level of values. The other situation was selected because we believed it to be the central means whereby crises at the level of values were collectively resolved in the clinic.

Our first critical encounter was the 'late' abortion. What constitutes a late abortion varies from one society to another. In Quebec, the limit observed for abortions is generally twelve weeks which is approximately half that observed in the U.K. We reasoned that abortion work becomes critical at the level of fundamental values the more the foetus that is aborted is perceived to be an unborn child. Denying the foetus that status is clearly an obvious way in which the threat of a fundamental crisis at the level of values can be reduced. Such a denial becomes more difficult to maintain, especially for doctors and nurses, the more advanced the pregnancy and the more developed the foetus. They must confront the reality of the infant form in what they call the 'debris'.

The second 'critical encounter' was the planning meeting of the equipe (team). It was clear that every aspect of the work of the clinic was discussed at these meetings. The meetings were used by the members not simply to resolve practical day-to-day problems, but to generate and sustain the value orientation of the members in their work, to provide resolutions of problems and to forge a cultural identity for the group and social support for the members. In the words of the nurse in our study, the function of these meetings was "To share that which we live; to share what we do - and a type of complicity between us".

The "Moral Drama" of Abortion Work

Doctors and nurses must confront, at the level of fundamental values, the reality of the foetus; and it is this reality which is at the heart of the 'moral drama' of abortion work as it is described here. Pregnancy, childbirth, parental love and obligation are source material for deep cultural theories and powerful feelings. The bringing of new life into the world is a focus for positive affirmation of life, of commitment to care for life and to respect life.

Whatever their political or ideological commitments for or against abortion, doctors and nurses are socialised and educated in societies where these acts of affirmation and of tender feeling towards new life take place all the time, in their own lives and in those of their friends and their patients. Furthermore, the medical training they receive is intended to reinforce these values in establishing their ethical obligation and vocation to save life and not to take life.

The reality of the foetus can be a source of real moral distress, even for doctors and nurses deeply committed ideologically to the
practice of abortion. Insofar as they are subject to, and participate in, all the primitive feelings, values, rituals and theories surrounding the process of birth and of caring for new life, they may also be subject to feelings of revulsion and grief and moral culpability when confronted with the reality of the foetus. The act of terminating the life of the foetus can be seen or felt as an act of violence and of violation, even of murder. Indeed, such work may only be possible for a great many doctors and nurses, to the extent that they find cultural support for this work at an emotional and not simply a cognitive level.

 Abortions have been performed more or less openly in the province of Quebec for some ten years. The people are principally Francophone and Roman Catholic. Quite apart from the official attitude of the Church towards abortion, Catholic culture (and Christian culture generally) provides a powerful socialisation into fundamental values as exemplified in the moral drama of the nativity, involving as it does, the birth of a special child in adverse circumstances, subject to active attempts to end his life at its beginning, and saved from harm by the same God who guides those (high born and low born) who bring gifts and come to honour and revere the Infant. The most central image is that of the Madonna and Child as a sacred unity, shielded by love from the ever-present threat of harm. These powerful cultural themes are real psychological forces in the shaping of consciousness and action even among those who have ceased to subscribe to a religious outlook or to accept religious beliefs.

 We have no means of knowing what beliefs our subjects hold because we did not ask them. We make the point that such cultural themes may be effective in shaping their consciousness irrespective of what beliefs they now hold.

 We asked the doctor and nurse (independently) to re-live an abortion which was well over their limit of twelve weeks and to run a commentary in the present tense on their thoughts and feelings in the process of re-living the events. In this way, we hoped to obtain qualitatively rich data concerning the most central aspect of the moral drama of abortion. To our surprise, both the doctor and the nurse chose to reconstruct the same abortion, although they had not had any opportunity to communicate with one another and were seen on separate occasions on the same day. Whether this abortion was so important to them because 'late' terminations are very exceptional, or whether it was something in the occasion itself which marked it as particularly significant we cannot say.

 The doctor's account is more restrained than that of the nurse and somewhat shorter. Some of this restraint may have been due to her training as a doctor and her consciousness of her image as a doctor in control of herself and the situation. Nevertheless, she was visibly very upset during the reconstruction and chose to terminate the commentary when (so it seemed to us) she was in danger of being overcome emotionally. The nurse gave freer reign to her feelings and her account provides an interesting view of the conduct of the doctor. She finished by breaking down in tears, however. The two accounts are reproduced virtually complete.

 The Doctor

 "We are looking down in the sieve because we always look after the abortion what came out in the debris, and then we see. Maybe it's because it's just bigger than usual, we see the limbs distinctly, the head, the eyes of a foetus. Denise who always reacts more strongly because of her personality, she takes my arm, tells me to look, speaking in a very low voice of course because she does not want the patient to hear. Look, take a look at what we can see in there ... she takes my arm and insists
with her theatrical accent, and it gets on my nerves. I am closing off, I am retreating, it's a block. I tell her to move away from me, give me some breathing room. I think it's what I see and also her reaction that disturbs me, it's all exaggerated; it's the remains of a life in a sieve ... it's all flashbacks that I have all the time. I have a lot of them. My daughter got a hamster for her birthday and the thing is pregnant without us being aware of it; a week later there are twelve hamsters in the cage and the mother decided to eat her youngsters, and I see one and she is gnawing on it, and I immediately think of myself and the abortion, it's like flashbacks all the time ..."

The subject chose not to continue.

The Nurse

"We have been working together for two years. Julie and me, and we think that this girl has passed the 12 weeks but we look at the 'debris' and it is obvious that she has not just passed the 12 weeks but that she is far, far, far more advanced than that.

Julie and me we have never seen that, never in our whole life. We have seen that in books, we have heard about it but we have never actually seen it in our own professional life. And I am starting to feel bad and I think that it does not make sense. I think we are overdoing it. It's O.K. to do abortions but what we are doing now does not make sense because Julie has found an arm or a leg. It is a little bit macabre but it is reality. We tell each other that it is impossible that it would be so big and so tall but we have to find everything to make sure that the abortion is complete and that there is nothing left in the woman. But we speak in a low voice because the woman is right behind us and she probably thinks that she is at 12 weeks but we see for sure because of its size that she is at 14 or 15 weeks. But we have to dig out the remaining pieces but we feel bad and me, I feel bad, bad, bad. I am telling myself that it doesn't make sense that I should start digging into this. I take Julie's arm and I hold it strongly, strongly, strongly, and she does the same on my other arm, and it is as though we were immobilizing each other.

But the job we have to perform is to dig in there as soon as possible to relieve the woman, make sure we have everything, remove the speculum and let her go. And now Julie decides to take a paper towel, part the pieces out and recreate it as though she was drawing it. In other words, put an arm here, a leg there, another arm, the other leg, the head, the limbs, and I am nauseated.

Julie is nauseated too; my stomach hurts, my stomach and everywhere, and I remember, but maybe I shouldn't say that. I crossed my legs and pressed them hard against my vulva and it was hurting. We do it quickly so as to get the girl out as soon as possible and right when she was out we fell into each other's arms with a lot of powerlessness, a lot of sadness. I wonder if I feel guilt in all of that because it is all so advanced it is just too much. I don't want to relive situations like that. It turns me inside out. It's horrible. I don't feel good. It reaches my own values, mixed values, I am not sure whether they are moral values or religious values because like all Chambres I was raised in religion, in values for life and I am wondering if I will keep on doing this. I don't think I will be capable of doing it any more. And I am crying and I am very emotionally taken. Julie gets out of the room to a little side rest area. She is looking outside and it is springtime, with flowers, leaves in the trees, growing and I see her crying."

The subject starts crying and sobbing.

The Culture of Distress

We have defined a 'corporate culture' as an ordered set of practical values, themes and routines, originating in, and providing solutions for, problems directly encountered in key parts of the work process. The corporate culture supporting abortion work for this doctor and nurse may be seen as centred on a resolution of the moral drama concerning what we have called the 'reality of the foetus'. The contradiction between the demand for a tender and reverent respect for new life and the assault on new life involved in aborting a foetus, demands resolution at the level of commitment, value and feeling and not just a cognitive resolution. We see the corporate culture of this clinic reflected in these 'native' accounts as an ordered set of solutions to the moral crisis posed by this contradiction.

Of key importance here is the concept of distress. The women who seek an abortion are frequently distressed. The sources of distress may be various. We can summarise them broadly as follows.
1. Distress about being pregnant, concerning personal or family relationships that are affected or liable to be affected by the pregnancy as well as distress at the threat to job or career or way of life. In short, we include here all the sources of distress that may cause a woman to seek an abortion.

2. Distress about having an abortion. For example distress at stigma that may attach to it in her own eyes or those of others, distress at the process that has to be gone through, e.g. anxiety concerning the physical operation to be undergone and distress at the thought of disclosure of intimate details of one’s life crisis to relative strangers.

3. Finally there is the distress occasioned by the idea of what is taking place or has taken place in the abortion itself, the grieving and sorrowing that may accompany the termination, the sense of powerlessness and loss. We shall term this last form of distress, the abortion grief.

There is no inevitability about many of these forms of distress. It is likely that most of the women experience at least some of them even if they do not experience others, and some women, perhaps many, will experience all of them. It was clear from the accounts furnished by our subjects that all of these forms of distress were clearly recognised and the work of the clinic was continuously spoken of by our subjects in terms of caring for and coping with distress.

The concept of distress appears to us to be of critical importance in the genesis of the corporate culture of this clinic. We see the central problematic of that culture as that of resolving the moral crisis of abortion work though affirming in and through abortion work the very values which that work appears to violate.

In their accounts, the doctor and nurse emphasise the importance of the woman recognising, acknowledging and expressing the distress she feels, of having ‘space’ in the culture of the clinic to be with her abortion. During the abortion itself (and afterwards) women at the clinic were encouraged to express what feelings of grief and sadness they might have. This grief belongs in the fourth category of sources of distress listed above. It is clearly in a different category from the other three sources of distress. The work of the clinic might be said to be designed to alleviate or end the latter. The grieving or sorrowing, the sense of loss in respect of the abortion itself, may be seen as a form of grief brought to fruition in the abortion work of the clinic. It was seen by our subjects as an instrument of therapy; the therapy of bringing into the open and expressing what might otherwise be repressed.

In the context of the corporate culture of the clinic, it is possible that the abortion grief serves another function for both doctors and nurses. It is in effect, an affirmation of the same values and sensitivities in respect of new life that appear to have been violated by the act of abortion. To the extent that abortion is, for the women (and vicariously for the doctor and nurse) an occasion for grieving, the ‘moral drama’ is raised to a new plane, one which transforms the other sources of distress at the same time. There is, in the abortion grief, an element of the sense of sacrifice. In the grieving for the loss of new life there is the implication that no mere expediency is involved here. The positive affirmation of life implicit in the grieving, in the sense of loss, may also come
to be realised as the primary motive for the abortion. The sources of distress which give rise to the decision to have an abortion can, to the extent of that realisation, be seen as conditions immanent to the life affording will to have one's children when one is ready to care for them.

The doctor told us of her own need to experience (vicariously) the feelings of the women. In her account of the late term abortion she does not separate these events from her own life, from her experience as a woman with children of her own. In what she calls her 'flashback', she recalls the child's hamster which ate its young. In reaching for this memory she seeks a metaphorical resolution of the moral crisis. Does the hamster eat its young because it is living in a world that is not ready to receive them?

In a brilliant analysis of a psychological crisis, Søren Kierkegaard wrote of the preparation of the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham as demanded by God. In Kierkegaard's religious analysis, Abraham was only the "greatest man who ever lived" if it was the case that he loved his son more than any man ever loved his son. If he did not love his son like that, then his act was that of a selfish and ignoble man.

Without wishing to press the analogy too far, we discern the possibility of a similar mechanism at work in the corporate culture of the clinic. To the extent that the culture can nurture and realise the affirmation of life and love inherent in human suffering, it can sustain at an emotional level a sense of abortion as an act of suffering in the cause of one's feeling for life. We are not speaking here of a cognitive justification but of an emotional resolution.

The resolution is fragile and must be continuously re-established in the social relations of the work process and in the planning meetings of the equipe (team). The solidarity demanded is at the level of practical activity as well as of ideology. Complicity with colleagues in the work is important as can be seen in the following excerpt from the doctor's account of her sense of betrayal when she learns, at the planning meeting of the equipe, that a colleague has decided to cease performing abortions.

"Helen announces officially that she will not do any more abortions from now on; very shortly she will not be available any more. I feel that it is definitely over, that she does not want to do it any more, but she leaves an open door, she is ready to help in the training of M, who is going to take over. She is ready to help her in the coming weeks but I really think we cannot count on her for the next coming weeks. She is getting off and I react very negatively. I feel like I am being abandoned. I also often think of stopping but I was never able to do it, and Helen does it and stops. I tell everybody that I accept it but it is obvious that I don't accept it, and the other members tell me that I don't have to accept it, but I feel an obligation to say that I accept it even if it is obvious that I don't accept it, because Helen was there at the very beginning five years ago ... we justified it and ourselves by telling ourselves that there was a need for an abortion service in the CLSC - and she doesn't say why she is stopping, she only says she is stopping just like that.

... and it's all mixed up because is it that she does not like to work with me or is it because she does not feel good in the intervention ... I know that technically it's always been a catastrophe with her, she is not a calm technician, an abortion with her is always long and painful; when we worked at this other place, the nurse who worked with her found it difficult because the girls were always suffering. I am mad, I am disappointed, I am aggressive and I have a lot of sadness also and it's all those feelings at the same time. I am really upset, I can feel my heart beating because Helen has already stated a few months back that she was maybe thinking of quitting, but it was all so vague and then she went on a holiday. She took three months off during summer, came back at fall, starts over
and then I hear from somebody else who knew her that maybe she was thinking of quitting. It was never great between this person and me. Then I thought, come on this is impossible. Helen works with me, there is no problem. She took three months off, she looks in great shape, everything's fine, and Helen announces right after all of a sudden that she won't do it any more. It confirms that I was working with her side by side without knowing what was going on in her head. We were there physically side by side but that's all. I don't know what was going on in her head all that time. Somebody else tells me that she is thinking of stopping, and that somebody, well anyway it was never great between that person and me, but it's all like she had a better contact with this person who was not closely working with us. I feel a lot of resentment. There is all this thing about us fighting together for abortion and a lack of communication and we did not share all the road she has travelled mentally. It's like a lack of trust or a lack of confidence and suddenly "bang" she says she is quitting. An abortion is very heavy for me. I want to go into mini-aspirations, my own practice, right out of my office...

The collective participation and guardianship of the work process is central to the realization of the corporate culture of the clinic. The role of the individual nurse or doctor is played down and, so far as is possible, the team seeks to mediate experience in all the principal encounters of the work process. The planning meetings of the equipe are of key importance here, together with the routines developed for ensuring that patients and nurses do not become isolated in one to one professional/client relations.

An excerpt from the account of one of the equipe planning meetings provided by the nurse in our study will serve to illustrate this tendency.

The account begins with the disclosure by one of the nurses on the team that she has just had an abortion herself and now knows more directly and intimately what the women suffer.

"... and then a nurse whom I work with announces to the whole team that she had an abortion in the last month... and that now as far as pain and the difficulty of going through an abortion she understands a lot more about what it means... comparatively with what she understood before, now she understands it differently and she wants to share that with everyone, she wants to tell them how she experienced it, her abortion."

This public claim to a special understanding with the possible unintended implication that no one who has not had the experience of having an abortion can have such an understanding of the feelings involved, is not taken up by the other members of the equipe in the account of the discussion provided by our nurse. Immediately this statement has been made it is followed by an account of a complaint by another nurse concerning 'new members' of the equipe who are too enveloping and too exclusive with the women, who do not give them sufficient space to live through and come to terms with their abortion. As a result the other nurses in the team do not have the necessary space to experience what these women are going through.

A resolution is reached for in which the need of the equipe to be involved as a group more with the women is acknowledged and reinforced.

"... and then another nurse says there are new members in the team and she thinks their attitude is difficult to take, their attitude towards the women... because she sees the nurses as being too enveloping towards women and they don't give them the space they need to experience what they are going through with their abortion because they are too enveloping, too possessive... and that even us, the other nurses working in the team, we don't feel we have the necessary space with these women who are women that they have already known in the clinic... then there are different reactions, the nurse at which all this is directed becomes defensive because she is a young nurse, she is a new nurse, it's only been two months since she is in the service... she never was in contact with abortion before and she finds it difficult to absorb all that consequently, she expresses what she has to express because it makes her feel more secure to be enveloping with women. She feels like she is doing good to
then and it feels very gratifying for her to act like
that with women ... This is what is happening ... and
this nurse says she's happy she could express all that
and to get to know the others' reaction. She is going
to change her attitudes, not to change everything because
there are things there that satisfy her but change things
so that the team can be closer to the women who are there
... not only the nurse and the women but the woman and
the team ... because now it is obvious that the team does
not have enough space and it's only the nurse and the
woman with her abortion ...

It is clear, too, from the accounts of the planning meeting of the
équipe provided by our subjects that such meetings serve not only
an administrative function but are central to the genesis,
dissemination and revitalization of the corporate culture of the
clinic. The spirit of open communication and 'comunitas' generated
at these meetings provides much of the emotional and ideological
support for the work. In these meetings, the images of 'distress'
and 'care' are negotiated and articulated. A sense of solidarity
is developed and the work process is mediated by a corporate culture
centred on the positive use of distress.

A final word is necessary concerning the tentative nature of
interpretation, which arises from a certain view of the research
process. It is our view that qualitatively rich data can be used at
the beginning of a research project to achieve a more or less
sophisticated but wholly tentative interpretation of complex processes.
This, in turn, can be used in the design of a fuller and more extensive
programme of research. We see the development of an interpretation
of this kind as extending and deepening the possibilities for
subsequent data collection.

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article as empirical illustrations.

Abstract

The present article deals with the notion of legitimation and its
practical implications from a semiotic-discursive perspective. It
argues that legitimation should be regarded as a discursive
category embedded in the conditions of possibility of any
totalizing discourse. Three legitimation processes are outlined:
referential, communicative and auto comunicative. To support the
argument, empirical illustrations are provided to enhance the
constellation within which managers attempt to attain legitimacy
for their practices.
INTRODUCTION

In the theory of discourse, it is argued that man's mind is mastered by his own discourses about himself. He is both the "subject-producer" of a discourse and the "object-receiver" of the same. The transmitted message within the discourse reflects an ideology which is, at the same time, the reflection of it. The paradoxical relationship between subject and object transforms myths into reality and places them in the very center of man's understanding. Due to this, the discourse may seem unproblematic and the messages produced within it and transmitted through it may seem to reflect an undisputable, given reality. An initial question at this stage is what are the conditions of possibility governing the production and the articulation of a particular discourse, as well as the meanings which these conditions have with regard to the produced messages and, above all, to their legitimacy. The prevailing ideology in relation to a certain discourse is often perceived as common for the producer as well as for the receiver and it is the representation of such values that serves to disguise the ambiguity of the discursive messages and thereby providing them with an illusory legitimacy. Ideology might then make the positions of the producer and receiver of discourse appear as unproblematic, and the message transmitted might also appear as though it was a representation of an unquestionable, given reality. Kristeva (1969) suggests that there are translinguistic mechanisms which are the origins of the meanings transmitted in a message of discourse as well as the meaning of the discourse itself. The meanings manifest in discourse are actually only traces of a germination of meanings in these translinguistic mechanisms. Kristeva suggests a mode of critical analysis whose purpose is to disclose the mechanisms anterior to any manifest discourse, and to investigate the mechanisms' effects that are concealed in the discourse and present there only as traces.

Semanalysis and Deconstruction.

Semanalysis might be seen as an elaboration of Derrida's deconstruction (Derrida, 1967), another sketch for a critical analysis concerning what is anterior to manifest discourse. The purpose of deconstruction is to take apart concepts and thoughts which serve as rules, that is to say which are assumed to be legitimate. In these, deconstruction seeks internal contradictions, ambiguities and paradoxes which question the very ground for any legitimacy. In other words, deconstruction questions the rules of the manifest discourse - understood as text - and seeks cases where the text transgresses these rules: cases where it violates rules it sets for itself and simultaneously also conceals this violation (Daudi, 1985b).

The ground for discursive legitimation would be, in this sense, the setting of the rules as well as the rationalization of their transgression parallel to the emergence of new situations. Changes in managerial practices and legitimating messages embedded in related discourses can no doubt be seen in relation to the emergence of new patterns in the environment. Still, what seems more pertinent is to relate these changes to the rules of transformation and to what is thereby contextually dictated within the discursive framework as the legitimate behaviour or the legitimate action to be taken. Semanalysis and deconstruction are thus to be used here
to investigate such mechanisms of the germination of meaning which
tend to make the positions of the producer and receiver of a
discourse unproblematic, and which tend to make the message
transmitted unquestionable, thereby creating legitimacy.

Semiaulysis and deconstruction generate the view that the
production and articulation of knowledge and messages in manifest
discourse are made inadequate by underlying translinguistic
mechanisms where the effects of these mechanisms on the discourse
are concealed. In other words, these mechanisms are the suppressors
of discourse: they prevent us from seeing the ambiguity of the
messages of the discourse. The production and articulation of
legitimating messages in discourse remain incomplete or distorted
and the discourse remains suppressed - and self-suppressed because
it produces and reproduces the very messages (legitimating or non-
legitimating) which suppress it (Laplanche & Pontalis 1967). The
conception adopted in this article is partly the one advocated by
Kristeva and Derrida where the analysis of the conditions of the
production of the legitimating discursive messages is emphasised as
well as the effects which these conditions have on the thereby
created legitimacy (or, illusory legitimacy). Other parts of this
conception are inspired by the work of Foucault (Daudi, 1983;
1983a) and, to some extent, by some of the ideas developed by the
semistician Greimas.

Dramatic Personae.

Greimas (1966) and Greimas & Courtes (1979) suggest that
an overall conception of any discourse might be seen when such
issues are considered: a) the general types of argument used in the
discourse; b) its motives and themes; and, c) its dramatic personae
as the central theme. In managerial terms, it could be argued that
the general types of argument within a discourse are: first, the
cognitive dimension of discourse related to the existence or the
inexistence of legitimating messages; second, the evaluative
dimension of discourse related to the status of objects of
legitimation in terms of importance and values invested in them;
and, third, the prescriptive dimension of discourse about what can,
must or must not be done, or what must or must not be the case with
regard to an overall totalizing ideology.

The motives and themes of a discourse consist of
established combinations of the general types of arguments outlined
above. In fact, any discourse can be delineated on the basis of the
recurrence of an established set of motives. The ways in which
these motives recur is significant for the themes of the discourse;
in this particular case, legitimation. Thus, in this sense, every
discourse related to a certain managerial practice - such as a
decision to be made - can very well be regarded as a variant of a
tale about one single theme: legitimation and non-legitimation. The
constellation of the dramatic personae of any given tale invests
the variant of this basic theme into the discourse. In other words,
every discursive legitimation of a certain managerial practice can
be analyzed against the background of the constellation
constituting it. A complete constellation consists of an object of
value (what is to be legitimated); a subject-producer initiating
and producing the actual legitimating messages; a receiver who is
supposed to harvest the relationship between producers; and,
ocasionally, helper(s) and opponent(s). This sort of constellation
is what Greimas & Courtes (1979) call dramatic personae where the
"positions" and the relationships between "persona" are not rigid but can be elaborated with regard to the context. The constellation may therefore be collapsed in the sense that a subject producer may also be a receiver, that is to say a subject may be the object of its own legitimating message.

This being said, the generality of this theoretical view suggests that the difference between a first-order discourse on a specific matter to be legitimated (object of value) and a discourse of higher-order – such as discourses on ethic, morality and ideology of which the first-order discourse claims to be a part – can from an analytical perspective be quite relative. The point to be made explicit here is that, although we cannot always differentiate between first-order and higher-order discourse we can still recognize the patterns through which the producer of legitimating messages often seeks legitimacy for these very messages by appealing to the values of high-order discourse. The conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that the shaping of these patterns is of course very contextual and, above all, is dependent on the position of the producer of the discourse and the particular message embedded in it. It is therefore possible to speak of different types or forms of legitimation. Considering the fact that we are here questioning discursive legitimation, the argument must then be related to a discursive level of discussion.

REFERENTIAL LEGITIMATION

The elementary level of any discourse is referential. In this particular case, it is a discursive legitimation of an object of value, organized by a set of types of arguments, motives, themes and dramatic persona. It is typical of the referential legitimation that it appears as "objective": the person or the group attempting to legitimate something tend to situate themselves outside the very legitimating discourse which they are producing and which, thereby, becomes, in an illusory manner, a characterization of an obvious reality. The empirical findings indicate that referential legitimation is often intimately connected to a strongly established power structure. The "power holders" will tend to "use" this form of legitimation to impose a case which they consider as "obvious" or which they wish to make others regard as such.

Empirical Illustration. The world of business enterprises in Sweden, it is not exaggerated to say, is largely characterized by a tendency for strong concentration. Ownership forms are often emphasized as important features in as much as they indicate the strength or the weakness of organizations with regards to their financial possibilities and their lobbying abilities. The most common form of ownership is a traditional construction consisting of what could be viewed as a strong owner willing to take responsibility for the destiny of the firm. This strong owner is supposed to supply fresh capital when needed and to be the holder of the "formal" power to destitute the management of the firm. This traditional form of ownership gave rise in Sweden to what is commonly called "family empires". These empires rest on a well established image in which the form of ownership which they represent is well accepted or, let's say, legitimated in the mind of the majority of the business community, the stock exchange, the
politicians and LO (the Swedish Central Organization for Wage-
 earners). These institutions are identified here as the receivers
of referential legitimation while those who advocate the
traditional form of ownership – the "family empires" – are referred
to as the "power-holders".

Parallel to the traditional form of ownership, a
relatively new form has been developed. What characterizes this
form is that two firms own each other’s shares. At the first
glance, one might say that there is nothing uncommon in such
practice. However, when the purpose of this form of ownership is to
exclude other possible owners – classified as undesirable, one
begins to see that it is a matter of a confined structure where,
sometimes, firms almost totally own each other, attaining thereby
strongly dominating positions. This form is referred to here as
cross-ownership. Management in the studied cross-owned firms seem
to have a stronger and more independent position than management in
traditionally owned firms. This is partly due to the firms
reinforcing each other by supportive interdependent relationships
and to the absence of "outsider-owners".

Following Greimas’ constellation of the dramatic persons
we have here an object of value, that is to say, a suitable form of
ownership; two subject-producers which are, 1) "the power-holders"
attacking any form of ownership that does not fit their views; and,
2) the cross-owners who defend their bread and butter and try to
justify themselves. We also have receivers who are supposed to
harvest the relationship between the two subject-producers. They
are represented by the business community at large, the stock
exchange, the politicians and LO. Some of them will tend to act,
ocasionally, as helpers or opponents supporting one of the two
subject-producers against the other one.

In that constellation, as it is, a state of warfare was
declared. Cross-ownership was very much criticized by the "power-
holders’/subject producers and by the majority of the receivers.
Due to the "power-holders’" strongly established image and widely
accepted discourse, a committee was appointed by the government to
investigate the matter. Two other committees were appointed by the
Swedish employers' organization (SRAF) and by the stock exchange
organization. The "power-holders’ are strongly represented in both
these committees.

The general types of argument presented by the
antagonists – the two subject-producers – are significant for the
discursive legitimation by which they wish to attain legitimacy for
their different practices. The "power-holders” argue for their
position by emphasizing the positive benefits for firms with
strong, committed and responsible owners, especially in case of
危机. The message embedded here is apparently meant to be, that
traditional form of ownership is associated with certainty and/or
security; a notion which is invested with great significance in the
Swedish context, and which appeals to high ranking values – high
order discourse – in the receivers’ minds, particularly LO. The
"power-holders” tend also to describe managers in cross-owned firms
as selfish individuals pursuing their personal interests and
striving for power “accumulation”. The concealed meaning of the
message here is probably to draw a threatening picture and, by
opposition, to make themselves appear as concerned with general
welfare and be viewed as socially responsible. They also wish to
pass the message that they actually are the legitimate “porte
parole" of the assumably established common ideology forming public opinion, and particularly that of the receivers. By doing so and by referring to history as witness they refer to the wealth and success they bring to the community. They also wish to make obvious that the discourse which is theirs, is in fact totally independent from them and that it speaks of an "objective" reality from the perspective of "the right" ideology. The discursive legitimation of the "power-holders" can thus be identified as a referential legitimation in as much as the subject-producer steps out of the very discourse which they produce and start to refer to it as though it was an "objective" one with a life of its own; as though they were themselves objects of the discourse which they produce.

The arguments forwarded by the cross-owners are not referential since they simply do not appeal to any established those in the mind of the receivers. Although the object of value at hand - the form of ownership which they advocate - seem to be internally largely legitimated among the members of the cross-owned organizations, it is still regarded with much suspicion by receivers. Now, the question to be asked is why are the messages in the "power-holders" discursive legitimation perceived as unambiguous by the receivers? Kristeva and Derrida suggest that the assumed common ideology of producer and receiver may serve to mask the ambiguity and provide the messages with an illusory legitimacy. Still, what permit us to speak of ideology if not the opposition of de facto and de jure? Ideology may be "defined" as a particular discourse seeking to appear as universal. Now, the opposition between the contingent particularity and the universally valid is a philosophical one. The problem is thus insoluble, if one with solution means a practical and definite separation of the

constituent of this opposition. Even if we were able to solve the problem, any argument would be meaningless unless the necessary references are made to politics, morality and ethic, and, even to religion. What escape the dilemma of the opposition are the symbolic and mythical dimensions of ideology. They provide explanations - which are neither de facto nor de jure - of the social world, legitimating thereby its present order. The particular order institutionalized by the "power-holders" become universally valid and, in the eyes of the receivers, perfectly legitimate since the translinguistic mechanisms accompanying the performed systems of symbols and myths serve to disguise the ambiguity of the discursive legitimation and serve even to create the illusion of a de facto prevailing common ideology.

COMMUNICATIVE LEGITIMATION

It is assumed here that a discourse cannot have effects unless its results are transmitted as an "obvious" message (referential legitimation) in a communicative circuit from a producer of discursive legitimation that encodes it to a receiver who decodes it. The process in this circuit establishes communicative legitimation. Politics is the overall characterization of this sort of legitimation in the sense that the process is shaped by a political game structure where the interests of individuals and groups play a non-neglectable part. An important aspect here are the codes used; a particular vocabulary is developed among the people involved with specific connotations sometimes understandable for both the producers and the receivers.
of legitimating messages and sometimes not. Empirical findings indicate that this vocabulary often takes the form of a "jargon" which is meant to appeal to identifiable values and to an assumed common ideology.

**Empirical Illustration.** How does a social democratic government legitimize the decision of closing down a large shipyard plant in an area already suffering from a high rate of unemployment, adding to it the burden of another group of 3000 people out of work? And how does the government legitimize its unexpected cooperation with a large private firm in the motorcar industry, especially when this cooperation resulted in establishing privileged concessions to the firm in question and important losses for the governmental treasure? Not that I am assuming economics as being the expression of any objective reality, but since the government's argumentation largely relies on its logic, and since the logic in this particular case seems to be something completely different, the question may be asked as to the government's "real" motives in this affair. The firm is supposed to create 1000 new jobs in the area, and, in the bargain, it wins a compensation in form of indirect subsidies amounting to 2 billion Swedish crowns. Now, is this a justified way of creating a thousand jobs? Now, from a political-economic point of view, does this action affect the equilibrium of this particular industry as a whole and what would be the reactions of competitors? Wouldn't they regard it as unfair to give privilege to one competitor at the expense of the others? Many questions can no doubt be raised in connection with this issue, and, surprisingly enough, none of these nor similar ones have been debated in the discussion which was to follow the initiating phases. The pseudo-debate focused instead on what was meant to be perceived as tangible matters but which in fact were exclusively matters of minor dignity compared to the importance of the general issue.

The *drakatia personne* involved here are the two main *subject-producers* of the discursive legitimation: the government (social democratic) and the private firm. I will concentrate my attention on the governmental discourse. Furthermore, we have the *receivers*; that is to say the public in general and the business and industrial communities in particular. The receivers' blessing of the government actions is vital since basically they are actual or potential voters. The constituent of *object of value* to be legitimated is the credit of the government; what might be called the social democrats' "ideology" or, in any case, what they are supposed to stand for.

The constituent of the *object of value* is quite obvious since for social democrats, slogans like "solidarity", "social involvement" and so forth, are part of the image which they cherish and which probably contribute to their success among their voters. Now this *object of value*, which emerged half a century ago and has been developed since, is now well established and largely ventriloquized and diffused through a whole battery of symbols, myths and linguistic constructions which anchor the present image of the party in its "glorious past". When the government decided to close down the shipyard - and actually did it - the *object of value* was threatened and thereby the credit of the party and its possibility to win the elections might have been jeopardized. Furthermore, the fact that the *subject-producer* has signed a pact which gives privilege to "private capital" is not likely to be regarded as a
positive action by the receivers. The subject-producer then ends up with a serious problem to deal with: how to transmit "obvious" legitimating messages within the frame of a situation which is all but obvious.

To cope with this problem, the subject-producer created a communicative circuit where codes and vocabulary are developed in a process which is meant to establish communicative legitimation of the issue at hand. First of all the two sides of the issue - the close down on the one hand, and the job creation through the "contract" with the private firm on the other - are separated. The first side is blamed on the central shipyard organization and the close down is conducted almost in secrecy. The second side is transformed and its constituent disguised: the disadvantageous "contract" with "private capital" is not judged very wise to be exposed. The message that has to be transmitted to receivers is instead the one emphasizing the government efforts to create employment and glorifying its role as a "sauveur" of an area in crisis. The developed vocabulary in this case attempts to shift attention from the heart of the problem: unemployment as a fact as well as deterioration of the object of value, and to direct it towards positive signs which do not necessarily exist.

The general types of argument presented within the constellation - in the first place by the subject-producer/government - are elaborated in such a manner that the post-explanations given for the close-down decision expose it as "rational" and indeed serving to ensure a better future for the concerned area. Furthermore, the privilege accorded to the private firm is encoded in order to be understood as direct subsidies to the area itself and not to the firm. It is true that the subsidies allocated to the firm made possible the creation of some new jobs, but, the price was too high and the real winner is the firm, not the area nor the government. Furthermore, the firm which was "chosen" as the partner of the government in this affair was portrayed as already committed to the life and the future of the region and as being socially responsible. The messages embedded in the efforts made by the government to give such a picture of this firm seem to be: 1) to attenuate its association - a disadvantageous one - with "private capital" (with the devil); 2) to prevent the weakening of the aura attached to the object of value - maybe even to reinforce it - and, 3) to appear as a government capable of heroic actions and thereby maybe even winning new voters. The "jargon" used was all the time a mythical-political one where significant economic facts about the issue were absent while legitimating messages were present.

There is no evidence of the success of this communicative legitimation rendered here, apart from the fact that the issue was actually not debated. Still, the evidence in this case may very well be the inexistence of a debate.

AUTOCOMMUNICATIVE LEGITIMATION

When communicative legitimation fails to provide a firm position (legitimacy) for the producer of discursive legitimation, then he/she will try to attain and maintain such position by himself. The individual or group attempting to legitimate something becomes involved in a process where he/she seems to "create" an internal illusory coherence. This coherence is sometimes felt as
such but it can also be purely pretended. In any case, illusory and or pretended coherence is produced and reproduced by an appendix to communicative legitimation: it denotes the auto-communicative, mythical and self-descriptive legitimation of the producer of discursive legitimation with itself. Most important, as the empirical findings indicate, auto-communicative legitimation make the legitimating subject's understanding of an unapproachable hero: he/she does not feel the need to legitimate such and such decision or action. Auto-communicative legitimation is, in fact, a process which describe the particular state where the legitimating subject attains legitimacy - or attempts to attain it - precisely by not providing any direct legitimating discourse or messages: legitimacy through non-legitimation.

Empirical Illustration. During the past few years one of Sweden's largest cities has been completing plans for the building of a large housing and shopping centre which here we might call the "thing". The city has been ruled for over three decades by the same political party which we might just as well call "the party". "The party" has strong affiliations with several influential groups in the community but also with society at large and it is generally approved and trusted by its own voters. Since "the party" is in majority at the Town Hall, things can hardly be worse: any proposition advocated by the majority is likely to be approved. When the "thing"-project was initiated the criticism which was raised against it was not of any major significance. It grew however with time and was mainly coming from the minority parties and from different associations in the city as the retailers, the ecologists and so forth. It should however be mentioned that the criticism was, in many ways, not directed against the "thing" itself but rather against the way or the form in which the whole process was managed.

The dramatic personae of the case are as follows: the object of value might be represented by the "thing", while the subject-producer is no doubt "the party"; not that the others are not producing any legitimating discourse, but because we will concentrate our attention precisely on that of "the party". The minority parties and the associations will be referred to as receivers and opponents. Other actors will appear in the discussion and will be referred to as helpers.

As it has been suggested, the conditions of possibility of auto-communicative legitimation seem to be the result of the non-possibility of the two other legitimation processes: 1) the subject-producer fails to attain legitimacy by referential means due to the absence of an assumed common ideology with the receiver, an ideology which would have served to disguise the ambiguity of the transmitted legitimating messages; 2) the subject-producer also fails with communicative legitimation because the codes which should exist between him and the receiver cannot be encoded nor decoded; the receiver being at the same time an opponent or a potential one. The subject-producer will then become the receiver of his own discursive legitimation: he/she will attempt to attain legitimacy by creating an illusory coherence around the decision to be made or the action to be taken. He/she will also prevent opponents from having insight into the subject of value and, on the whole, will make it look as though his/her external legitimacy is really granted, thus he "is" an unapproachable hero. Still, as it becomes apparent in the case, auto-communicative legitimation seems
to be intimately related to the subject-producer's ability to neutralize opponents.

A crucial question here was the traffic situation in the city and how it was going to be affected by the "thing"-project. Now in this commune, like in all other communes, there are special instances whose task is to examine such issues as traffic problems. Furthermore, those instances happen to have the formal authority to initiate investigations on the subject. In this particular case, the instance concerned with the problem was not permitted by "the party" to conduct any investigation nor to analyse the matter. Instead, it was given detailed directives stating how the planning ought to be accomplished. The purpose of "the party's" action was apparently to avoid any investigation to be made. "The party's" motive seem to have been the fear that such an investigation might come to an opposite conclusion which might jeopardize the fulfilment of the "thing"-project. Furthermore, a debate on the object of value was not likely to be desired by the subject-producer. The object of value had already been criticized by receivers/opponents who regarded the "thing" as a threat against the inhabitants of the city, and, the conclusions from an unfavorable investigation could then have been used to reinforce this threatening picture and to convince the rest of the community. Then, the matter might have been debated, the object of value closely examined, criticized and maybe even rejected. The subject-producer would not take the risk. The subject-producer would rather neutralize the opponents and create thereby an illusory coherence vis-à-vis the general public who is not involved in the dramatic personas and who will never know what actions the subject-producer has been taking.

Another important aspect in this case, and which seems to be characteristic of autocommunicative legitimation is that the subject-producer, due to his/her self-descriptive legitimation, tends to present the decisions to be made and the actions to be taken as "fait accompli". In the case at hand, the "party" being in a majority position, automatically has the means to appoint committees and thereby to create favorable instances accommodating itself with helpers, in order to be able to expose ready-made propositions which are hard to attack. Neutralizing opponents and ensuring the support of helpers have provided the subject-producer with an external legitimacy without actually being forced to produce any discursive legitimation for a decision and subsequent actions on which obviously very few agreed. The created illusory coherence towards the external public and the belief in being heroes acting in the very best of the community are thus the marks of the subject-producers of autocommunicative legitimation.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Understanding the notion of legitimation and its immanent connotations as discursive categories invests them with a mark: that of arbitrariness which governs the condition of possibility of any discourse. The very thought of legitimation is itself possible only in a culture where an all-embracing borderline exists defining inferiority in relation to exteriority, what is normal in relation to what is pathological and reason in relation to unreason. Thus, what is good and what is bad, what is accepted and what is rejected, what is true and what is false are not values loaded with
the immutable eternity of divinities. Beyond practical experience and reason, the transcendentalism of what these words are associated with belong to the world of ideas. Man, through and within his discourses, produces ideas, concepts and thoughts, establishes codes and delimitates territories for what is universally valid. But Man also transgresses and violates the rules he sets for himself and, simultaneously, attempts to conceal this violation. The transgression, the violation and the concealment of these rules become then the objects of inquiry which are necessarily embedded in the discourses where the rules are established. In that manner, the all-embracing borderline between reason and unreason is accentuated, establishing and reinforcing thereby the legitimacy of the very notion of legitimation. In our field of inquiry, management, the notion of legitimation is indeed pertinent since it unveils areas into which our insight is still far too little. Beyond the instrumentalism of our theories and beyond the often very necessary and "legitimate" utilitarian "esprit" in which they are conceived, the opacity of this notion should be regarded as a challenge, not in order to attempt to give it translucency but to problematize its formation as discursive category enveloping management practices.

After all, the universality of legitimation might be questionable. In a culture where people's minds are not shaped by any all-embracing borderline, the word legitimation perhaps does not even exist. Did Mister Chance legitimate himself?

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Skilful Organizations: those which Thrive and Survive over a long of
time (part two)
Teddy E. WEINHALL & Harry C. KYRIAZIS

5. MAIN HURDLES THAT THE SKILFUL ORGANIZATION HAS TO OVERCOME

There are basically two interconnected, major hurdles which constitute cardinals threats to the survival of the organization. The first are the imbalances or maladaptations within the Decision Making Main System, while the second is the imbalance or maladaptation between the Scope of Decision making (SDM) and the Managerial Structure.

The two arrows coming out of the Managerial Characteristics box in Figure 1 are the connection between the above first and second main hurdles. Indeed, the managerial characteristics (i.e. the leadership, followership and other interpersonal characteristics) of the CE (Chief Executive) and other key-position managers, affect both the Organizational Strategy and the Managerial Structure. Thus when the organizational strategy has to be adapted to the pressures from the wider Environmental systems and to the competition from other organizations in the Immediate Environment (for instance, by modifying the number of product/service lines, but expanding in the geographical dispersal), the managerial characteristics of the CE and his key-position managers may lead them to do just the opposite (in our example -- expand the organization in both product-line and geographically). Not being able to cross this hurdle, being confronted by a cardinal divergence between the organizational strategy needs on the one hand, and the managerial characteristics needs on the other, would certainly kill the organization.

Major changes in the organizational strategy require a substantial interorganizational mobility of workers, and/or customers, and/or suppliers, and/or shareholders, as well as managers, which we shall discuss when dealing with the next main hurdle. Let us consider a car manufacturing organization, which has been producing standardized and popular cars for a long while, until recently. The organization is now in the process of constructing a new, revolutionary car; and within a short while winding up its previous car manufacturing operation. The members of its human FDM (factor of decision making) will have to change, within a few years, from mass production (including robots' manufacturing) operators, to more sophisticated and technically trained workers; from shareholders who are primarily expecting to receive their dividends annually, to investors who are willing to risk their capital, without receiving any dividends for several years, but expecting the value of their investment to increase considerably; from customers who could only afford to buy standardized and popular cars, to those who can afford and would like to have the most innovative car; etc.

The management may confront this hurdle of major adaptation in the organizational strategy, every few or several years. The frequency of such major adaptations depends on the rate of growth (primarily in scientific-technological terms, but also in the speed of geographical dispersal), of the type of activity the organization is in. Thus adaptations in the organizational strategy (in what, how, and where the organization is operating), are much more frequent in an organization involved in high-tech electronics than, say, in a governmental organization.

In order for management to overcome the second main hurdle (see Figure 1), in adapting the Managerial Structure to the Scope of Decision Making, the CE and his key-position manager should have Managerial Characteristics in line with the required new structure. As the managerial characteristics are part of the personality traits acquired at a very early age, and because the CE would require at least a few key position managers to help him move the management from one managerial structure to another, we could assume that these few top executives should be people with different managerial characteristics than those of the CE and key-position managers in the present (i.e. previous) structure.

The frequency of the inevitability of adapting the organizational structure to the dynamics of the Immediate and wider environments, and of adopting the managerial characteristics to
the required managerial structure, is one and the same. For every time that a change is introduced in the organizational strategy a consequent change has to be introduced in the managerial structure (see Figure 1).

We shall discuss in the following part 6 of this paper how we can judge whether management runs a skillful organization (i.e. is able to overcome hurdles), and in the last part 7, how management can become more skillful in this. We would like only to stress at this point, that not all the adaptations in the managerial structure which would enable management to introduce the necessary changes in the organizational strategy and in the managerial structure, should be accompanied by interorganizational managerial mobility. Only the major adaptations in strategy and structure require having a different CEO and a few other key position managers. From our experience in studying clinically 19 different organizations in Israel and five other countries (Britain, France, Greece, Japan, and the US)⁶, we found that only in about one quarter (five of the 19 organizations studied, in one of which this is only a prediction, rather than a fact, as the study was terminated only in May, 1985) -- the CEO felt he had to vacate his post to another CEO, so that the major hurdles could be overcome, and the organization could survive and thrive.

The two above-mentioned main hurdles could be labeled "conceptual hurdles", as they are just the major problems which we encounter along the dynamics of organization and management. The following two "behavioral hurdles", are actual hurdles which the skillful organization has to overcome, so that the two conceptual hurdles could be dealt with. Both of the following hurdles are actually behavioral norm; or put in other words -- corporate culture values, which prevent management from

overcoming the two major "conceptual hurdles". We shall refer to these two behavioral hurdles as the two "secrcty diseases". The first secrecy disease is the "anti-mobility" norm, and the second is the "no full disclosure" phenomenon.

The "anti-mobility" norm exists among organizational employees throughout the world. It is part of the corporate culture, but it varies from country to country. Its origins are in the loyalty of organizational members to their respective organizations, and their tendency not to divulge the organizational secrets to other, competing organizations; hence the "anti mobility" is a secrecy disease. This corporate culture is strongest in religious, nation-state and military organizations. This is the reason why the "anti-mobility" norm is strongest in Western European countries where the Church, the governmental and the military organizations preceded and strongly influenced the industrial and business corporations; it is also very strong in those Latin American and Islamic countries whose managerial cultures of which were influenced by the European managerial cultures. The countries in which the governmental, religious and military organizational cultures have influenced at the least the business corporate cultures, are also those in which the "anti mobility" norm is the weakest. These are countries which have not had a long cultural history and heritage. Three examples will suffice. First, Israel, whose culture is an integration of the cultures of all the ingathered Jewish immigrants from over one hundred different countries. Then, the two superpowers -- the USSR and the US. The Bolshevik 1917 revolution annihilated its preceding Church, government and military traditional cultures; when Soviet managers are being transferred from one organization to another, they feel that their experience is enriched, and that they move from one sub-organization to another, of the same large organization they belong to -- the USSR. The US, on the other hand, is the haven of "the deviants of all the world unite" -- the Irish who did not want to starve, the Italians who did not want to be destitute, the Eastern European Jews who

did not want to be persecuted, and so on. They left their cultures behind them and created a new culture, in which the industrial and business corporate cultures have influenced those of the church, government and military, and not vice versa. In our estimation the interorganizational and the geographical mobility of American managers and other professionals is the largest single explanatory factor, among many others, for the large economic, professional and, most of all, scientific-technological success of the US.

The second secrecy disease is that of the "no full disclosure" phenomenon. This is even a bigger behavioral hurdle for management to run a skillful organization.

On the whole, individuals are far from being frank and open with those people with whom they maintain more than casual relationships. In fact, people rarely reveal their thoughts completely, even to those closest to them. This "no full disclosure" secrecy disease is, however, strongest within management hierarchies. The main block to revealing one's thoughts, opinions, attitudes, and other feelings to others in the hierarchical structure lies in the nature of the hierarchy itself. It stems from the fact that a person's future in an organization is dependent on those who are above him and below him in the hierarchy, as well as on those who flank him.

Whenever someone interacts with his hierarchical neighbor, whether superior, subordinate, or peer, he bears in mind, consciously or intuitively, that whatever is said may have a bearing on his future in the organization. This awareness and caution prevails regardless of whether he is ambitious or not. Thus a person's ambition may be to hold on to his job when many others in the organization are losing theirs.

The same caution about what an individual reveals of his feelings regarding what is going on in the organization exists also with regard to all those related to his immediate neighbors. In other words, the circle of those with whom he should be careful when talking about organizational conditions and people, including feelings about himself, is extended to include those who might transmit his feelings to his superiors, subordinates, or peers.

This means that almost no individual in an organizational hierarchy will reveal his innermost thoughts and feelings to his immediate organizational neighbors. He would tell them most things which he feels would be helpful, or at least not harmful, to himself. He would conceal from the, things which may be obstacles to his future in the organization. He would, indeed, twist some of the things that are in his mind and come out with what may be considered as "lies".

The question of what is or is not the "truth" requires some elaboration. There is no absolute truth in organization or, for that matter, in life as a whole. This is closely linked to the non-existence of objective facts in life and in organizations. There are only individual perceptions of what is happening around us. Only when the perceptions of all or most individuals who have witnessed or experienced an event coincide, can one say that this consensus is the truth and a fact.

The only absolute truth that exists is in relation to one's own innermost thoughts and feelings. One can lie to oneself or to others, in revealing one's feelings and thoughts. Alternatively, one can tell the truth, meaning one's own truth, which does not necessarily correspond with, and may at times conflict with, the truth as others see the same matter.

With regard to this type of truth, and only to this truth, it may be said that when a manager communicates with his superior, subordinates, and peers, the things he tells them consist of "the truth", not "the whole truth", not "nothing but the truth". In other words, part of what he tells them is what he really thinks and feels. Another part of his feelings and thoughts he conceals from his listeners. The third part represents things not consistent with, and which are contrary to his innermost feelings and thoughts.

Apparently, no research has tried to establish the
proportions among these three components of what people tell each other in organizations. It is therefore a fair assumption that ongoing interpersonal communication is equally divided among the "truth", "not the whole truth", and "not nothing but the truth", on the average. Actually the relative weight of each of the three parts, especially the first part (the "truth") in relation to the subsequent two parts (the "non-truth"), depends on the degree of balance among the principal systems of the TOS.

The three categories of truth and non-truth in interpersonal communication as they relate to five contingency situations of the TOS are as follows (see Figure 11):

**Contingency position 1.** The three principal systems, SDM, managerial structure, and managerial characteristics, are in balance; managerial satisfaction is positive. The relative amount of 'truth', 'not the whole truth', and 'not nothing but the truth' is equally divided.

**Contingency position 2.** The SDM grows, but the managerial structure and managerial characteristics stay as they were; managerial satisfaction is negative. The pressures on managers are enormous because the managerial structure is not advanced enough for the SDM. The managers are not able to cope with the SDM. They increase the relative part of non-truth in what they are relating to others, and accordingly decrease the truth in what they say.

**Contingency position 3.** Although a new managerial structure suitable for the SDM is forced upon the managers, most of them, including the chief executive, remain. The managerial satisfaction of these old-time managers is negative, because they are forced to operate in a structure alien to their managerial characteristics. Therefore, the non-truth is still relatively large among them, especially among old-timers and newcomers.

**Figure 11** Relative 'truth' and 'non-truth' among managers in hierarchies in different contingency positions of TOS subsystems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOS subsystems</th>
<th>Contingency position</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDM</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial structure</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial satisfaction</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>On the average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Truth**

- The truth: Average, Much less, Less, Less, Average
- Not the whole truth: Average, More, Much more, More, Average
- Not nothing but the truth: Average, Much more, More, Average, Average

*We assume that on the average the total feelings, thoughts, opinions, etc., of a person are equally divided into his or her telling the truth (1), "not the whole truth" (2), and "not nothing but the truth" (3).*

**Contingency position 4.** Key managers, including the CEO, are replaced by new ones, with managerial characteristics suitable to the requirements of the SDM, are brought in. The managerial satisfaction improves, changing from negative to positive, because soon the new managers are going to bring the TOS to contingency position 5. Accordingly there is a reduction in the non-truth.

**Contingency position 5.** The balance among the subsystems of the TOS is restored, along with the positive managerial satisfaction. The relative amounts of 'truth', 'not the whole truth', and 'not nothing but the truth' are back to average.

The two secrecy diseases discussed, 'anti-mobility' and 'no full disclosure', cause three ailments which endanger organizational health and consequently lead to fatality among organizations. The anti-mobility disease is linked closely to industrial secrecy. The stronger the anti-mobility norm in a country, the more the industrial organizations keep secrets from each other. 'No full disclosure' is both a personal and an organizational disease. Individuals in organizations do not reveal all their feelings, opinions, and attitudes to each other. The consequences of this to oneself and to one's organizational superiors, subordinates, and peers are seen in two severe organizational ailments. One represents maladaptations between the sub-systems of the TOS, while the other represents the weight of accumulated undisclosed feelings.

We shall discuss those two ailments in more detail in the next part of the paper.
6. **How can we judge whether the organisation runs a "skillful organisation"?**

Obviously, in order to find out whether management runs a skillful organisation, one has to explore the TOG (Total Organisational System) and see how well does management tackle the major hurdles mentioned in the previous part of this paper.

It is clear that because of the two secrecy diseases - the 'anti-mobility' and the 'no full disclosure' - and especially the latter one, internal auditing of the proficiency of management to run a skillful organisation, is not possible. So, the first thing to do is to find out whether the CE and his management are set up for getting over the two ailments which are consequential from the no full disclosure disease, namely:

**The Undisclosed Feelings Ailment.** On the average one could assume that every day, every manager in the organization goes home with two thirds of his feelings and thoughts, undisclosed. Usually he does not have anybody out of the management to relieve his mind and heart, to open up to them. So his mental and mindfull load is expanding regularly. This would cause increasing problems of motivation, satisfaction and proficiency at work.

**The Hierarchical Communication Gap.** Consider first the upward communication in a situation, in which the superior is aware of only one third of the true feelings of his subordinates. His own superior is aware of only a third of what he is aware of. Assuming that he is relating to his superior only one third of the one third of the truth of his subordinate, the superior's superior will be aware of only one ninth of the truth of the subordinates. In other words, under such conditions, the truth of the lowest level in the hierarchy is exponentially reduced as the communication flows up the hierarchy. The calculation for the amount of low-level truth reaching the top of a five-level hierarchy is therefore:

\[
\frac{1}{3} \left( \frac{1}{3} \right)^4 = \frac{1}{81} = 0.01234567
\]

This means that under the specified conditions only a little more than 1 per cent of what the low-level managers in a five-level hierarchy really think and feel reaches their CE. If two more levels of hierarchy are added, there will be seven echelons and six communication gaps. The share of the truth of first level of management reaching the CE drops to little more than 0.1 per cent (3 to the power six makes 1/729).

The same is true when the communication flows downwards rather than upwards. Thus in a hierarchy of five levels under the same assumptions, only somewhat more than 1 per cent of what the CE really thinks and feels is reaching his first line of managers.

It may be a revelation to managers that this communication gap is not peculiar to them and their specific organization only, but it is a universal sickness. Unlike the undisclosed feelings ailments, which one often hears complaints such as 'there is nobody I can talk to over here', the communication gap ailments is rarely admitted by managers.

Every manager knows, of course, that he is not telling his superior, subordinates, and peers everything on his mind; but this is an indication not to be openly discussed even with people outside the concerned hierarchy.

This organisational ailment is even more severe for the management, than the previous one of undisclosed feelings, because without knowing if the management does not confront the two above-mentioned main hurdles or if the organization is on the other hand in a serious situation with regards to these two main hurdles - management can do nothing about it. Thus the most helpful thing for management would be to enable the CE and other managers to know more about the feelings and thoughts of managers throughout the hierarchy (more than, for example, 1/729 of what people really feel and think at the very bottom or very top of the hierarchy!).

Thus, the more management is enabling the organizational members, and especially the managers, to open up - the less the danger from the two ailments, and the more management can confront and overcome the two main hurdles, in the organizational strategy and in the managerial structure. Because of the 'no full disclosure' phenomenon, managers cannot help other managers to open up, because they would not open up before one another. Therefore, all kinds of approaches like an 'open door' policy, would not and do not work.

How can management help the managers open up, without doing it itself? This is the subject of the next part of this paper.
7. YOU CAN MANAGE IT BECOME YOUR SKILL?

There are many skills needed for management to help organizations thrive and survive. For securing the continued cooperation of each PMU (human factor of decision making — see figures 2 and 3) and handling each of the principal systems of the TOS — the management needs a different set of skills. However, as the saying "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing" so we can say — not possessing all the required skills for running the whole TOS is dangerous for the organizational thriving and survival. Let us survey several of these partial skills, about which we are occasionally being told that if we master each of them — it would be a panacea for success and survival. We shall do so by mainly referring to some of the more recent examples of such approaches which could help management only partially (see the first three approaches in figure 12), but also refer to older well known approaches to skillful management. The following are only several examples for limited, and sometimes unhelpful approaches to managerial skill.

- **Skill in Human Relations.** As all other things in the dynamics of management and organization, there is no 'good' or 'bad' human relations, and the appropriate human relations depends on the contingency position of the organization. Thus, 'McGregor's (7) Theory X' is typical of the behavior of an entrepreneurial leader, and is suitable only for organizations which need to be enterprising, usually when they are started. "Theory Y", which is a management in which the lower hierarchical levels participate more in the organizational decision making process, is more appropriate the more the management moves first to a formally centralized (functional structure) and then to more and more centralized structures (from a "one mouth", to "two mouths", to "three mouths", to "six mouths" and finally to twelve mouths' decentralization). If we would have accepted McGregor's contention (7) that all organization should be run on the V Theory — we would not have had any new organization, products, methods, innovations etc., and the whole world would be stagnated. Another example in pros and cons management is William Ouchi's Theory Z (see figure 12). If we accept Ouchi's assumption that a Japanese Hiugi decision making process (which is a sort of an upside-down decision making process when compared to ours; if this is what it is, because we cannot be sure that we understand Japanese phenomenon to be that it is) is the participation of lower levels in the decision making of the whole organization. It means that there is in Japanese management a simultaneous high degree of hierarchical organization, which in our organizations is contrary to participation, together with a high degree of informal activity through the hierarchy — his advocacy of participation is at least, not as universal as McGregor's. Ouchi deals only with large organizations, as the other approaches mentioned in figure 12, except for the TOS approach. McGregor on the other hand, suggests that Theory Y should replace Theory X, under any conditions.

- **Skill in Profitability and Return on Investment.** If all the managerial skill and effort would be concentrated on getting more dividends for the owners, all business corporations would disappear in oblivion within 5-15 years. Other PMU, not only the shareholders, have also to be remunerated for and receive returns on their cooperation with the organization, customers want better, cheaper and more available products, the workers want better wages, shorter working hours etc., and so want all the other PMU. If everything goes to the owners nothing remains for the others. The organizational example of Swissair (8) deals with management being made to concentrate on profits for the owners, to the degree that it constitutes a constraint on its ability to manage the whole immediate environment.

- **Skill in Marketing.** The story of the Rolls Royce (8) aero engine is a story which started by concentrating on the employees' desires and interests, proceeded to take care of the wishes and interests of the customers (who wanted more innovated and cheaper engines) too, but, unlike the Swissair example, did not consider all the owners' interests. This is what brought Rolls Royce to bankruptcy. In other words none of these skills can be at the exclusion of the other skills. If any of these skills, say marketing, is performed on a high level of proficiency, in relation to the other managerial skills mentioned above and below then it will be at their expense, and would


(8) The summaries of the examples of Swissair and Rolls Royce appear in pp 36 and 37 of Managing Growing Organizations (see Figure 12).
Kill the organization in no time, because their systems will be in complete imbalance with one another.

- **Skill in Growing.** Yes, organizations have to grow. However, as long as they are run in one of the basic structures - an entrepreneurial, a functional, a product/service or an area decentralized structure - they have to go through periods of stabilization between one growth period to another. It is during these periods of stabilization that they get out of their present managerial structure and formalize their next one (see Figure 10). The skill in growing, as well as the two previously mentioned skills in profitability and marketing, are the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHOSE APPROACH</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>HOW CAN AN ORGANIZATION BE SKILLFUL?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCG APPROACH (Boston Consulting Group)</td>
<td>About to be published by Harper and Raw</td>
<td>Adapt its strategy to the market conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEICKEN APPROACH</td>
<td>In Search of Excellence by Peters and Waterman (Harper and Row, 1982)</td>
<td>Following the eight principles - in the organizations they have established as successful, mainly by having maintained good performance results over a few decades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORY 2 APPROACH</td>
<td>William Ouchi's book published by Addison-Wesley (1981)</td>
<td>Copying some of what seem to be the ways in which the Japanese do it, and let us assume that the voluntary behavior of key position executives could be changed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12: Four different approaches to skillful organizations.

- **Skill in Organizational Strategy.** BCG (the Boston Consulting Group) has been accumulating expertise and trying to pass it over to its clients, as to the appropriate strategies (of what, how and where) in which they have to operate (see Figure 12). This is what we call the first major hurdle that management should overcome. But how can it overcome it, without tackling at the same time their second main hurdle, that of adapting their managerial structures to their scope of decision making, which are the function of their organizational strategies (see Figure 1)? Or, to put it into other words, how can they be even expected to change their strategies, if they do not have the appropriate managerial characteristics to do it, i.e., becoming too expert and skilled in conducting its what, why and where strategies without keeping it in balance with the principal systems (see Figure 1), would "kill" the organization too, although it will take longer than with our previous examples.

- **Skill in Perpetuating Individual Technical Skills and Promoting Managerial Mobility.** One of the best known cliches in managerial literature is that of "Peter's Principle." (9) Peter warns his audience not to promote people to their incompetence. In this he assumes that the most important aspect of a manager are his technical abilities, which could be learnt, and not his managerial characteristics which are acquired at a very early age. However, even the technical requirement of a role are changing very rapidly in our times and it is said that everyone who lives and works towards the end of the 20th Century will have to change his skills at least three times in his or her lifetime. As for the required managerial

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Skills meaning the way in which a person should conduct his or her relationships with others in the organization, these may change in every role, on the average, every 5 - 10 years (for science based high-tech industries, this may be every 2 - 3 years). So you do not have to be promoted to your incompetence - if you stay more than 5 - 10 years in your post, you become incompetent anyway!

- **Skill in Running a Product/Service Diversified Organization.** We have shown earlier in the paper that in order to survive organizations have to grow in their size, how and where. This means, among others, that they have to diversify their product/service lines. Peters and Waterman advocate to organizations, on the other hand to stick to their competences and not diversify. Apparently by the time they reached this part of their *In Search of Excellence* (see Figure 12), they did not notice that they start their book with lots of praise for the Japanese large corporations, which are the root conglomerated organizations in the world.

- **Skill in Running Organizations Simultaneously in a Formal and Informal Structures.** Except for the above principle of Peters and Waterman which is wrong, the other seven principles which they seem to advocate for corporations that wish to excel (and which organization does not?), are on the whole correct. One of the most novel of these eight principles is that of large corporations (in the sense of their large product/service diversity, their use of advanced technologies and science, and their geographical spread) having to facilitate a large and continuous range of innovating activities, which to a large extent require informal relationships among the performers; yet continue simultaneously to manage their existing product/service lines and countries in centrally and decentrally formalized structures. This, they very rightly point out in another one of their eight principles, cannot be done in a so called "matrix structure". They do not however point out how it can be done. To believe that the only way in which it can and is done, is in a "multistucture" which is described earlier in this paper (see Figure 9). Indeed, it is because they did not realize that in order to be able to run multistucture one needs very particular managerial characteristics, they included in their sample organizations which had been run by straight forward entrepreneurs. This enabled the first author to predict, since the end of 1983 when he first read *In Search of Excellence*, that at least half of the 35 corporations would not last much longer with the CEOs which Peters and Waterman described so vividly in their book. One of these corporations was Westinghouse, and indeed very soon afterwards they wanted their leadership of the organization. In other corporations of the 35 either this happened, or they entered into growing difficulties for their success and survival.

The short and long of the above is that the management of skillful organizations required various parts of some of the above skills, but much more than that. It requires an ability to overcome, at every stage of the contingent development of the organization the two main above mentioned hurdles.

This in turn requires management to know what is really happening throughout the Total Organizational System (as the saying goes -- "the beginning of wisdom is knowledge"). What really happens in an organization is not something "objective", but rather the subjectiveness of what is in the hearts and minds of the members of the organization, primarily the managers but also other organizational members, like workers, customers, suppliers, shareholders etc. In order to know and be aware of the feelings and thoughts of the organizational members, the organization has to be helped by outside consultants who would carry out every several years a so called clinical action-research, which would be fed back to the Chief Executive and eventually to other managers in the hierarchy. (10)

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(10) This way of helping management to become more skillful is described in: "Help for Chief Executives - The Outside Consultant", by T.D. Mainhall in *California Management Review*, Santa Clara, 1978, and also in a paper mentioned in previous footnotes (6).
8. THE OLDER THE ORGANIZATION - THE MORE SKILLFUL IT HAS BEEN

then ownership was separated from management, on the whole, first in the UK and then in other western countries, people thought that organizations would live for ever. After all, they said, such an organization could much easier entwine the life of the individual who created it and run it all his life. And indeed management could be much more skillful if it were not closely linked to and dependent on any of the human IM (factors of decision making). Unfortunately, at least two other human IM have been trying their hand at time to time in intervening directly in management, usually because of political and ideological reasons - government and workers. These too IM should, of course, participate in the PD (decision making process), and use their bargaining and legal positions in every organization the best they can in order to further and achieve as much as they can; all these pressures and power are their legitimize rights, exactly as they are the rights of the shareholders, customers and other IM (i.e. the stakeholders in the organization).

But, exactly as separation of ownership from management was a good thing for the organization, so would the separation of workers and government from management be to the advantage of the organization. Almost invariably when two similar organizations (similar in most aspects of their TOS, i.e. similar in the composition of their principal systems of the TOS, as per Figure 1), with the only difference that in the one there is "participation", i.e. intervention of workers and/or government in the management, that management who does not have any members of other IM in its midst - succeeds to manage better a skillful organization.

Nonetheless, while organizations before the separation of ownership from management, had usually a maximum lifetime of, say, fifty years (from the time their founder-manager-came was in his twenties until he died in his seventies), the usual longevity of organizations nowadays is estimated at around 100 years. Very few organizations which are with us today are more than 200 years old, i.e. were born before the Industrial Revolution. Let us first of all find out why it is that the older an organization is, the more skillful its management has been in having its organization thrive and survive, and then let us consider a few examples.

We would like to compare this skill of management, to the skill of an individual to stop smoking. If the individual is just able to reduce the number of cigarettes he smokes per day, i.e. one stops smoking between one cigarette to another for somewhat longer periods of time, this is no indication of the skill to stop smoking; many a time it proves the contrary. If the individual has succeeded to temporarily stop smoking say for several months, even this is not indicative of a skill to stop smoking. It is only the individual who stopped smoking once and for all, who could and should be considered as having the skill to stop smoking.

However as long as the individual is still alive, we are not positive he will not smoke until his death. So we should modify our previous statement and say - the longer an individual lives after having stopped smoking the more he has been skillful in stopping to smoke. This is exactly what we should say about the management's skill for running a surviving organization - the longer the organization lives, the more skillful management has been in keeping it alive.

There is another analogy between the individual's skill to stop smoking and the managerial skill to ascertain survival. The ability to stop smoking is dependent to a large degree on the individual's personality. So is the managerial skill to ascertain survival dependent to a large degree on the organizational "personality", which is the corporate culture. In the following three examples of long living organizations we shall highlight those aspects of their corporate cultures which seem to us to explain why they survived much more than other organizations. By "corporate cultures" we mean those aspects of their organizational and managerial behavior which are basically different from the universal contingency behavior of all organizations throughout the world. This part of the "corporate cultures" of all organizations within one national culture are all those norms and values in say, one country which make organizational and managerial behavior in organizations within that national culture, different than those in organizations of other countries; these are, for example, norms and values regarding such things as interpersonal managerial mobility, the attitudes towards bribes and slack funds, the attitudes towards time and punctuality etc. In a similar way the "corporate culture" of multinational corporations is that that they easily accommodate within themselves individuals from different cultures, that they more easily adopt their organizational behavior in every country to its national culture (or, alternatively, that they do not carry the culture of their country of origin, to the countries in which they operate), etc.

The three examples of old organizations, and those aspects of their corp-
Orienteering cultures which helped them to become more skillful than other organizations, are by their longevity, from the very old to the more recently founded:

- The Roman Catholic Church (the RCC is the 'mother' of all organizations — about 1800 years old). Three aspects of its “corporate culture” helped it to survive:
  - The RCC has two managerial structures in which it operates simultaneously. The one serves for its routine decisions, according to its pre-established rules, directions, doctrines, etc. The second managerial structure serves for policy decisions, as well as one-shot, non-routine – non policy decisions. The latter structure is composed of three levels only: the Pope, the Bishops (everyone else who has been ordained as bishop) and the Priests (everyone else who has been ordained as priest). This latter structure enables the RCC to overcome the “Hierarchical Communication Gap” always caused by the interpersonal “Re-Pull Disclosure” syndrome which exists in the RCC hierarchy as in any other organization.
  - Confession. The confession has helped the RCC through its catharsis aspects, to overcome the second ailment caused by the “Re-Pull Disclosure” syndrome — the "Undisclosed Feelings" ailment.
  - Electing old rather than young Popes. Since the first half of the 19th century, the College of Cardinals has elected old individuals as Popes, apart from three notable exceptions. As their life expectancy was not usually more than about ten years the RCC has had the opportunity to review its leadership needs in terms of the managerial characteristics of the Pope, every few years. In two out of the three cases of Popes who were elected before they reached the age of sixty years, the RCC suffered severe setbacks during their tenure. The third is the present Pope John Paul II.

- The Mafia (the Mafia is the longest survivor among organized crime syndicates, it has been around for about 700 years since it first started operating in Sicily, as a sort of a Robin Hood type of protector of Sicilians from the persecution of foreign conquerors). The aspects of the Mafia's culture helped it to survive:
  - Ignoring most systems of the "Wider Environment" principal system. The Mafia has been ignoring the following four environmental systems (see "The Wider Environment" in Figure 1):
    - The Deployment Market System,
    - The Capital (money) Market System,
    - The Consumer (supply - demand) System, and
    - The Social-cultural (and geographical) System.
perceived Japanese corporate culture aspects, from which the non-Japanese organizations could learn (11)

- The "Multistructure" Managerial Structure. This structure is perceived to be part of the managerial changes instituted in 1912, of which the lifetime employment in the large zaibatsu type corporations, was the major one. This change was apparently introduced on the basis of the notion that for the Japanese there is deep and that exactly as one is part of Japan and that's so, so one is, part of, say, "Hitotsubashi" during all his lifetime. Its sense that part of this shift to lifetime employment was the notion of a multistructure managerial structure, the dynamics of which is not achieved by interorganizational managerial mobility, but is rather attained by an internal, intraorganizational mobility.

- Different ways of management education and development for different types of managers. Closely related to the multistructure, in which the awareness of differences in the managerial characteristics among managers seems to be a strong awareness of the difference in the interpersonal characteristics of different managers. In any case, what we believe to discern is that, while the formal types of managers, whether those suitable for centralized (i.e., functional) or decentralized (i.e., product line or area structures) are being sent to formalized types of training in management education and development programs; while the informal types of managers, the entrepreneurs and their entrepreneurial aids, are being sent to roam and visit organizations and their environments around the world, so as to "fill their batteries" for further entrepreneurial activities.

We have presented several instances of corporate culture which we believe that the SSC, the "fagia" and Japanese zaibatsu like "Hitotsubashi" to outlive all, but a few, of their contemporary organizations. We believe that it is by studying their corporate cultures and imitating them in kind, rather than in detail, we can make our present day organizations much more skillful. That is why we feel that we have learned more from the old organizations, than one could learn from relatively young organizations, as the ones studied, for example, by Peters and Waterman (see Figure 12).

(11) The first author presented a paper on "What we can and cannot learn from the Japanese", which is included in the proceedings of the International Academy of Management’s Seminar at Yerevan (Armenia) and Moscow, October 6 - 13, 1984.
Therefore we are often obliged to do only with a verbal characterization. The "quantitative and qualitative" relations form a dialectical oneness which is to be taken in account at systematic approach to the evaluating of the investigated object and the management of its further development.

Every corporation which has resulted from the integration of producing concerns, goal organizations and scientific research institutes is noted for individuality from the view of the whole as well as from that of inner structure. This individuality is reflected by the so called specific conditions which are very important for the management of the corporations, especially in such a high industrial concentration as there is found in the Czechoslovak economy. They form a reserve which is always at our disposal to be used in the frame of passing to intensive factors of economy.

An important factor influencing in an outstanding manner the rise and character of the specific conditions of every corporation is its social climate, the activity and evaluating level of its development until now and the approach of the managers to their future development.

Managing as a strategic process is based on comprehending the identity of the corporation. Forming the idea of the organization on the world and expressing its obligations to society rises from the systems of purposes and ideas. It is a strategic clue for the strategic demeaning of the organization. The chief management task is to secure the penetrating of the profile in concrete and the mission of the corporation in the whole organization, to every worker in it and to form such measures which hold for a long time, from the very beginning and also to form an inner facility for the further development.

The definite form of the purpose and idea systems is formed by the managers, especially in the top level of management. An important part is played in this sense by the so called ethics of the managers which becomes evident in the management improving system and which has to take the relations between people up to a higher level. It ought to influence a gay and creative environment educating people and favouring the participation of the workers in managing the reproduction process of the whole organization and thus forming facilities for ensuring the desirable development of economic effectiveness.

The purpose and idea system is not only an inner matter of the corporations, but it gradually penetrates into their environments and influences the opinions of the society at evaluating their demeanour. In this way gradually there is formed the reputation and the good name of the organization which influences not only the customers' interest in their products, but also the technical, economical and social cooperation on the level of business partners and the rest of the environment.

Figuring the phenomena passing in the inner structure of corporations is therefore difficult because of their complexity, changeability and uniqueness. It is necessary to search some more possibilities to complete the work with the indices and to raise the knowledge level of objects and processes, passing in their inner structure.

The dialectical oneness of the "qualitative and quantitative" relations in the corporation as a whole, its separate subsystems and their elements requires special information as a means of expressing, following and influencing.
For an effective decision it does not to take into account only the "quantitative" characteristics, because a rational piece of information cannot be separated from the relations and causes which made it or which influenced its development. From a wider point of view on the managed object it must therefore be completed by pieces of information of "qualitative" character rendering the phenomena chiefly from the standpoint of their properties, continuity, causes of rise, purpose, ethics etc.

These are the mostly found privations of information in corporation management:

1. Indifferentiated information and the rise of more information sources with one index. These are two factors closely related. The common rise of both these privations consists in the basic information not being definitely determined by the primary information. It might be different in every concern and time, as the place of rise changes by development.

If synthesis is not applied in management, the information system is so large in range and details that it makes very complicated or even quite impossible for the manager to find his bearings in the problem or in investigating the object as a whole.

The contemporaneous state is characterized by the fact that the information from the primary source to the user has many degrees and therefore it is lengthy. During this way there occur mistakes which may be caused by many influences for communication disturbances. The call for one information source and for its quick way from the origin to the aiming use forms the facility for rising the quality of management system and applying synthesis in management. If we consider a corporation as a pyramid from the point of view of organization and its functional structure, then it ought to have the mirror form of the organization structure. If it has not the mirror form, there is no facility for the differentiating of the pieces of information and as a rule they must be used extensively and the input quality to the deciding process is reduced.

2. Wrong information

More values of one piece of information give rise to a dispute on the question which of them is right. In practice, it often means that that value is right, which is at the disposal of the worker in the higher degree, being responsible for the problem sphere. The correctness of the pieces of information depends on a considerable degree on the source. They have been taken from. If the source is given by personal contact it is always remarkable for the informer's subject. Therefore it is better to work only with pieces of information which are relatively objective. This information quality may be received from accountancy, statistical sheets and analyses issued from evidence.

3. Incomplete pieces of information

It happens very often that - being a mistake - a concern phenomenon is figured by a minimum number of indexes without investigating if they reflect it in a proper way. Forming an information system it is necessary to apply the systematic approach and to figure the concern phenomenon, which is always very complicated, by an index system. We naturally try to minimize the number of indexes in the system and maximize their declaring efficiency. Applying the system approach in figuring a concern phenomenon enables us to consider the concern phenomenon as a system and to figure it in a complex manner on the basis
of an index system in such details which correspond to the requirements of the given management degree carrying out the investigation.

4. Late information

We are to keep in view that the information value is wearing and therefore information given in time is one of the decisive criteria for the information quality. If the information reaches us in time, we can still make decisions influencing the course of the given event. A first-quality information given in time enables the manager to make his decision in good time when he still can influence the development of the concern phenomenon.

The duration of the practical information consequence depends on its synthetic rate. The more synthetic it is, the more it is practically applicable, as a rule, even if its concrete rate falls. The applicance of synthesis in work with information rises from the management level it has to serve for. The higher the position of the manager deciding, the more synthetic information he needs to proceed from knowledge investigating the object as a whole.

5. Not applying the system approach

Not applying the system approach bears upon information desintegration. The scientific and technical development includes progress as well as negative influence. One of the last is the rise of conditions for management desintegration. That is for the reason that more and more specialists take part in the management of certain corporation fields. It may be said that the latter get smaller and smaller, and we rarely meet such a manager's activity which should execute the role of synthetic or general managers, concentrating the effort of the specialists in solving the needs and aims of the managed object as an entity.

The top managers of the single fields of corporations cannot even know the specific conditions under which the concern phenomena pass. If they had to find them out earlier, the management intervention should not any more influence the course of a certain event. Moreover, such a command should interfere with the specialist's domain in managing the field in question, it should deprive him of responsibility for the further development, reduce his motivation, and it should prove that the higher management degree would not at all consider him as a specialist in managing the field in question, in a word, that it has to substitute for him.

6. Expenses of the information system

If the management level depends on the information quality, then on the rationalization degree of the information system depends the effectivity of the management system.

Information system rationalization is the basic facility for forming the information system, and it is also the facility for the economic effectiveness of the managed object.

There ought to be inserted into the information system first of all those pieces of information which contribute more for management than the expenses for getting them. The deciding role is played first of all by the quality, complexity and the fact of getting them in good time, at applying this rule.
Creative Work and Improvement of Corporation Management

Among the chief causes giving rise to the need of improving the corporation management there are the call for the increase of the economic effectiveness which may be reached only by basic measures in the field of structural changes, the development of science and technology, investments and the like. The realization of these measures is to secure by a set of technical, social, organization and economic innovations afflicting even the wide environment of the followed object.

Under the concrete conditions of corporations there may be interesting only such a creative work which issues from its real needs, conditions and interests, solve the resulting non-equivalents from its dynamic development and solving them proceed from the possibilities being really at the disposal of the corporation.

The creative work of a manager therefore cannot be any, but it must rise and be influenced by the inner aims and interests of the managed object as well as by the needs and interests of its economic environment. To work in a creative manner the manager has "in an inner way" himself to realize certain facilities of a synthetic worker. These are:

- character features,
- temperament,
- familiarity with work and skill.

The greatness of economic effectiveness implying the success of corporation function has to be such one as to secure in a regressive way and stimulate the necessary level of creative work under concrete conditions of the corporation in question.

Representing the conditions which influence the creative work of the managers and in this way indirectly also the economic effectiveness of corporations, we may rise from three basic starting points which influence the development and effect of the "quantitative" and qualitative relations within the corporations.

These basic starting points for forming the inner relations of the corporations work out the facilities for the necessary creative work to be influenced by the concrete conditions of the working place in question which might be considered as specific and the economic conditions which might be considered as general.

Figure 1: The creative work respect the existence of "quantitative and qualitative" relations in the corporations

![Diagram showing the relationship between general conditions, specific conditions, and creative activity of workers.](image-url)
The relations influencing the manager as a producer of creative work are numbered by odd numbers and those of his own part in management by even numbers.

Both the relations give expression to "quantitative" relations in managing the object, mostly because the restricting conditions and the part of the workers in management is realised by different forms and managing methods, using various indices figuring a certain concern phenomenon basing on its quantification.

The relations shown in figure 1 and numbered by figures express first of all "quantitative" relations and give room for the existence of "qualitative" relations which are figured in dashed lines.

An effective management system ought to join the "quantitative" and "qualitative" points of view, because they form a dialectical oneness. Affecting this dialectical oneness influences finally the economic effectiveness of the managed object, because it influences the relations between men and it this way also the quality of the creative and social climates.

The idea behind this article is a rather circumstantial one, being related to the writer's own position within the European system which produces literature in the corporate studies field. As a member of the organizing committee of the Standing Conference on Organisational Symbolism, I gained access to a large number of papers (mostly as yet unpublished) dealing with Organisational Symbolism and Corporate Culture. It was probably the sheer weight of this material which first drew my attention to the emergence of some new trends marking the theoretical approach to these matters. Several features of the new trends attract special interest in themselves, quite apart from the conclusions to which they lead. Here, I will not be going into the details of those conclusions, but merely considering some formal aspects which display the symptoms of a fresh relationship between the research side and the corporations and organisations it investigates. The relationship will be seen, in the light of all work on the same subject, as a further illustration of the broader evolutionary rapport linking the corporation to society as a whole.

This leads me to take two different sets of considerations in turn.

Firstly, by describing the particular symptom in question; starting with its most obvious feature, which is the appearance among bibliographical references - and thus the sources of conceptual inspiration - of authors whose fields and production seem at first sight to lie well outside the traditional area of corporate studies.

Having then outlined the new area brought in by these new references, I will next focus on the way the latter are brought
to bear in an attempt to formulate general concepts applying
to the corporation as a whole. This brings us to two fundamental
questions:

- can the concepts taken from one field of science (in
  the wider sense, including philosophy and psychoanalysis)
  validly be transposed to another field?

- correlative, is there a continuum between the corpora-
  tion and its social environment such that we can indiscrimi-
  nately extend to the former certain concepts originally
developed to assist investigation of the latter?

A further aspect which will be considered is that of
the application of such concepts on a more selective basis, to
narrower and (some say) marginal areas of investigation. This
will bring us to examine the status of researchers using unorthodox
references in relation to the corporation, and to consider
the nature of the new corporate partners addressed by these, together
with that of the new areas on which they enter.

Finally, under this first heading, the article attempts to
identify the underlying corporate model implied both by the trans-
position of new concepts and by their application within circumscri-
bred areas. In turn, this model implies a specific type of
relationship between the corporation and its social womb.

Secondly, the above lines of approach will bring us back
to the central issues concerning conceptual transposition and
the nature of the corporation as such. An initial postulate
consists in saying that, in the absence of proper considera-
tion of these two points, the findings resulting from this new trend
remain open to question. To overcome this deficiency, and with
a view to being able to interpret those findings adequately, two
alternative approaches are available and are examined in turn:

- construction of a strict diagram of the transposition
  process, matching formal analogies between the source
  area and the "host" area. Reasons are given for dis-
  carding this option;

- a demonstration of the way in which the corporation, on
  the one hand, and corporate research, on the other, have
evolved both in relation to each other and in relation
to society as a whole. This is the option selected.

Once the evolutionary process in question has been hatched,
it emerges that what we have hitherto called a "transposition"
is not in fact aptly described by that word, to the extent that
the "source" and "host" areas tend to overlap as the corporation
moves closer to becoming the focal point in the social scheme.

By referring to a model which explains this movement, and
describes the internal structural consequences it has on the
corporation, we come to integrate within a single diagram all
the characteristics of the "symptom" from which we started: new
specialists inside the corporation, new areas and subjects of
investigation, new reference sources, and similar nature of the
findings made.

This article at no time discusses the precise content of
such findings, but it does attempt to uncover a characteristic
possessed by most of the papers concerned: an "arm's length"
approach to the corporation when appraising it. However, while
the earlier generation of authors quoted in the current new-style
research papers adopted an overall approach remote from the
business world (typically ignorant about, and uninterested in, the
corporation - furthermore considered unworthy of serious study),
those belonging to the tendency now considered have taken up

...
positions inside the corporation walls - but taking with them the concepts borrowed from those same predecessors. Here again, however, this movement can be seen in the light of the general trend taking the corporation towards the centre of society, and of one of the main consequences of that trend on corporate conduct: the appearance of Management Symbolism. It is in the very nature of the corporation's evolution that it should now embrace a type of critical appraisal formerly exercised from a distance (and in less informed terms), while at the same time devising the best means of controlling it.

OUTWARD MANIFESTATIONS OF THE "SYMPTOM" - NEW BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CREDENTIALS, NEW AREAS OF REFERENCE

As indicated at the head of this article, our critical review will be limited to about ten of the papers submitted to the SCOGS Symposium held at Lund (Sweden) in 1984. This number represents about one-tenth of all the material received by the symposium, whose theme was "Organisational Symbolism and Corporate Culture". A brief overall review points to some salient trends:

- some papers adopting the traditional ethnological meaning of the term "culture" and thus offering cross-cultural comparisons between countries while placing the main emphasis on the corporation (2);

- papers which, from the conceptual and methodological standpoints, remain fairly similar to classical management studies but achieve a more modern look by introducing some recent developments (3).

These constitute a significant body of contributions which, either for strategic reasons or because they had not thus far found a forum, joined up with the movement materialised by SCOGS. In addition to these, the more innovative approaches - on which this article focuses - included:

- attempts to define the new concepts which mark out the area of the symposium's theme: culture, symbol, myth, saga, hero, and so on; and, in particular, to express their analytical significance in terms of empirical studies (4);

- work directed to aspects of the corporation which had not hitherto been subjected to analysis, such as the "style" of corporate relationships, the roles of humour and cynism, etc (5).

The new source material

For a more precise understanding of the distinctive features of the innovative movement just referred to, it may be helpful to display in tabulated form a fairly comprehensive selection of the writers who are newcomers to the corporate studies literature, thus:

- linguists
  - semioticians - BARTELS, BERIDA, KRISTeva
  - socio-linguists
  - philosophers
    - emphasis on linguistics and psychoanalysis - RICOEUR
    - emphasis on social history - MARCUSE
    - emphasis on economics - ALTHUSSER
    - emphasis on socio-economics - Frankfurt school, HABERMAS, LACONIC, etc
    - emphasis on epistemology - CASUER
- psychoanalysts - FREUD, JUNG, to lesser extent, LACAN
- sociologists - DEVEREUX
- anthropologists - LÉVY-STRAUSS, BATESON
- historians - E.P. THOMPSON
The above list of authors referenced reveals the outline of a catchment area which, although apparently loosely assembled, nevertheless possesses some salient features:

- in addition to belonging (to greater or lesser extent) to the scientific world, these writers are part of what might be called the intellectual establishment, in the sense of being recognised as qualified to comment on society as a whole;

- many of them are French, and many have Left-wing views (but not all of them);

- none of them, except possibly Marcuse in "One-dimensional Man", has been attracted to the corporation as an institution suitable for specific inquiry.

**Macro-concepts**

As a first step to understanding the significance of these references, let us now take a look at the system of demonstration into which they are incorporated by corporate research. From the mere enumeration of their parent disciplines, without need to be familiar with their works, it is to be expected that the concepts borrowed from them will be of a general kind, from each of two standpoints:

- firstly, because they relate to phenomena which feature over the whole range of society: language, culture, the unconscious, and so on,

- secondly, because they are not chosen among the most specific notions attaching to the parent disciplines, but among those which are the most outward-looking and evocative.

These concepts thus derive their usefulness from being of general application: being valid for society as a whole, they can legitimately be applied to the corporation which is part and parcel of that society. However, the way in which they are applied retains some ambiguity - just one of several consequences of a general problem we are about to discuss, namely, that their transposition from the parent discipline to the corporation has not been "crafted". Many of such concepts are linked to an area of inquiry which is fairly homogeneous in relation to them: for example, a community of individuals all speaking a given language, sharing a given culture, and so on. When these are applied to the corporation, either of two cases may arise:

- either the corporation is to some extent "transparent", and the concepts then relate to those parts of it which intercept the conceptual plane considered, in the same ways as could apply to the study of any other component of the social fabric,

- or the corporation is so introverted that it in itself constitutes a close community with formal characteristics comparable to those of the area in which the concepts originated.

It might be argued that, in actual fact, this ambiguity prevailing over the application of such concepts is avoided, in that we often have the impression that the researchers using them have converted them into corporate research tools: for example, when they speak of corporate culture, they mean neither "the cultural phenomena within the corporation", nor "the cultural particularities of the industrial world", but are referring to the the whole set of values and perceptions obtaining in a given corporation. However, even if this conversion is strictly made,
we are still left with difficulties concerning the general application of the study findings: to be able to say that a particular cultural factor is typical of and relevant to all corporations, we must first of all be able to consult a precise corporate model explaining the role of culture in the corporation and describing the cultural structure. This is why the researchers in question are not anxious to make a clear choice between the two options set out above: a given factor is general because it belongs both to a corporation and to the extended field of application of a concept defined in relation to the wider society.

The ambiguity affecting the deployment of general concepts is also largely due to the very nature of these: they are very "dense", and thus extremely difficult to handle. In quite a lot of cases, this difficulty is evidenced by the methodology used to handle them. Let us take three examples: language; culture; and the unconscious. In each case, the utilisation of the concept relies on specific subject matter and particular methods of observation and processing. In the first case, we have a linguistic analysis of speech, in the second an ethnological observation, and in the third a psychanalytical treatment. As would be expected, these methods quickly become "saturated": an ethnologist has to observe a simple and immobile society for two years in order to determine its structure of family relationships, a psychanalyst needs many years more before he approaches the end of a treatment, and so on.

Micro-studies

The cumbersome nature thus associated with these general concepts has two consequences:

- in the first place, there is a tendency for some conceptual "fragments" to acquire the status of separate entities, quite removed from the strict conditions of observation from which they grew. For example, they are used to interpret attitudes or responses in situations unrelated to the analytical science which gave them relevancy. Similarly, assumptions are made concerning symbolic or mythical manifestations picked out in isolation, without the backing of a genuine ethnochemical study. In other words, corporation study is importing incomplete formulas, taken away from their conceptual context, and validating them on the basis of mere precedent (one more advantage of the ambiguous attitude noted above appears here: it is legitimate to assume a cultural factor within the corporation, because we already know that it operates in society as a whole);

- secondly, there is the application of these concepts - or bits and pieces of them - to investigating situations which are not only highly localised but in many cases are marginal. Not all of the papers considered accept this marginal qualification, but the following interpretation of its meaning should show that it is relevant to most such situations:

- the localised aspect derives directly from the unwieldy nature of the concepts themselves: even when taken out of the strict context of the application of the methods by which they were evolved, they are not suited to dealing with highly complex situations, so that their field has to be limited to small numbers of individuals, short periods, ad hoc events, and so on. Speech analysis is the typical application.
- the marginal aspect is more enlightening, but it must first of all be understood what we mean by this. It applies to situations arising on the outer fringes of the corporation, or concerning people who are either at the very lowest end of the corporate hierarchy or who engage in activities in the space immediately between the corporation proper and its social (but not commercial) environment. In these marginal zones, the structural weight of the corporation falls more lightly on the people concerned so that, usually, these are less able to deploy subtle and varied means of affirming their status within the corporation. This means that they are more likely to respond to socio-cultural motivations of the general kind, corresponding to the "imported" concepts.

The foregoing considerations tend to show that, unless we assume the corporation to be completely transparent, the concepts based on the body of references listed earlier lead to findings that are difficult to interpret (this is not to say whether they are valid or otherwise), both in relation to the corporation as the subject of study and to the fund of relevant knowledge already acquired, and in relation to the parent disciplines where those concepts originated.

Later on, the second part of this article will be mainly concerned to show that the corporation is not transparent, but that there exists a structural continuum between it and its social environment. To some extent, this justifies the application of concepts formulated for study of the latter, for the purposes of investigating the former. However, this result of the evolution of the respective positions of the corporation and of society as a whole has not been perceived by a majority of researchers,

for a very simple reason: this reciprocating movement is also the origin of the spate of new reference sources in corporate research literature. A single cause, described as the occupation of the centre of society by the corporation, has thus produced two effects:

- a modification affecting the discipline concerned with the study of corporations, in the shape of references to concepts borrowed from other disciplines which were hitherto very remote from it;

- a transformation of the relationship between the corporation and the society, evidenced by a structural interplay between the two and accompanied by increasing interest in non-economic approaches to understanding that fresh relationship. Consequently, recourse to the "borrowed" concepts becomes increasingly legitimate.

Furthermore, there is a bridge between these two evolutionary trends, founded in structural changes within the corporation and leading to a modification of the interface between the corporation and the corporate research side.

Transposition of concepts

However, before going into the details of these various trends, it is appropriate to come back briefly to the idea of the "transposition" of concepts. By describing the conditions which this requires, I hope to explain why most of our researchers fail to consider it. At the same time, this will explain why they were unable to distance themselves from the trend discussed immediately above.

.../...
This transposition can best be described by reference to what some mathematicians call a commutator diagram, as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Concept } A' \\
\text{Society (1)} \\
\text{Corporation}
\end{array}
\]

(1) Assumed relevant to most of the concepts being discussed.

The diagram should be read as follows: there exists between the Society and the Corporation a structural homology such that concept A is in the same relationship to the Society as is the concept A' to the Corporation. We now assume that we can refer to a Society model which is relevant to the various concepts discussed. For the homology to be established, we must therefore also have a corporate model relevant to those same concepts. As the concepts are fairly general, and often applied in conjunction with each other (a researcher referring to linguistic concepts may also call on cultural or psychoanalytical ones), it seems necessary for the corporate model to be in continuity with the society model. An example of this kind of demonstration can be found in several papers I published last year (5).

\[\text{Implicit models.}\]

Not having consulted such models, and thus unable to proceed to a strict conceptual transposition, the researchers in question are prone to fall in with two ersatz substitutes which implicitly serve to make up for the lack of a time scale on which the corporation can be positioned, as well as that of a systematic relationship of the incidental to the structural factors involved.

\[\text{.../}.\]

The first of these ersatz "models" (which I prefer to refer to as "metaphors") substitutes for the corporate model proper, and the second for the construction of the transposition process:

- the organic metaphor. The approach adopted by the researchers quoted is usually an overall (or multi-disciplinary) one with respect to their target areas, in that they are concerned to identify the components which enter into the fields of sociology, linguistics, psychoanalysis, and so on. This concern understandably extends to an attempt to identify the relative incidence of these dimensions. Although this is not clearly announced by its practitioners, such an approach suggests to me an image of the corporation made up of an assembly of systems, like the venous, nervous, glandular and other systems of the human body, which are always present in comparable configurations. Using a model of this kind, we can think of taking "slide samples" as a means of ascertaining the local configurations of these dimensions. Naturally, we cannot directly view the structure of the vital organs, but we can make assumptions as to their behaviour from observation of the flows occurring in the subordinate systems. The authors of the papers discussed do not hesitate to do so, inferring corporate power concepts on the basis of observation of purely local events.

- the Galilean physics metaphor. This is related to the one just described, to the extent that it concerns the method used to observe the local phenomena. The concepts borrowed from the new reference areas are used by way of instruments destined to extract from the material observed (as could not do the conventional corporate study approach, since it was not discriminating in relation to this material) some new interpretations which refer back to the...
parent discipline.

We thus have the arrival of new methods, applied to things previously latent and which had for all time been waiting until researchers had sufficiently powerful instruments to detect them. As when Galileo first focused his telescope to see stars that had been there from the beginnings of time. This brings an a-historical, and thus a-sociological, view of things which cannot perceive the changes which have affected the corporation as the result of its changing relationships with the society as a whole.

Furthermore, these two metaphors also imply a certain "natural" continuity between the corporation and the rest of the social fabric. Earlier, we saw that continuity could be postulated, but had to rely on a homological relationship between two structures.

If we are to understand the changing relationships between researchers and the corporation - including the perverse effects accompanying them and which are all the more insidious that, in the absence of an appropriate corporate model, the researchers cannot objectivise their procedures and their position in relation to the corporation - we must refer to a model which is sufficiently comprehensive to bring out both the changes occurring within the corporation and the further changes induced by these in the shaping of the research methods and approach.

DYNAMICS OF THE CORPORATION VERSUS DYNAMICS OF THE RESEARCH FIELD

Those readers who are acquainted with my recent work will recognize in the following certain patterns of thought developed in a number of articles published in 1964-65. Given that I am here making a slightly different point, I will attempt to give a specific presentation of these. I continue to hold as significant - especially in the light of the foregoing - the existence of a single basic outline of the corporation for both the static and the dynamic approaches to investigation. Hoping to bring out sufficiently clearly the interactions between the corporation and the discipline which studies it, I will first of all describe (in broad outline, of course) their separate evolutionary trends, before going on to show the processes by which the corporation gradually integrates - in stages I will call "translocations" - some acquisitions previously appearing in its environment.

The evolution of the corporation

Given that our main concern is the relationship between the corporation and the discipline which centres on it, we shall give priority consideration to the matter of corporate skills and specialisation as they are deployed with regard to its social environment.

Two fundamental movements are involved here. After a brief recapitulation of their features, I will go on to make a closer inspection of some of their effects.

The first of these movements is that made by the corporation in the direction of the surrounding society. Through a series of processes arising mainly out of the rationalistic ethic which preceded over the emergence of the corporation, the latter tended to gain an increasingly greater hold over its technical, economic and social environment. In doing so, it created new vocational categories, sought to control the new population groups that gradually entered its orbit, and took firmer control of its own internal organisation. Extended to its environmental fringes, these rationalistic endeavours gave rise to the appearance of
new working occupations accompanied by all that these implied: new school syllabuses, new social mores and, in the end, new sociological segments whose earning levels and life styles were distinct from those of the social classes which had previously pervaded the society. At the same time, there was a spread of the business ethic - in the sense of a general assimilation of values such as those of time and productivity, whose common characteristic is that they relate individual behaviour to its consequences in an economic universe dominated by the industrial system. Then, more diversified kinds of organisations made an appearance, in response to diversified technologies, products and markets. By the end of the 19th Century, this meant that the concept of organisation had achieved some degree of autonomy. It was recognised that the success of the corporation, meaning its profit performance and ability to adapt to changing economic circumstances, depended to some extent on the efficiency of its internal organisation.

We have already seen that each of these processes is in relation with one of the fundamental dimensions of the corporation, i.e., its organisational structure, the structure of its social environment, and its corporate culture, and has contributed to shaping the social environment towards conformity with the economic rationalism of the industrial ethic of the day. However, as these processes gained momentum - and as the industrial population increased - the corporation came up against social and cultural resistances in its environment. For example, organised labour markets were set up in the trades and occupations initially created by the corporation, and the latter then had to take account of relative classifications these established when recruiting its workers and providing careers for them. Thus, when the corporation gained a central position in the society, it encountered increasingly complex situations concerning both the social factors affecting its management and the skills available to it for dealing with these.

The second movement to be considered is the internal counterpart of the external developments just described, and concerns the ways in which the corporation can handle this complexity after becoming both greater in size and closer to the centre of things. The movement itself consists in changes in the image of the individual worker and in the prevailing wisdom within the corporation. The greater the number of individuals who, in one way or another, earned their livelihood and acquired their social status from the corporation, the more it became inevitable that those individuals should enjoy comparable treatment and consideration both inside and outside the work place. At the same time as this change of outlook was taking place, it was also realised that the economic performance of the corporation depended not only on the efficiency of its manufacturing processes and the quality of its products, but also on the behaviour of its production workers. Thus, as and when the latter became more complicated to handle for the corporation, they simultaneously emerged as one of the keys to its success. Consequently, corporations developed more sophisticated personnel management techniques and hired staff capable of implementing them. In other words, it has been by reference to the individual, whether considered as a worker, a member of a social class, or a psychological entity, that the socio-cultural way of thinking mentioned earlier has gradually taken root.

To sum up and consolidate the above observations, we can identify a series of different types of movements taking place over time:

- the corporation has a rationalising influence on its social environment, resulting in the creation of new occupational categories and a new social ethic.
- this in turn means that the corporation itself is faced with internal problems different from those of a technical and economic kind it initially knew;

- there thus occurs increasing corporate sensitivity to matters of organisation and personnel management;

- in the same way as the earlier sharing of technical problems led to the devising of overall technological solutions, the new awareness of the general nature of organisation and personnel problems has given birth to a new body of specialists engaged in working out general solutions to these;

- it can thus be considered that, once again, the corporation has contributed to the emergence and generalisation of problems formerly specific to it. This has justified the development of a scientific or technological approach to this field of study, and thus the appearance of professional researchers to deal with it.

The evolution of the corporate research field

It is regrettable that no reasonably systematic attempt has so far been made to write a history of corporate research. The works which apparently address this question can more accurately be described as attempts to focus interest on the particular part of that field of study in which their authors are engaged. In the absence of such a reference, it is necessary at this point to introduce some basic notions which, although not sufficient to reconstitute the evolution of the whole field, bring out certain trends and, as well as throwing light on its current status, give an account of the particular position from which we started.

In the first place, we can say that current theory is divided into two main categories:

- holistic theories considering the corporation as a whole entity and investigating its adaptation to its environment on the structural and strategic planes;

- individualistic theories based on the idea that the corporation is not such a rationalistic entity as economic theory would have us believe, because the corporate employees behave to some extent independently of that theory.

For the reasons already described, the corporate researchers who introduce new reference areas generally belong to the second school of thought, on which the rest of this article will therefore focus. It should first be borne in mind that the two trends developed in parallel and that both were affected by the complexification of the corporation, but with different reactions:

- the holistic school produced increasingly refined models of the corporate entity,

- the individualistic school produced increasingly sophisticated models of the corporate employee.

Furthermore, these processes were in both cases accompanied by the increasingly general orientation of the models - at least as concerns the theories I elsewhere describe as "Utopian" (?). That is to say, that their application is no longer specifically related to the corporation: the corporate structure is merely...
one among many organisations covered by systems theory, and
the psychological profile of the corporate employee applies
equally to explaining his behaviour in contexts outside the
corporation. This is further confirmation of the fact that,
as the corporation becomes a more common feature of the social
fabric, so are the models applied to it made less specific.

A look at the individualistic theories reveals a more
precise attitude to reflecting the multi-dimensional view of
the corporate worker. The first major presentation of a worker
stereotype was that of Taylor, with its cog-in-the-machine image
of a production factor that could be made to react to certain
motivational stimuli. Subsequently, there came a move towards
regarding the individual as capable of less rationalistic reac-
tions, but the operational aim remained the same: that of ensuring
that worker behaviour was made predictable enough to be concen-
tric with the demands of specific work processes. Then, with Mayo,
came the era of Human Relations theory, and the worker stereotype
gradually became more complex: a hierarchy of aspirations (Mas-
low), based on behavioural psychology (Simons), inspired by psycho-
analysis (Tavistock), made up of disparate tendencies (Herzberg),
etc.

The holistic theories represent a movement which, starting
from the structural whole, "descends" towards the worker, often
in didactic fashion, defining the conditions he must accept if
the structure is to remain efficient. Individualistic theories
have in common a tendency to "ascend" towards the top of the
structure, seeking to determine the general characteristics
which the corporation must display in order to motivate its
personnel effectively. In most cases, however, neither of the
two approaches achieves its aim.

Coming back to our original idea, the interesting part of
all this is that the individualistic theories place their emphasis
on the individual, and thus on his close environment. For example,
they tend to demonstrate that workers are most motivated when they
can express their creative powers, when they are asked to produce
complete assemblies, when there is worker participation in manage-
ment decisions, and so on. These are all hypothetical assumptions
which can be borne out empirically only by considering small numbers
of workers at a time. The findings derived from confirmation on
this scale result in rather general statements regarding the or-
ganisation of work, the style of command, and the like, which are not
only difficult to translate into overall structural terms, but also
difficult to reconcile with the traditional (quantified) economic
line of argument. In short, this is a type of theory more suited
to evaluating and criticising existing organisations and explaining
why they do not achieve the results expected of them, than to
proposing more efficient organisational structures to replace these.
This school of theory thus displays the localised nature of the
studies performed under the new trend of research, together with
their implicitly critical finality to which I will come back later.

The same theoretical school is also notable for its inclination
to seek out the references supporting its models of the individual
in areas increasingly remote from the actual corporation. This
explains why the models are becoming increasingly general and less
and less specific to the corporation: the authors referenced are
Watson, Skinner, Lewin, Freud, and so on. The outwards move is not
due solely to the dynamics of the corporate study field, reacting
to the failings of the earlier models and seeking scientific legit-
Imasy from recourse to increasingly "pure" models (drawn from the
group dynamics of the psychoanalyst). It can be claimed that the
trend is an expression of realism to the extent that it faces
ever-increasing complexity of real situations with models of a
matching kind. And the reality is becoming more and more complex
because (to revert to our Galilean metaphor) more powerful means
of observing it are becoming available to us.

What can be considered as a more profound reason is that the corporation, in its evolutionary movement towards the centre of society, has to deal with a more complex individual. Even though actual working hours are being reduced - a steady trend ever since the beginning of the industrial era - the individual interacts with the corporation to an ever wider and more potent extent. The worker who becomes unemployed dies a social death as surely as did the nobleman sent back to his province from the court of Louis XIV. The Taylorist model fits workers recruited from the rural world and still untouched by the corporate ethic. The psychoanalytical model may be suitable when the corporation becomes involved in extra-mural matters by such things as the provision of leisure facilities and housing, or some aspects of family welfare, and takes a more tolerant attitude (in the sense of accepting less orthodox behavioural inclinations). This is not to say (although it may apply on the overall plane) that the individual is more complex than at the start of the Century; but the corporation is more involved with different aspects of the individual and thus encounters his inherent complexity to a greater extent.

The translocation factor

The increasingly complex corporation can thus be matched with a corporate research profession whose different tendencies seek to produce more close-fitting models which will necessarily also be more complex. At the same time, however, the corporation is not an inert object lying completely outside the field of the researchers who study it. It is constantly trying to improve its own performance and, to this end, seeks out fresh sources of enhancement in ever-receding borderline zones of activity.

This process goes through stages which draw attention to the relationships between the corporation and its research environment. Having chosen to call this process the "translocation" factor, we can outline its evolution in the following terms:

- greater complexity of the corporation is matched by the appearance of increasingly elaborate models which non-specialists find it increasingly difficult to handle. These models are of a more general nature, but are failing to produce results on the general level; they work only in special situations and subject to special conditions. Furthermore, if general findings were to be extracted from them, these would be of only limited interest for corporations engaged in competition with each other. There is a striking antimony between general scientific research directed to the corporation and the notion of a vested interest suggesting that there will be a permanent time-lag between the real status of the corporation and the one described by the research side.

- faced with this situation, the corporation's search for solutions in perimeter areas over which it has small control impels it to take on board the problem situations for which no general solution has been provided. While
Consequences of translocation

As noted earlier, the relationship between the corporation and the academics has given rise to a series of translocations whereby the corporation takes on board certain problem paradigms formulated elsewhere and employs specialists to tackle them in more limited and precise configurations than the general framing to which the academic researchers had found no satisfactory response.

The corporation thus creates new corporate posts which are filled by salaried specialists and located in departments which formerly brought in ad hoc consultants to solve such problems; business strategy specialists now permanently employed in top management offices, or labour relations specialists in personnel and welfare departments.

Who are these new specialists? Usually, they are young executives from advanced teaching establishments (in France, Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales or Ecole des Mines) giving polyvalent management qualifications. They thus possess qualifications in traditional subjects (engineering, business administration), often with the addition of an orientation towards the Human Sciences. The fact that they are drawn into the corporation signifies that their potential value to it has been recognised at top management level, and illustrates the long-term process whereby the corporation is impelled to seek the sources of its productivity ever further afield, in response to structural changes in added-value formation and to decreasing returns on basic production systems. Aspects formerly regarded as marginal - business organisation, data processing, and so on - are becoming the centres of corporate life. The prevailing corporate wisdom is evolving in the same way.
direction. The translocation phenomenon is thus resulting in a steady increase in the corporation's skills concerning subjects more remote from its origins, making it more dependent on similarly "foreign" socio-cultural ways of looking at things.

The job of these new specialists is to handle problems within restricted confines, which has the effect of drawing a new frontier - slightly moving outwards - between the zone of corporate competence proper and the outer realm of problems seen to affect the corporation but which it does not possess the skills to tackle, either because they are too highly specific to justify forming in-house specialists, or because they are too closely related to external socio-cultural factors. We must not, either, overlook the fact that, as the corporation moves closer to the centre of society, the new problems it encounters also become less general and more specifically related to it. There is thus a period of time during which those problems have not yet matured sufficiently for the corporation to be able to take them fully in hand. One of the functions of the corporation/researcher interface is to pioneer the new areas of study being opened up by the translocation process.

The evolution of the corporation specialist function also has major effects on the corporation/academic research relationship, due to what might be called the "institutionalisation" of the new specialists themselves: they are concerned to achieve recognition of their field's legitimacy as opposed to that which formerly ruled within the corporation. This creates, in practice, a rivalry between the issues considered to be priorities because they are of immediate central importance, and those which, although at present more remote, deserve priority on the grounds that they have greater potential for development.

The new specialists, due to the nature of their skills and their striving for recognition, are giving increasingly audible expression to their arguments as opposed to the more established ones which are, so to speak, part and parcel of the existing management armament. They thus draw attention by being more articulate, relying increasingly on arguments based outside the established corporates area of reference, and claiming an independent institutional backing (symposiums, consultants, etc). Contacts between the corporation and the outer environment are enhanced in two ways:

- the new specialists are in a position to set forth more precise assignment formulations for outside consultants, owing to their greater ability to extract the essentials of a problem;

- the quality and abundance of their observations directed to the corporation management provides a valuable raw material for the incoming consultants and outside researchers.

Translocation seen from the outside researchers' standpoint

As we have just seen, translocation viewed from the corporation's standpoint means an awareness of new problems,
the appearance of new internal factors (status and representations of the newly-admitted specialists), and the formulating of more stringent specifications for consultant assignments. Both the corporation and the specialists themselves are vaguely aware of the translocation phenomenon, even though they do not formulate it in such precise terms as we do here. Seen from outside the corporation, it is a challenge to the competence of the consultant expert in certain fields: the very development of the consultancy profession was in response to the inadequacies of in-house corporate possibilities in those fields. The outside consultants must therefore reaffirm their relevance on the basis of new concepts, new approaches, and new sources of reference. Of course, many (probably most, in fact) of the researchers interested in the corporation will be able to continue to work in connection with conventional matters such as structural analysis and organization theory, but this will be for corporations that have not caught up with the translocation trend now in train.

As we noted earlier, the evolution of the corporation takes the form of recognising new problems, but these are initially related to isolated cases and thus remain unconsolidated and without formal definition. One of the functions of the academic researcher community is to draw into a general theoretical formulation these isolated, local problems situated half-way between the corporation and its outer environment. This is not to say that solutions will be found, but the problems will at least be properly structured and given, so to speak, an identity separate from that of particular corporations.

While the researchers are proceeding to that formulation, they must reaffirm their expert status which, as said above, has been somewhat undermined in the course of the translocation process. They must therefore seek out concepts and approaches in areas which, for various reasons, still lie outside the sphere of knowledge of the in-house specialist. I believe that this search is behind the appearance of new sources of reference evoked at the beginning of this article. This need for researchers to demonstrate their expert status in empirical areas to some extent explains the local nature of their intervention, corresponding to the type of practice of new professionals I described elsewhere by the term of management symbolism: experiment inventive presentation.

However, the researchers referred to at the beginning of this article are to be seen as a kind of avant-garde of a general movement which can be described as the awakening of the corporation to cultural and symbolic phenomena. For many researchers, including DRAKE and KENNEDY, and Peters and WATERMAN, who take a very managerial standpoint, this trend— which they have largely helped to formulate—has been interpreted as a phenomenon that is strictly internal to corporate development, without regard to its implications as an instrument of changed relations between the corporation and society in general. It could be said that, as compared with the latter, the researchers introducing new sources of reference are at the Antipodes of the field of production of knowledge about the corporation. They have a very precise view of the increasingly external variables coming into play, but perhaps tend to underestimate certain specific primary characteristics of the corporation, such as the fact that it is a place ruled by authority. The omission of this point, together with the nature of the authors referenced, contributes to invest these new contributions with a critical tone in relation to the corporation, to which I will return in my conclusions.
The new interface relationships

Rather interestingly, certain problems which are formulated in naive fashion by company specialists tend to be given a more sophisticated dressing by the academic commentators. For example, the former talk of "communications" and "image", while the latter study "representation and argumentation" and "identity"; as might be illustrated thus:

```
            Communication          Representation/argumentation
            |                           |
       In-house             academics
       specialists           |

               Image           Identity
```

This polarisation, so to speak, is relevant to a form of appraisal of another category of operators, who are neither company employees nor academics: the consultants. Without going into a full-scale assessment of this profession, I will merely point to a distinction which exists there. Alongside the large firms proposing rather set routines (such as for image-building), there are much smaller ones which concentrate on much more specific and sophisticated tools, putting them over to corporations of some size (often in the nationalised sector) where they find in-house specialists with the time and capacity to engage in useful discussion.

At all events, we can clearly see the development, at the hands of the new generation of researchers, of an argumentation based more on social and cultural considerations than on the strict business ethic. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the large nationalised undertakings where profitability and market pressures are not felt so directly.

Here, as always, the more remote an argumentation lies from the original economic imperative, and the more its effectiveness depends on the credibility and powers of persuasion of its proponent, then the more it "classes" in the sense of BORSE's terminology and the higher the notional benefits that can be attributed to it. This leads to very lively opposition between the engineers, businessmen, financiers and so on who stick to the traditional lines of argument, and the new counsellors whose purpose is to show that all the former's efforts will be in vain unless the human factor is brought into the act. This struggle for pride of place within the corporation may explain why the new in-house specialists are not displeased by the intervention of outside researchers who, armed with the new reference sources considered here, establish a kind of area of criticism which highlights the alienating and generally adverse effects of the traditional tenets of management. This is a further example of an objective alliance sustained by two very different processes: the institutionalisation of new in-house specialists combining with the desire of a new researcher generation to achieve recognition.

CONCLUSIONS

In actual fact, it can be observed that this critical tendency is not an entirely new one, but that the way in which
it expresses itself has changed. The researchers lumped together under the "Human Relations" label have produced findings and developed practices which justify the consultancy activity: unable to offer general models giving guidance enabling an organisation to be made motivating from the start, they left the door open to direct intervention in the workplace, for the purposes of making spot diagnoses or of introducing practical experiments which require constant monitoring. To put it one way, they were able to say that some things should not be done, but unable to point to profitable alternatives. This means that the general tone given off by this tendency can be considered rather critical. The new generation of researchers is thus at the cross-roads of two different traditions, of which the first had a long-established interest in the corporation, whereas the second has overtaken the rest of the field on the crest of the waves of "recentering" and "trans-location" I mentioned earlier.

In the final analysis, too immersed in the process of normal development of their discipline to notice and ponder on their own tendencies, the new researchers quite naturally turned towards new concepts which, to the extent that the corporation/society interface was widening (especially at the level of the individual) proved to be perfectly relevant (provided, of course, that they had already proved relevant to study of the individual in relation to society as a whole).

It often happens that those who contribute to the development of a discipline — especially if they are still young researchers like myself — are too close to its evolutionary trend to see it properly. I confess that there was a time when I quite failed to be aware of the historical and cultural dimensions of certain studies I had to perform, at the start of my career.

However, it now seems to me that the corporate research field could well lay down a requirement for justified concepts as the basis of a theoretical approach to studying the corporation as a social institution. In this respect, a comparison with the science of Sociology is instructive. The discipline grew up over several decades without giving birth to any technological counterpart, and the very idea of intervention was abhorred. Then, in the last fifteen years or so (contemporary with the emergence of the Personnel Directorate and after May 1968 — the connection with the latter will be discussed in my next article), an avowed social engineering practice has emerged, although still in only marginal areas (prisons, immigrant workers, etc). By contrast, in the area of corporate studies we have thus far seen nothing but technology without theory.
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