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DRAGON EST REPRODUIT PAR L'ECALE POLYTECHNIQUE (FRANCE)

POUR LE CENTRE DE RECHERCHE EN GESTION DE L'ECALE POLYTECHNIQUE (PARIS)
"Why don't you try it in a French zoo? They accept nearly everything."

"Vincent, is that true?"

"Best wishes, also from Puff"

Berkard
Curing the monster:
Some images of and considerations about the dragon

by
Burkard Slepers

(Presentation at the 3rd International Conference on Organizational Symbolism and Corporate Culture: "The Symbolics of corporate artifacts", Milan, Italy June 24 - 26, 1987)
"The dragon was evolved along with civilization itself."

Smith ([1919], 76)

"The artifacts of culture can be understood as defense systems that help to create the illusion that we are greater and more powerful than we actually are."

Morgan ([1986], 213)

Abstract:

Although the dragon has become part of SCOS' and its journal's logo since its first international conference at Lund in 1984, this fabulous creature itself has not yet found too much recognition in our common discussions and reflections. I, therefore, intend to contribute some images of the dragon from various sources, e.g. mythology, history and art as a basis for further reflections upon the symbolism of the dragon.

As the dragon has been primarily a mythological figure for the irrational, the chaotic and the evil in our Western tradition, some further thoughts will be presented on how we in SCOS may cope with this part of social reality. In general, as well as in our own 'corporate culture', in particular. In face of the symbolized reality the dragon stands for, this 'monster' has to be cured more carefully in order to keep it alive as an important dimension of the symbolic representation of organizations.

Puff, the magic dragon:

A song from Peter, Paul, and Mary

1.

Puff, the magic dragon
lived by the sea
and frolicked in the autumn mist
in a land called Honah-Lee.
Little Jackie Paper loved that rascal Puff,
and brought him strings and sealing wax
and other fancy stuff.
Refrain...

2.

Together they would travel
On a boat with billowed sail,
Jackie kept a lookout perched
On Puff's gigantic tail.
Noble kings and princes would bow
Whene'er they came.
Pirate ships would lower their flag
When Puff roared out his name, Oh!
Refrain...

3.

A dragon lives forever
But not so little boys.
Painted wings and giant rings
Make way for other toys.
One grey night it happened
Jackie Paper came no more
And Puff that mighty dragon,
He ceased his fearless roar, Oh!
Refrain...

4.

His head was bent in sorrow
Green scales fell like rain,
Puff no longer went to play
Along the cherry lane.
Without his lifelong friend,
Puff could not be brave
So Puff, that mighty dragon,
Sadly slipped into his cave. Oh!
Refrain...

Refrain:

"Puff, the magic dragon lived by the sea
And frolicked in the autumn mist
In a land called Honah-Lee (2x)."
The dragon! ... The dragon appears to me as one of the most fascinating creatures in our nonzoological garden of mythological species. I would like to take this opportunity to share some of the images which I have discovered during my attempt to 'chase the dragon', an attempt which was reactivated primarily through the SCOS-poster and button at our first international conference at Lund in 1984 and which since became our logo.

1. Dragonology or the science of dragons: Some facts and figures

Before I invite you to join me on the journey into the mythological fields of the dragon, its images and symbolism, I would first like to offer you some facts and figures about its existence, quality and dissemination. I am convinced that I will be able to provide enough evidence to allow you to accept it as a scientific truth that the dragon is a primeval, universal and real phenomenon (cf. Johnsgard and Johnsgard (1982)).

The dragon belongs to the wider family of snakes and serpents, as such it is much older than mankind. Contrary to men, dragons are creatures of chaos (Redaktion der Time-Life Bücher (1985), 13). As it can be learned from various accounts of the creation of the world dragons have existed since the first days of the genesis.

Dragons are born from eggs which usually have the size of two man's fists (III. 4). Especially during infancy their predominant living space is water; different species prefer lakes, swamps, rivers, or the seaside. At least for the Chinese version of the dragon it can be proved that dragons take about 1500 years to grow up to their full length, another 500 years till their characteristic horns develop and again another 1000 years till their wings are formed (Redaktion der Time-Life Bücher (1985), 44). Descriptions of dragons were seldom accurate, because those who happened to meet a dragon were so scared that they could only remember one or the other of its horrible parts without any further perception of its Gestalt (ibid., p. 95). Although it seems to be true that no one dragon equals the other (Mode (1983), p. 120), (III. 5), dragons predominantly consist of the following elements: the jawbones of a crocodile, the teeth of a lion, the wings of a bat, the legs of a lizard, the claws of an eagle, the body of a python and the horns of a bull (Redaktion ... (1985), 14; cf. de Visser (1913), 70).
Dragons are disseminated all over the world. Detailed maps prove their existence all over Europe (Redaktion ... (1985), 73 f.; Vinycomb (1906), 79 ff.), (III. 6) as Dickinson ((1981), 75), for instance, indicates it, there are at least some 60 places in Middle-Europe which derive their names from the dragon, such as Drakenburg (Dragonburgh), Wurmlingen (named after a big worm which was the original Germanic word for dragon, as in Lindwurm) or Klagenfurt (a town in Austria which derives its name from the wailing which was heard when the town was destroyed by a dragon, a tragedy which is depicted by the huge monument in the town center - please ask Wolfram Burisch for further details, he has just been there as a visiting professor. He sent me a beautiful postcard from there for my collection of dragons.)

From their historical evolution dragons can be classified into two main categories: the cosmic and the mythological dragons; the latter are often then subdivided into modern and psychic ones. Cosmic dragons cannot be regarded as animals in the literal sense, they were incarnations of the chaos, they are direct descendants of the Titans who lived before time. Contrary to their predecessors the modern mythodragons were natural creatures; they housed in caverns and canyons, curled around mountains and ancient mounds, leaving behind them stink and slime, they crawled through the woods and mixed with the ghosts of sources and rivers (Redaktion ... (1985), 76). The psychic mythodragons (III. 7), which seem to be the most interesting...
ones in the context of the symbolic of artifacts are inhabitants of the human inner world. As they often cannot be acknowledged as such, they have to be projected into objects of the outer world (Steffens (1984), 7).

So far as the existence of the dragon is concerned, it seems to me that with what I have said so far it seems to be sufficiently proved. — Let us, therefore, now turn to the more important question:

II. How to cope with a dragon: Five pragmatic ways

Whereas the proof of the dragon's existence is more a matter for scientists or researchers, the question of how to handle a dragon leads us into the fields of scholars (cf. Cooper (1983), 721). There are five predominant ways of treating a dragon:

1. The heroic way: "You have to kill him!" (III.8)
2. The magic solution: "Kiss him or throw him against the wall!" (III.9)
3. The Chinese version: "It is the emperor of wisdom and rain!" (III.10)
4. The science fiction approach: "Ride him!" (III.11)
5. The lonely child solution: "Let's be friends!" (III.12)

Out of these five versions, the heroic solution of killing the dragon obviously is the predominant one in our Western tradition (III. 13); nevertheless, the magic creators of the SCOS logo around P. O. Berg deliberately have not chosen the image of the knight fighting the dragon because that would have given "too much power to the knight as..."
being a symbol of the victory of the modern technocratic society over the primitive and instinctive dimensions of life" (Berg 1987a). Another, obviously unconscious reason for their choice could have been that e.g., the image of St. George would have been too reminiscent of the Order of the Garter (III. 14) which then probably would have been in collusion with SDS' predominant myth of an open network.
Although I favour this creative attempt of organizational myth making, it appears to be important to elucidate a bit further the image of the dragon fight which is as old as mankind. The legend of St. George (III. 15) seems to be a good example to begin with because the history of his relation to the dragon not only has a relatively clear origin but also a significant relevance as a symbol of many European nations. As he was the patron saint of all those who had devoted their lives to fighting, St. George was also the patron of the crusaders. They obviously were the ones who brought the image of St. George as the dragon fighter back. It then ultimately became a constituent part of his iconography through Jacobus de Voragine (from Viareggio, i.e. Varazze near Genoa) a dominican and archbishop of Genoa, who, in the 13. century, included this legend into his 'Legenda Aurea' (Golden Legend) which was of great influence on the folkloristic piety (Braunfels-Esche (1976), 21 ff.; Egli (1982), 223 ff.). Although St. George did not officially become the national patron of England until 1347, his feast, the 23rd of April, received the same rank as the great feasts of the ecclesiastical year through a synod at Oxford in 1222. Around that time he also became the national patron of Georgia, Greece, Russia, Hungary, Poland and Sweden; in Germany he was the patron of the nobility.
That the dragon became the incarnation of evil, the enemy and often enough the devil in the Christian mythology during the last millennium is not only evident through thousands of churches which were dedicated to St. George all over Europe but also through the fact that altogether the legends of nearly 60 saints are based, one way or the other, on dragon killing (Aufheuser (1911), 239); among them are also women who like St. Martha vanquished the dragon with holy water or St. Margaretha who became the patron of pregnant women, because, when she was swallowed by the dragon, the cross which she was wearing grew till it finally burst the monster (Redaktion ... (1985), 95; cf. Roheim (1972), 299).

That the dragon also has a long tradition in our Western military history is, for example, indicated by the 'dragons', the French cavalrymen in the Thirty Years War, who were equipped with small-arms called 'fire-spitting dragons'; it seems that the fact that, for example, the English, French, German, and the Swedish language have incorporated the Latin 'Draco' (which was taken from the Greek 'drakon'), originates from the dragon as a cohort sign of the Romans which they themselves had adopted from their Teutonic enemies (Höfcer (1961), 99). The self-identification with the dragon in order to put one's enemies to flight is in itself a symbolic act which e.g. can be found among the ancient Persians, who wore dragon helmets, or among the Vikings, whose ship bows were shaped like a dragon (Ill. 17), a symbol which was later put on the church roof as protection against the demons. "In the sign of the dragon they were conquering the dragon" (Steffen (1984), 30).

Due to the limited time for this presentation I can only remind you with some further names and images of how primeval and universal the heroic way of coping with a dragon is. There is, for example, the mythical story of the Nordic hero Sigurd who when he killed the dragon on behalf of a dwarf realized only by chance that one single drop of the dragon's blood gave him the knowledge about the primeval things on earth. Or remember what happened to Siegfried, his Germanic namesake, who took a bath in the dragon's blood in order to get the strength of the dragon himself. The epics of Beowulf and Wiglaf (Redaktion ... (1985), 7 ff.) or that of the Golden Fleece are other examples that the dragon had to be slaughtered in order to receive the enormous treasure which he kept in custody. The ancient Egyptian mythology contains a further image of the dragon fight. It is the sun-god Re who accompanied by his hyena faced guard Seth in his shining barque moved across the Egyptian sky keeping away the dragon Apep who reigned over darkness striving to annihilate the god of light (Ill. 18).

That a woman or a virgin is part of the dragon fight myth, as in St. George's legend or in fairy tales (Rank (1922)), is also a constituent dimension of many of the dragon images of the ancient Greek mythology. There is, for instance, the Greek god of light, Apollo, a son of
Zeus, who killed Python, the dragon who had tried to kill Apollo's
mother Leto (Steffen (1984), 44; Fontenrose (1959), 13 ff.). Perseus,
another son of Zeus (together with Danae), fought the dragon at the
seashore of the red sea and thus gained Andromeda as his wife (Redak-
tion ... (1985), 120 f.; Egli (1982), 216 f.) akin to Cadmus, a hero
from Theben (Ill. 19, 20), who liberated Harmonia, a double of Aphro-
dite, by slaying the dragon (Roheim (1972), 301). And most famous of
all is the myth of Amor and Psyche. Amor, the son of Venus and Jupiter,
liberated Psyche, the king's daughter, who, chained to the rocks,
was posed for the monster. He hurt himself with one of his arrows.
Thus he fell in love with her in order to save her.

In my attempt to understand especially these latter myths of the
dragon fight I found a contribution which Roheim ((1972), 297 ff.)
made, quite challenging. As this author demonstrates a variety of
connections between the ancient Apollo myth and that of Cadmus, it
becomes evident that both these dragon- or serpent-slayers are ser-
pents themselves. From such a reading of these myths it becomes evi-
dent that "Apollo or Cadmus, the young serpent, killed the old serpent
at springtime and married the old serpent's daughter" (Roheim (1972),
307). As such "the idea of death (is) associated with that of a new
life" (ibid., 304); thus the dragon or the serpent turns into a symbol
of fertility and initiation. - From another psychoanalytic perspective,
i.e. from the Jungian tradition, Erich Neumann ((1953), 83, 162),
makes the point that the serpent or the dragon represents the archet-
ype of the 'great mother' which has to be conquered in adolescence in
order to integrate the anima (cf. Smith (1919), 140 ff.). Whereas
the serpent or the dragon in these ancient myths, no matter whether
they were Greek, Egyptian or Judaic, originally symbolized the relation between man and his cosmos or the universe, it seems that particularly in the legends about various saints since the Middle Ages the dragon became a container for the often unconscious anxieties related to sexuality, marriage and the loss of virginity (III. 21). What originally had been a symbol of mankind was more and more converted into an episode of certain individuals. As such the dragon also became a symbol of the pleasure of the flesh and lasciviousness which then had to be projected by men into women (III. 22 - 24).

I am quite aware that what I have stated so far about the dragon fight as the predominant mythological way of coping with a dragon has to be left as nothing more than a brief sketch. Before I try to refer to the SCOS-dragon I would like to give you at least some further imaginations of how to cope with a dragon.
The above mentioned magic solution is a proof that the relationship among virgins and dragons was more complex than just being a city's sacrifice to prevent the annihilation of the town through the monster. Some women, who had fairy-like magic power, kept these monstrous creatures as slaves in order to use their strength for bad purposes or just to tame these beasts (Redaktion ... (1985), 83). The Russian sorceress Marina in the palace of Kiew used to seduce the dragon fighters and turned them into harmless magpies, pigs or oxen. The French ghost-lady Succube rode a dragon and seduced her young adventurers through vampire-like kisses which ultimately made them die. As Neumann ([1953], 121 ff.) states it, the image of the madonna standing on the dragon is a symbol of the wholeness of the female self; in its Christian version it has been converted into the virgin (Maria), who tramples the head of the serpent. It seems to me that from its symbolic meaning the virgin in the fairy tale of the frog king who throws her snake-like playmate at the wall, can also be subsumed under the magic solution of coping with a dragon.

The Chinese version of the dragon, however, has quite a different mythological connotation than the traditional western one. Akin to the western dragons the Chinese dragons are of cosmic origin but they were much more the friends of the mortals. As the dragon represented ultimate wisdom and was the source of blessings, he became the symbol of the emperor who thus was regarded as a descendant of the dragons. The dragons were the masters of the rain; they often had god-like qualities (Redaktion ... (1985), 41 ff.; cf. de Visscher (1913), Williams (1975), 132 ff.).

It seems that the dragon in the science fiction literature has for the most lost its magic and threatening character; it occasionally has been converted into a domesticated animal which, as it is tamed and controlled, can be utilized like a flying horse due to its enormous power and its ability to fly attacks against one's enemies (e.g. McCaffrey (1981); Vance (1986)). How the dragon in science fiction stories has been degenerated in comparison to the ancient mythological figure seems to quite an extent to parallel the discrepancy between the horses of the horsemen of the apocalypse (III. 25) and brewery horses; like horses, dragons are tamed and bred; the passion is gone.

III. 25

The dragon has also become an increasingly prominent figure in children's books. Although in some cases (e.g. Lindgren (1986)) the dragon seems to keep his magic notion, it predominantly seems to be turned into a pet or a friend for the lonely child. Quite often the dragon is trivialized into a child-like little creature who either is full of inferiority feelings himself (Korschunow (1984); Schmögner (1975)) or becomes the ally against the child's parents or his comrades (Kent (1986); Nerev (1986)). As such the dragon occasionally has become a substitute for the split off double which, as, for example, in R. L. Stevenson's 'Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde', was a well-known
pattern in the fictions and novels at the turn of the last century (cf. Reed [1971], Mahoney [1982]). The design in recent children's books suggests the notion of the Jungian shadow (Ill. 118), an unconscious psychological function (cf. Burkholder-Matuda [1981], 69 f.). - From this idea, however, liminal impressions of children's books about the dragon [1] [i.e., to confirm their positive educational function (cf. Burkholder-Matuda [1981], 69 f.). - From this idea, however, liminal impressions of children's books about the dragon [1] [i.e., to confirm their positive educational function (cf. Burkholder-Matuda [1981], 69 f.). - From this idea, however, liminal impressions of children's books about the dragon [1] [i.e., to confirm their positive educational function (cf. Burkholder-Matuda [1981], 69 f.). - From this idea, however, liminal impressions of children's books about the dragon [1] [i.e., to confirm their positive educational function (cf. Burkholder-Matuda [1981], 69 f.). - From this idea, however, liminal impressions of children's books about the dragon [1] [i.e., to confirm their positive educational function (cf. Burkholder-Matuda [1981], 69 f.). - From this idea, however, liminal impressions of children's books about the dragon [1] [i.e., to confirm their positive educational function (cf. Burkholder-Matuda [1981], 69 f.). - From this idea, however, liminal impressions of children's books about the dragon [1] [i.e., to confirm their positive educational function (cf. Burkholder-Matuda [1981], 69 f.). - From this idea, however, liminal impressions of children's books about the dragon [1] [i.e., to confirm their positive educational function (cf. Burkholder-Matuda [1981], 69 f.).
III. The dragon as a symbol for corporate identity: Avantgarde or arrièregarde?

As I have already mentioned, it was a deliberate decision to take the image of the dragon for the SCOS-logo without the often related image of the hero or the knight. The designer actually was asked by P.O. Berg "to let the dragon tear down the organization chart that was trapping it" (Berg (1987a)). Underlying this image is obviously quite a different notion of corporate culture than the one propagated e.g. by Deal and Kennedy (1962): "For an organization you'll need heroes; if you don't have them create them!" Such a trivialization of the hero would, as I assume, ultimately lead to a trivialization of the dragon - and the concept of culture.

It seems to me to be important that we as SCOS-members collectively try to find out what such a new version of the dragon could mean and represent for us if we are prepared to give it more significance than just a trademark - which some of you are wearing on your shirts in form of a crocodile. As the SCOS-dragon obviously is supposed to have another relevance than just to discriminate its members from those who in their respective organizations wear a lion or an eagle on their ties or benners, it seems important to discover its particular meaning through a comparison with other dragon images, its similarities and differences.

In my own first attempt to relate the SCOS-logo to other more traditional dragon images I found the considerations about avantgarde and tradition/arrièregarde quite helpful which Bazon Brock (1986, 102 ff.), a colleague of mine, developed in his theory of art. The widespread understanding of avantgarde is that of a total break with every tradition and the creation of the absolutely new, alternative and unfamiliar, which then often enough either leads to the consequence that such a piece of art is either regarded as meaningless and gimmick or that the artist himself becomes the object of irony and aggression. Brock's perspective, however, is quite different: he is convinced that we only recognize that as avantgarde which forces us to build new traditions. "Traditions" as he states it, "are nothing other than those comprehensions about the relationship of historical events which result from the respective contemporaries' attempts to look backwards" (Brock (1986), 105). Unlike the usual understanding of tradition as a force coming out of history which then influences the respective present, Brock regards as tradition that which influences the social construction of historical events in the present in so far as these historical events are united as 'history' through a new tradition. Without such a (re)integration of the new into history which - at least so far as the history of art is concerned - especially during the last centuries has been a history of the previously new or avantgarde, the avantgarde remains meaningless and falls into oblivion as soon as it is antiquated by the very next avantgarde.

As in art, the function of the avantgarde in mythology or symbolism could be to look at the apparently assured interpretations of our ancestors from a different perspective, i.e. to recognize again as unknown and surprising what has been regarded as evident and familiar. To the extent that traditional myths and images have to be rediscovered or reinterpreted from newly created or shaped images thus the new myth may also appear in another light.

To create such a new tradition often enough means recognizing the
social as well as the unconscious dimensions these images refer to and are built upon as parts of a common culture. This, for example, means that ancient images often latently carry, so to say, more crystallized meaning than we often contemporarily are able to reactivate or that we in a non-conscious manner are referring to earlier images; we may even quote from them without being aware of the fact or of its sources.

In order to demonstrate more explicitly what I mean by it, let me first start with one example which, in the present context, I find interesting, as it might contribute towards a better understanding of the SCOS-dragon. On my hunt for the dragon I found a picture of one of the adventures of Baron Münchhausen fighting the dragon in what appeared to me on the first sight as quite a curious way of dragon slaughtering (Ill. 28). Münchhausen, a German officer of the 18. century well known for his countless adventurous journeys, once killed a dragon in Nubia by sticking a cake made of pitch and poison on a long stick into the dragon’s throat. As soon as the monster had swallowed it, it bursted into pieces with a terrible bang. Well, I thought, just another of those curious stories of Münchhausen like the one in which he pulled himself up by his own hair out of the swamp (cf. Watzlawick 1979) or akin to the one in which he rode on a cannon-ball. But only later, when I discovered another picture showing the ancient prophet Daniel killing a dragon at Babylon in the same manner, I was able to realize that the Münchhausen episode was a quotation which, as it may be assumed, may even be older than the dragon fight in the Daniel-Apocrypha. Referring to the biblical context (Dan. 14, 23–27) the Münchhausen story received quite another meaning: to stick into the dragon that which it is normally supposed to spit out.

And I made two similar discoveries in my attempt to look back on previous dragon images with the SCOS-logo in mind. One refers to the use of the dragon as a symbol for corporate identity, the other one is related to the combination of the dragon and the organization chart.

As I stated it before, the fact that the dragon became a symbol of corporate identity is not new. During previous centuries countless churches and many nations as well as cities have chosen either St.
George or St. Michael, the dragon-fighters, as their patrons. And even earlier the Romans and the Vikings, among others, had chosen the dragon as a symbol which they carried in front of them on their various military and exploring expeditions in order to scare their enemies as well as unknown demons. It seems that what later became a slogan of the crusaders referring to their cross, the "In this sign we shall conquer!", originally referred to the dragon; for the Roman legionaries, for instance, the preservation of their dragon's banner literally meant the survival of the cohort (cf. Hogarth and Clery (1979), 158 f.).

According to my understanding, unlike the ancient Romans or the crusaders of the Middle Ages, we at SCOS are not preparing a military campaign; we are not propagating the endless war of growing economic and managerial successes. In comparison to these contemporary myths what the SCOS-logo seems to represent is an anti-myth. This anti-myth is based on the assumption that "the dragon is to symbolize the underlying, powerful, restless, collective aspects of the organization which, although we try to imprison them ..., tend to break through, break out and 'disturb' the smooth machinery functioning of the corporate machine" (Berg (1987a)). There can be no doubt that "the dragon itself is powerful, ruthless, determined - but not necessarily evil. It is people, who cannot stand things they cannot control, who see cruelty and viciousness in him" (ibid.).

What the dragon in the SCOS-logo is supposed to symbolize for our contemporary institutions and our work enterprises, in particular, is a different metonym from the the glittering and sterile pseudorealism, as it is expressed in the best-selling soap operas on corporate culture and the related search for excellence. The dragon in this newly created version may get the previously explored function of the avantgarde in order to help us to create a new tradition of looking backwards to previous dragon myths and images in order to (re)discover that there may be other ways to cope with a dragon than just to annihilate it. It may even be the case that, by referring to the Chinese version of the dragon, we may discover new ways to help wisdom out of the wheelchair where it has been dislocated societally, in order to incorporate it in our organizations again (cf. Sievers (1986 a/b). The dragon tearing down the organization-chart may thus e.g. help us to perceive our history of industrialization from a new tradition, i.e. the repression and imprisonment of that part of reality which cannot be counted and measured.

So far as the image of the "dragon breaking out of the corporate psychic prison" (Berg (1987a)) in the SCOS-logo is concerned, I found two pictures which caught my thoughts and which may help us on our further attempts to perceive the mythology of our logo. The first one is obviously well-known to all of you; it is the front page of the first English edition of Thomas Hobbes' 'Leviathan', which appeared in London in 1651 (III. 30). The Leviathan is, in the Judaic tradition, the cosmic dragon which along with his counterpart Behemoth was created at the beginning of the world (cf. Steffen (1984), 83 ff., 112 ff., 142 ff.). This cannot be the occasion to argue about the meaning and the possible failure of the Leviathan as a political symbol, a point which was extensively made by the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt (1982) in his book which first appeared in 1938. What strikes me, if I compare the composition of this picture with that of our logo, is the combination of the chaos symbolizing creature on the one and the
Leviathan is his citizens" (ibid., 168); an expression which leads to the imagination of looking at the SCOS-dragon's scales as being built by the members of an organization (III. 33).

IV. SCOS, the magic dragon: Pet or fundamental?
The further exploration of the two Leviathan images which I happened to find on my way to the cave of the dragon may throw a new light on our own logo - probably not primarily through analogy but hopefully through a kind of playful creative exploration of our own cultural experience.

In revitalizing the dragon for our organizational world we may discover through this image a myth of the dragon which differs both from the pet notion of the lonely child as well as from the cosmic creature, which filled up the emptiness and exceeded the universe. If we
allow the dragon to be a symbol for the unconscious similar to the
serpent from which it descended, we may find ways to perceive, to
understand and ultimately to live in our organizations which lead
further than those which are offered by the mainstream approaches
of our organizational and managerial theories. Curing the monster instead
of killing it may help us to integrate into our own individual and
collective lives those dimensions which traditionally are considered
as typhonic, named after Typhon (whom Zeus in his attempt to annihi-
late him, imprisoned in the vulcano Etna, cf. Fontenrose (1959), 70
ff.), i.e. our 'animalistic' nature which - when we discover it in
ourselves or in others - often scares us so much that it has to be

to repeat the title of one of the children's books "There's no such thing
as a dragon" (Kent (1986)).

In order to let the dragon break out of the corporate psychic prison

From what I was able to present so far, I hope that you got a bit
further in touch with the fascination which the dragon as a mythologi-
cal symbol has possessed since the early days of mankind. Although I
find it very encouraging that SCOS, with P. O. Berg's help, has redis-
covered the dragon and chosen it as its logo, I would like to repeat
on this occasion a warning which P. O. Berg already expressed: "You
cannot fool a dragon - he senses tricksters miles away. Dragons are
not calmed or fooled by smooth talk or manipulation but cut right
through the most essential (power) relationships and (emotional) expe-
riences" (Berg (1987a)).

This warning in mind, it seems to me that, so far as the presentations
to our conferences as well as the contributions to our journal are
concerned, we have not seriously enough started not to fool the
dragon; on occasions it appears to me that there are just still too
many tricksters around and that the stories and images which are
presented about the dragon, i.e. about 'the ugly face' of our
contemporary organizations, are far away from an attempt to elucidate
where, how end to what an extent "our organizations are killing us"
(Morgan (1986), 273). Much too often these contributions seem to

(As Typhon is occasionally regarded as the father of other
monsters such as Cerberus, Hydra or Lerna (Steffen (1984), 43 f.), the
acquaintance with the dragon ultimately may lead us to further discov-
eries.)
of our organizations, as is indicated by the dragon tearing down the organization chart, a first step could be to indicate and to describe the traps and chains in which the dragon traditionally is caught in our organizations. What we as SCOS-members have been able so far, to contribute, for example, to a further understanding and conceptualization of culture, in general, and of corporate culture, in particular, reminds me in its predominant part of a comment George Steiner ((1971), 34) once made referring to T.S.Eliot's 'Notes towards a definition of culture' which appeared shortly after the Second World War: "Now, only three years after the event, after the publication to the world of facts and pictures that have, surely, altered our sense of the limits of human behaviour, was it possible to write a book on culture and say nothing." - If we are, however, prepared to discover in our "exercise in contemporary archaeology" (Berg (1987b), 25) the dragon traps as corporate artifacts, we have to acknowledge that the dragon, whose image we are projecting on others, lives in us (cf. Steffen (1984), 253 f.). It has to be recognized, accepted and cured by us before we will be able to discover it in the outer world of our organizations.

Don't let us forget that "a core element in the drawing", as Berg (1987a) states it, is "that the dragon should be fearful, i.e. scare the people experiencing him. Fear (of the uncertain, of lack of control, of the unknown, of death, of love - that could be lost -, of pain etc.) is probably one of the key emotions that build up the collective".

I would like to finish this presentation with a Chinese fairy-tale which was given to me by one of my students. It is based on the
Chinese imagination that the dragon is sleeping during wintertime. At this time it is very tiny. In the flash of the first thunderstorm at springtime it is raising again towards the clouds. As thus it is expressing the nature of the dragon as a cosmic appearance.

The dragon after the hibernation

Once upon a time there was a scholar reading in the upper floor of his house. It was a cloudy and rainy day and the weather was gloomy. Then he saw a little thing which was shining like a glow-worm. It was crawling on his desk. There, where it had been, it left behind burning tracks curved like the tracks of a rain-worm. It gradually twisted on to the book and the book, too, became black. He then realized that this could be a dragon. Therefore, he carried it on the book in front of the door. He stood there for quite a while; but it remained seated, rolled up and did not move at all.

Then the scholar said: "One shall not say of me that I was wanting in respect." With these words he carried the book back and laid it down again on the desk. Then he put on festive raiment, made a deep bow and escorted it outside. He was no sooner out of the door than he noticed that it raised its head and suddenly it extended. With a hissing sound it flew up from the book forming a shining stripe. It once again turned back to the scholar; by then its head was already as big as a barrel, and the size of its body measured nearly a cord. After another meandering a terrible thunder-clap crashed and the dragon went up into the air.

Then the scholar went back and investigated which way the little creature had come. The tracks went to and fro as far as the bookcase.

(Chinesische Märchen (1961), 135 f.)

Don't let us be too afraid to have a look in our bookcases; we may discover a dragon in hibernation.
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35. A Chinese Dragon
ABSTRACT

In this paper, I begin my methodological explorations with a consideration of the problems of the adoption of perspectives, of proximity and distance or of objectivity and self-interest. The problem is initially formulated in terms of the dilemma, not of the sociologist, but of the poet—a problem which is essentially the same but which has been explored through different paths of commitment.

The formulation of this problem as one of objectivity in the researcher, or the eradication of bias, has been a characteristic of positivist research. The effects of this approach have extended into areas where it is implicit and perhaps unrecognized, and these effects are examined in the work of 'reflexive sociologists' Gouldner, Davis and Watson. The focal problem here is one of self-knowledge and declaration.

The problem of distance, of stepping outside one's data, is an alternative perspective on the same problem. The problem is recognized in the work of Silverman and Gellner, but is most interestingly observed in the comments of Sartre and Moore in their novels. The process of fictionalization are here found to be similar to those by which the researcher interprets his data and produces his account.

This is observed through an analysis of the work of Jason Ditton, particularly with reference to his approach to data, theory, and the production of his accounts. The importance of language in creating accounts which are constitutive of the world rather than revelatory of its essences, and hence are inescapably persuasive versions of the world, is stressed by discussion of Silverman and Melville.
Finally, the paper closes with a summary of the problems which bedevil the researcher in observing, handling and interpreting data, and in producing an account. It is suggested that our research accounts, this paper included, are inescapably of an order of fiction, and are persuasive versions of the world which is unknowable in any 'objective' sense. Perhaps the best appreciation of the nature of that social life which we seek to explore is to be obtained through an active shifting and exchange of perspectives.

Perspectives, Interest and Bias

'Up above the clear sky a solitary aeroplane moved, bright silver in the sunlight, a pale line of exhaust marking its unhurried course. The Bofors gunners on either side of us were running to their guns and soon opened a rapid, thumping fire, like a titanic workman hammering. The silver body of the aeroplane was surrounded by hundreds of little grey smudges, through which it sailed on serenely. From it there fell away, slowly and gracefully, an isolated shower of rain, a succession of glistening drops. I watched them descend a hundred feet before it occurred to me to consider their significance and forget their beauty.'(1)

The above is taken from the war-time diary of the poet and tank-commander, Keith Douglas. It is a short, mimetic piece, catching the exact order of Douglas’ responses, which were instinctively aesthetic, those of the poet and painter that he was. We are up in the blue North African sky with Douglas, as his attention to the objects of his vision transports him closer to them. We feel the vibration of the guns, marvel at the sparkling ‘shower’ which falls from the plane, and finally we return to earth with Douglas as he realises that he is being bombed.

Douglas exemplifies here a problem of perspectives which exists for any observer or engager with the everyday world – the problem of appearance and significance, the essential ambiguity of experience. A bombing raid may be a thing of beauty, but to see this alone would at the very least imperil the observer; but the perspective of the Bofors gunners, responding instantly as their exhaustive training demanded, so attends to significance and its imperatives that other potentialities are forgotten.

Douglas in his poetry explores the divergence of perspectives from their unity in the event. He finds deceptiveness, complexity and ambiguity in his experience, and his endeavour (and finally his achievement) is to allow these experiential qualities to be sustained in his poetry, without the domination of a single perspective. As sociologists, exploring the same resource as Douglas, we share his concerns: to let experience speak through us, to puzzle over its definition, to explore appearances and perspectives. However, the commitment of the sociologist has taken a different path to that of the poet.

Although as sociologists, or members of a social world, we are not unused to the idea of the difference between aesthetic and mundane perception, we are rarely given to the adoption of the aesthetic.

'This contrast, often emerging with startling suddenness, is like a momentary switching on of some new current, or the passing ray of a brighter light, illuminating the outlook upon perhaps the most ordinary and familiar objects – an impression which we experience sometimes in instants of direct extremity, when our practical interest snaps like a wire from sheer over-tenacity, and we watch the consummation of some impending catastrophe with the marvelling unconcern of a mere spectator.'(2)

We must be traumatised into another mode of perception, when ‘our practical interest snaps’. We step outside the taken-for-granted world of things which we designate and classify for-all-practical-purposes and, perhaps for the first time, respond to qualities of colour, texture, rhythm, position, movement, sound and composition. This stepping outside has a dual quality: both standing apart from everyday categories, and standing close to the phenomenon as given, as experienced. Looking at a phenomenon with this distanced disinterest, 'objectively', entails:

'permitting only such reactions on our part as emphasize the ‘objective’ features of the experience, and by interpreting even our ‘subjective’ affections not as modes of our being but rather as characteristics of the phenomenon.'(3)
We are not accustomed to switching into this mode, and to accomplish it infrequently. Douglas' concern is to move between perspectives with facility, to slip between the worlds of interest and disinterest, of the aesthetic and the mundane. His effort is located in the interstitial area where the everyday world is ambiguous. Through this duality of perspectives the world of ideas does not become synonymous with the aesthetic, nor the world of feelings with the mundane, but they are fully realised as inseparable. There is no 'knowledge with no point of view' - the world is known and expressed through ideas and feelings.

'As long as one clings to the positivist ideal of the absolute spectator, of knowledge with no point of view, then one's personal situation and responses can be seen only as a source of error.'(4)

If we accept for the purpose of argument that knowledge may be absolute, and it is the sociologist's job to retrieve such knowledge, then it follows that as an instrument of its realisation he should be as free from defects as possible. Thus the subjectivity of the researcher should be eliminated as the source of bias, and the researcher should 'make his methods a litmus of the society under study'(5).

The idea that bias can be and should be eliminated rests upon the assumption that it is an appearance, and not a natural quality of the object of investigation(6). Bias results from the collection of evidence in such a way that an alternative answer to a research question is favoured(7). It is a result of the engagement of the observer with the observed, and his response to that engagement, the selective filtering and procurement of evidence, and a confounder of objectivity.

Therefore, within the context of positivist auspices, the concrete speaker is not an author; he is a one through whom the analytic author - nature - speaks. Nature speaks through the speaker.

In positivism, the speaker is a vehicle of nature, his analytic status it that of a messenger. The inquirer is not an author; he passes the word but he does not author it. This is to say that the inquirer does not create the word, because he merely passes it on from its creator. He is not responsible for originating the word, he is responsible only for transmitting it.

An inadequate inquirer, now a poor messenger, is one who gets it wrong, distorts it and so on.'(8)

It follows that any adequate social inquirer should therefore eliminate completely the effects of his personality from his research, and allow the evidence to speak through him. The means of controlling this intrusion is the general methodological theory, which by its very generality avoids any specific bias. 'Once joined to guides for technique...one has, in effect, done all he can to control bias'(9).

Is it then possible to eradicate bias by the studious and conscientious application of technique? Sadly, we have no guarantees that our enquirer will be made competent by the operation of these controls.

'To be sure, there is no guarantee that any given research undertaking actually will produce relevant, reliable, and unbiased information'; or, again, 'We cannot eliminate the effect of the observer in science; we can however, limit and measure this effect and this gain some control over the variables in the research'.(10)

 Reflexive Sociology

If we cannot remove the researcher from his research by technical means, what recourse is left? How can we control his effect? One influential means has been suggested by Goubner, with his notion of 'reflexive sociology'.

'Insofar as social reality is seen as contingent in part on the effort, the character, and the position of the knower, the search for knowledge about social worlds is also contingent upon the knower's self-awareness. To know others he cannot simply study them, but must also listen to and confront himself...'(11)
The values of the researcher cannot be eradicated from his work, and thus sociology can never be value-free. But these values and the 'background assumptions' of the sociologist, his 'world hypotheses', 'domain assumptions' and 'postulations' should, so the argument runs, be made explicit and brought into the foreground, to help the reader to evaluate the work and assess the implication of the theorist in his theories and the researcher in his researches. After all, if as Dave argues, what we are presenting is 'representative experience', the circumstances of the particularity of the experience should be made explicit.

'The representative experience goes beyond the particular, localised, albeit intersubjective experience. It articulates the connection between the latter and the major currents of social and political concern, between the personal trouble and the public issue. Quite simply, to have any impact on social, political or any other form of public thought and action, the particular must stand for the general.'

As laudable a pursuit as self-knowledge might be it nevertheless fails to improve the quality of our social knowledge. Firstly, the 'confessional' aspect would seem to fulfil the function of creating trust in the reader, in the same way as a man with a criminal conviction would be expected to declare it at a job interview. If a man is honest about his failings we might trust him; he may have reformed; if he avoids imparting the information, or he lies, his work may be considered invalid. But in the end we have to make the decision to trust him or not - we are unlikely to have recourse to his data, even if we had the time; just as we are not likely to check every job applicant for a prison record. His confessions may be bogus; they can at best be partial.

Secondly, it is usually admitted that any form of self-declaration can only be partial, as total self-knowledge is unattainable. But this still assumes, despite an admission if not a demonstration of the author's incompetence, that he remains nevertheless in some degree competent to comment upon himself and his work. It would seem to be paradoxical that what is a situation of the ultimate subjectivity, i.e. the subject presenting the subject, should be offered in the service of objectivity. The author's intentions may not be accessible to us as his readers, but neither is the instrumentality of authorship any guarantee of epistemological privilege.

'I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts...I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them...Will you believe me?...there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration.'

Thirdly, the notion of 'reflexive' sociology as constituted here implicitly follows the positivist line in treating the observer as passive, and social life as an object, even though admitting technical inadequacy. Although 'bias exists in every study', the methods of 'reflexive' sociology exhort us still in the positivistic vein not to behave as though it does. By declaring it, it ceases somehow to be a problem for those evaluating the work, and assumes evaluation to be possible, and, in facilitating it, by implication desirable.

Although the idea of reflexive sociology is, in realizing a researcher's theoretical antecedents, an advance on those of 'qualitative' methodology which suggest that a researcher can go naked into the research stripped of theoretical presuppositions, it is nevertheless presumptuous to suggest that he will have anything as elaborate as a 'world hypothesis'. It is more likely that a researcher, in common with most other mortals, will hold many such views some partial, others more complete, struggling and emerging and being realised from day to day. To present the realities of doubt and confusion which characterize the researcher's world would no doubt traumatise the reader's or evaluator's world.

What the researcher who seeks to control his interest is doing can be explained in terms of his orientation towards a community rather than towards an idea.
'In orienting to one's own interest as a resource for study, one is failing to respond to the necessity of promoting some authoritative version of the world which is intelligible to a community; a biased researcher is assumed to be showing an inability to control his interests where the object(s) of such interests are matters external to the objects about which he claims to speak.

Thus within the positive project the charge of bias is really a charge that the inquirer is showing lack of reflexivity because he is deflected from respecting community and this deflection is created by forces over which he has no intellectual control, i.e., by will. Bias is then inadequate inquiry in the following sense: it is to fall out of ignorance (of one's unnecessarily private suscepts), to be a theoretic member of the scientific community of agreement. It is to base a public claim upon the private. It is not to possess the private (attitudes, biography), but to transmute the private into the public without knowing it.'(21)

A study such as Watson's(22) can be seen in just such terms - in demonstrating awareness of interest and of reflexivity, it demonstrates respect for community and establishes its right to membership of that community and to be viewed as valid research. In declaring his 'personality', Watson becomes anonymous, and his research demonstrates and reaffirms the notion of community, of authority, and of social life as an object.

A further development of reflexive sociology can be found, more fruitfully, in Paul Willis' concept of self-reflexivity(23). Willis perceives the criticism of implicit positivism, but locates his interest in 'the relationship between subjective/cultural systems'(24). The focus of reflexivity is in the area of surprise, of strange or unaccountable behaviour, of obscurity, or of failure to communicate. It is when the world of subject and researcher diverge, rather than when they converge, that the possibility for discovery is greatest.

'It is here, in this interlocking of human meanings, of cultural codes and of forms that there is the possibility of 'being surprised'. And in terms of the generation of 'new' knowledge, we know what it is precisely not because we have shared it - the usual notion of empathy - but because we have not shared it. It is here that the classical canons are overturned. It is time to ask and explore, to discover the differences between subjective positions, between cultural forms. It is time to initiate actions or to break expectations in order to probe different angles in different lights. Of course, this is a time of maximum disturbance to researchers, whose own meanings are being thoroughly contested. It is precisely at this point that the researcher must assume an unrestrained and hazardous self-reflexivity. And it is the turning away from a full commitment, at this point, which finally limits the methods of traditional sociology.'(25)

The researcher interrogates his own world as well as that of the subjects and generates new insights by investigating interruptions.(26) His research is neither self nor subject orientated, but is concerned with the dialectics of the relationship, the interstitial area, the exchange of perspectives.

Distance and Everyday Life

The researcher then, moves between his world of emotions and ideas and the subject's world of emotions and ideas. Tradition has it that the researcher's world will be dominated by the idea, and professionally one would expect it to be so. But it cannot be divorced from the subject's world. As Gellner argues, theoretical development must cohabit with action and investigation, and the 'way to proceed' in social enquiry should consist of a confluence of 'the attempt to formulate the criteria of knowledge and the sustained investigation of our social situation'.(27)

Similarly, Silverman suggests that we must investigate and enquire both within and without the situation in order to appreciate both members' understandings (empathy) and their wider implications for human knowledge.

'The concern, however, must be to understand members' ordering of experience in order to step outside it so as to understand the human processes through which activities are assigned meanings.'(28)

The researcher can thus be seen to be developing awareness by
movement between perspectives, manipulating distance. But there are practical problems associated with the maintenance of variable positions and deciding when it is appropriate to observe, to retreat, or to be deeply involved with the experience. And this has implications for the methodology of research.

'That's what I must avoid; I mustn't put strangeness in where there's nothing. I think that is the danger of keeping a diary: you exaggerate everything, you are on the look-out, and you continually stretch the truth.' (29)

When studying everyday life, a substantial amount of which the researcher has in common with the subject, it is easy to be almost too vigilant, to regard that which is not strange as strange. That which is not strange to the researcher might be strange to the subjects, and that which is anomalous to the subjects might not seem worthy of the researcher's attention. Thus as Willis suggests points of divergence are important (30) and both researcher's and subject's common-sense assumptions, their taken-for-granted, should be pursued by the interruption and interrogation of the everyday situation (31). But the researcher may still in doing this be satisfying, unwittingly, his own need for something to write about, and 'making the news'. The issues may become distorted and out of proportion purely by the fact of observing, investigating, and noting them down. It is not unusual to find an anomaly when it is sought, and this form of generation of incongruity may result in an inability to understand the very thing which is addressed. Everyday life may become the everyday life of my fieldnotes.

Brian Moore, the novelist, provided a further point in a television interview:

'At the end of one of my novels, a man who has become a novelist attends his mother's funeral. He finds himself looking at the expressions of the mourners, the gestures of the priest, the grave-diggers shivering in the cold impatient to finish the job, and he realises he has forgotten that he is there for the funeral of his own mother.' (32)

The researcher can become the same as the novelist. As we develop as professionals, the more we are likely to lose the capacity to become involved in the experience, and through that to understand it. The more we observe everyday life, the easier it is to distance ourselves from it, and perhaps explain it, but the harder it becomes to understand it. Cohen and Taylor offer the idea that our daily fantasies, or 'escape attempts', are crucial factors which enable us to get through the day, and can help us to understand deviance or deviant behaviours (33). These fantasies will remain inaccessible if we are locked into a professionalised distance. Schutz is discussed by Bauman in the context of professionalised thinking:

'Again, like in Heidegger, it is suggested that there is only one kind of understanding, applicable to both ordinary members of society and to their specialised and trained students; both cases of 'making sense' can be described in identical terms... The superiority of sociologists over interpretive procedures operated by the ordinary members of society may consist only in their operating the same procedures consciously and in a methodical way.' (34)

The 'conscious' and 'methodical' application of the procedures may nevertheless be so different from the common-sense application of them that it constitutes a different perspective.

'The world of everyday life is taken for granted by our common-sense thinking and thus receives the accent of reality as long as our practical experiences prove the unity and congruity of this world as valid. Even more, this reality seems to us to be the natural one, and we are not ready to abandon our attitude toward it without having experienced a specific shock which compels us to break through the limits of these 'finite' provinces of meaning and to shift the accent of reality to another one.' (35)

The problem that the researcher might face is that the perspective once gained might be so hard won that it becomes as constricting as is common-sense. The only solution would seem to be a constant shifting of perspectives, or the adoption of multiple perspectives, in order to avoid confinement to any one of them. The problem is not entirely alien to the subjects the researcher may study, as they, within the bounds of non-professional common-sense, must
constantly decide how close to get to a situation, or how to maintain their distance. Their solutions may ultimately provide the researcher with his own.

Ditton, Data and Accounts

Jason Ditton, in his study of 'fiddling' amongst bread salesmen, makes a similar point:

"Observation, then, is not something restricted to sociologists. The sense, of course, in which some ordinary actions share this reflective dimension legitimates the sociological variety. Sociological research, from this viewpoint, is more of an exaggeration of conventional social activities than something separately constructed and separately justified."(36)

But there is, despite its elegance, something unreal about Ditton's conception of the researcher which does not quite connect to ordinary observation. He quotes Goffman:

"There is a sense, anyway, in which all observation breaks hidden rules structuring interaction. The researcher is, as Goffman notes of the type 'conspicuously concerned to an improper degree with the way that the interaction, qua interaction, is proceeding, instead of becoming spontaneously involved in the official topic of conversation.'(37)

It is in this sense of involvement that Ditton is not quite convincing. He produces a convincing enough account, but although he coyly protests that he found difficulty in extricating himself from the research situation (38), and produces staggering quantifications of his data as if to affirm his authenticity (39), the feeling remains that although he has the detail and the apparent understanding, where is the engagement? Ditton seems to be always the researcher, never 'spontaneously involved' despite his sympathy and sensitivity to his subjects. His perspective is always that of the researcher.

There is a certain naivety about Ditton's attitude to his field-notes which combines with his apparently sophisticated appreciation of 'covert' participant observation and the use of skilful interview techniques like the 'false question'.(40)

Consider his presentation of 'personal covert participant-observation skills'.

'Nevertheless, I was able to develop personal covert participant-observation skills. Right from the start I found it impossible to keep everything that I wanted to remember in my head until the end of the working day (some of the shifts were over twelve hours long) and so had to take rough notes as I was going along. But I was stuck on the line', and had nowhere to retire to privately jot things down. Eventually, the whine of using innocently provided lavatory cubicles occurred to me. Looking back, all my notes for that third summer were on Bronco toilet paper! Apart from the awkward tendency for pencilled notes to be self-erasing from hard toilet paper (sometimes before I could even get home), my frequent requests for 'time out' after interesting happenings or conversations in the bakehouse and the amount of time that I was spending in the lavatory began to get noticed. I had to pacify some genuinely concerned work-mates, give up totally undercover operations, and 'come out' as an observer - albeit in a limited way. I eventually began to scribble notes more openly, but still not in front of people when they were talking. When questioned about this, as I was occasionally, I coyly said that I was writing things down that occurred to me about 'my studies'.(41)

The above encapsulates both the main means of recording data in social research, and that which has come to replace it. Research data and its interpretation are dependent on memory. Memory creates meaning and creates an account, for everything we experience is instantly past and instantly subject to recall. The richness of the experience is something we can only contain within ourselves, structured by memory. As Kosinski states: 'The remembered event becomes a fiction: a structure made to accommodate certain feelings.'(42) We cannot escape from memory, for we cannot experience and account for or give meaning to and interpret events simultaneously.

Ditton would appear to start with an appreciation of the centrality of memory, but bemoans its fallibility. It is here that we can
discern the implicit service of the 'positive project'. (43) What Ditton produces are a set of notes to aid his memory, but how soon do these notes acquire a life of their own and even totally dominate interaction? Soon, Ditton is scurrying to the toilet with such frequency as to mark himself out as an incontinent and draw sufficient attention to himself as to bring out his declaration of himself as an observer. We can even detect a note of regret when he states that he was still unable to write notes in front of people while they were talking. What consequences might that action have had for social interaction, and how involved with his subjects could Ditton have been then? It would seem to be reasonable to expect that people would adjust their conversations and reassess their opinions if they were being noted down under their noses. But even if this were not the case, how naturally could Ditton have reacted and behaved when dominated by this need to observe? Or also when, even though not literally writing notes, he was imaginatively doing so, or preparing notes to be written shortly after? He would also have found it difficult to generate his own data for analysis as one of his own subjects, as his 'participant' status would have been only marginal.

The influence of Goffman on Ditton's work can be detected in his concern with interactive techniques, and with his concern with impression-management, which is characteristic of the former's work. Ditton plays the sociologist as con-man, albeit in a very gentle way, and notwithstanding his claims to the contrary. 'I didn't deceive the subjects', (44) he says, but they remain 'subjects', and are there for the sociologist to exploit for his data.

'But we cannot be above society or outside of it and part of it by means of a simple schizophrenic copulation or momentary improvisation. The whole point of Garfinkel's incongruity procedures is to show that the sense of possibility and its technique of impression management is false to the naive intersubjectivity which is the unarticulated structure of our everyday trust in and competence with social reality.' (45)

As Ditton self-consciously observes and takes his notes, he seems to become dependent on them. What is the consequence of his pencil notes being self-erasing from hard toilet paper? Is the experience also erased? Surely this cannot be so, but the inference from Ditton is that it would. The notes seem to contain the experience, some form of 'objectivity' is embodied in them which is there to be analysed discreetly.

'Four hundred typed foolscap pages of despatch data lie unanalysed in my filing cabinet, although they have been thoroughly searched for any information pertinent to an analysis of the sales department.' (46)

'In December 1973 I returned to Durham with a total of over 4500 hours of participant observation and thirty-four taped and typed interviews under my research belt.' (47)

'Although my original intention to analyse all this data still stood, it soon became apparent that I had too much information.' (48)

'Regrettably, involvement with the first questionnaire gobbled up the analysis time which I had planned to occur between periods of participant observation.' (49)

Ditton has become divorced from his data. That which was designed as an aid to the creative and recreative processes of memory, a personal message from the researcher to himself, has acquired the objective qualities of embodied experience.

Ditton does not at first seem to imply this at all. He tells us that his account is unavoidably impregnated with 'theory':

'Theory, like weather, is a zero sum concept: it cannot be more or less there, only more or less recognised and reordered. Naked experience is strictly unrepresentable as it stands. It has to be theorised in order to be communicated.' (50)

The question, which Ditton fails to explore, is what constitutes 'naked experience'. Is it his 'data', which he then theorises in order to make it communicable? Is it his imaginative reconstruction of his 'data', which he then theorises in order to make it communicable? And does the ordering or theorising of data exist without the need to make it communicable, in the effort to understand or even in the selective perception of experience? I am
here arguing that 'experience' is something other than the data which represents it.

'What I have been suggesting here is that by describing events through particular terms and conventions of language, we have already experienced the events, i.e. rendered them as an intelligible move in some game (ordering, obeying, murdering) of which our language speaks. So our descriptions constitute events.' (51)

So our field notes are already part of this theorising and ordering process. The conversations which we note are part of someone else's ordering process. Our memories, insofar as they are linguistic phenomena, are a similar example of description which 'constitutes' an event.

We seek to explore and understand our experiences through our descriptions of them in language, but in so doing we constitute them in language, and thus leave them in some way untouched. We can only write, with language about language:

'It is not that the world can only be grasped by language - so our accounts can be biased, distorted or mistaken - rather the world is already within our language.' (52)

Our experience will therefore always remain in a sense, beyond our grasp. Herman Melville's novel, Moby Dick, is a brilliant dramatic realisation of just this fact.

'The book itself dramatises its own meaning. By the end we know everything about what men have thought and said and written about the whale, all the versions of it they have formulated, from the religious to the utilitarian. We have seen the whale mythologised and measured. But at the end we are left only with a book, not a whale. The only whale which Ishmael actually enters - i.e. whose inwardsness is reached, is a dead one. But a dead whale is mere matter; its essential reality has departed. The whale is most real when it is actually plunging through the sea, and then it can not be appropriated, only appreciated, as Melville appreciates it in some of the most beautiful prose in American literature. It is an illusion to think we can ever 'catch' reality.

Ishmael survives because he learns that things are separate and other from what we call them. When Ahab wants to project his version of the whale onto the whole crew, Ishmael finally holds back, for he recognises the essential separateness of names and objects. He knows that man is bound to name the world, but he has a much looser and more flexible sense of how language relates to the world than anyone else. He does not strap himself tight to the whale as Ahab so literally and fatally does. He knows that there is a whale; he knows that it is men who project meanings on to it. Call me Ishmael: call it Moby Dick. He knows that when we send out the lines and nets of language into the world, all we bring back is language.' (53)

What we produce then, are accounts of the world, and of our experience, which represent not 'the world' or 'our experience', but our way of looking at it, and are as such 'persuasive accounts'. (54)

What is misleading about Ditton's brilliantly persuasive account is that it fails to present itself as such, and appears to us as a brilliant analysis of 'data', which may have by implication the associations of the language - game of positivism, recalling Willis' critiques of participant observation and 'qualitative methodology', and McHugh et al's critique of positivism:

'In its recognition of a technical inability to record all that is relevant - and in its yielding of this zone to another technique - positivism may actually preserve its deepest loyalty: to its object of inquiry truly as an 'object'. The duality and mutual exclusivity of the over-nestly opposed categories, 'qualitative' methods and 'quantitative' methods, suggest already that the 'object' is viewed in the same unitary and distanced way even if the mode is changed - now you measure it, now you feel it.' (55)

'In positivism, the speaker is a vehicle of nature...The inquirer is not an author; he passes the word but he does not author it.' (56)

In his recognition of an inability to produce 'pure ethnography', (i.e. a naturalistic reproduction of research experience) without the incursion of theory, (i.e. some attempt to analyze the processes of that experience) Ditton exemplifies Willis' recognition of the failure of technique:
Perversely, this theoretical impossibility of producing pure ethnography legitimates the overt celebration of theory-impregnation. It is useless to pretend to produce pure ethnography: one might as well come clean and admit to producing a 'theorised ethnography'.(59)

The object remains an object, and we have an analysis of experience rather than an analysis of an account. Dutton virtually disappears as a self-conscious author and is replaced by theory, and although his claim is that his research was 'intuitive'(58), his data collection and analysis are dominated by a concern with method, which 'has pressed the sciences into its own service'.(59)

What then, of the accounts which I offer? If I accept that I am as a researcher, in some sense the author of my own experiences, and the author of an account of these experiences, I am still implying that I have one account of them. But my account will not only change through time, it will also exist as one of a number of accounts possible for me, which may shift and interchange. I may have a private account (e.g. memory) which differs from my public accounts in speech and again in writing. I may negotiate my account not only with regard to the limitations of the medium in which I am expressing it(60), but consciously or unconsciously with regard to the audience to which it may be directed, or the community from which it sprang.(61)

Further, I cannot be sure that my account will not produce other accounts in the form of various readings which it may inspire in its readers. In this sense it may act as a springboard for further accounts. My own reading (for I am sure to return to the work at a future date) will no doubt never be the same again as it is as I write. The text has, in a sense, got beyond my control.(62)

I return to a consideration of 'reading' in another paper. At this point, however, I offer my account as an invitation to a participation in a reading which may well produce the reader's own 'text'. I therefore go further than Blum:

'We offer our accounts to the world as a way of showing how the world, of which we are a part, is made of text. When we offer an account, we are offering a way of thinking about the world. We are offering a way of making sense of the world. We are offering a way of understanding the world. We are offering a way of making the world intelligible. We are offering a way of making the world possible. We are offering a way of making the world real. We are offering a way of making the world meaningful.'(63)

Each account is submitted as one possible version of my experiences of language and organisational life, emergent through time and the medium, and directed usually towards an understanding of my research experiences as a participant observer. Personal disclosure is presented therefore not as a confessional, an attempt to declare bias so that it might be discounted, or an assumption of a capacity for self-analysis which might dispel fears of my unreliability as a research instrument. It is a phenomenology of the possible origins of my research interests, and an exploration of some of the ideas emergent with it. It is part of my account, not a prelude, background or foreground to it, and it is as subject to interpretation as is the rest of the account. The whole account, being based upon the same interpretive processes as is fiction, is therefore inescapably of an order of fiction. Kosinski, both a Professor of Sociology in his native Poland and a Professor of English in his adoptive home, the U.S.A., and an internationally famous novelist, gives an insight into the relative abstraction of sociology and fiction:

'First when I saw myself as a sociologist, as a social scientist, I assumed that I was already operating on a high level of abstraction. Indeed, equal to that of fiction, after all, a sociologist abstracts certain social forms into meaningful formulas which could be perceived by others in an act of self-recognition.'(64)

In reading this account, or any account, the reader will collaborate in this act of self-recognition. In creating this account, I have tried to be aware in my own work of the problems which beset us all as writers and sociologists. These are as I have tried to show, the dilemma of being both researcher and participant, analyt and data: the difficulty of being sensitive to a range of data; the dangers of being dominated by technique, of treating data as 'objective', and of the researcher becoming separated from the authorship of his data whilst failing to perceive such a separation in the authorship of his account.
Possibly the most significant problem is that with which this paper began, of being able to adapt and move between differing perspectives:

'the sociological imagination, I remind you, in considerable part consists of the capacity to shift from one perspective to another, and in the process to build up an adequate view of a total society and its components. It is this imagination, of course, that sets off the social scientist from the mere technician.'(65)

Whether the view we build up from this shifting of perspectives will ever be 'adequate' in C. Wright Hill's terms is impossible to say. It should, however, enable the fictional implications of social inquiry to be appreciated. As Kosinski states of his autobiographical works:

'the whole journey could actually have taken place in the mind.'(66)

Notes
3. Ibid, p 399.
6. Persons who are interested in bias are similar to the believers whom Socrates discriminated from true philosophers; like the pursuit of beautiful things, the concern with bias is a concern with whether a 'thing' (speech treated as a thing) appears biased or unreliable. Because a thing which appears biased can also appear unbiased, the 'object' for the believer is not the Real but something which changes and becomes', Elum A.F., Pous, D.C., McHugh, P. and Raffel, S., On the Beginning of Social Inquiry, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, p 48.
8. Elum et al, op cit, p 70.

'This conception of reflexivity is taken up in this study to enable the reader to make better sense of my theorising activity and to enable him more easily to evaluate both my own reporting and interpretations by revealing to him something of my self, the nature of my involvement in my research settings and, most importantly, the value positions and the structure of sentiments which are behind the accounts which make up this volume. If the reader of a sociological study can see something of the way that the sociologist generally fits into
and interprets the world which they both, to varying extents, are bound to know, then he can more effectively decide which of the findings to assimilate into his own understanding of the world and which to reject. The assumption is being made here that sociology cannot be value-free. It must therefore be incumbent upon the writer to reveal to his audience his value position for two reasons. First, one's values cannot be stated briefly in a few introductory comments or summarised in an appendix, and second, they are a part of one's self and experience, so the sociologist's value stance must be brought from the background into the foreground.


13. Watson, op cit, p 4, discusses these concepts of Goulner's, and builds his first chapter discussing those of his own which supply illustrates the futility and irrelevance of the project.

14. Dave, A., 'The role of experience in the construction of social theory: an essay in reflexive sociology,' Sociological Review, Vol 21, pp 25-55, p 35, quoted in Watson, op cit, p 5. There would seem to be little alternative available to us - the particular must always stand for the 'general' because we can never have access to the 'generals'. See Gouding, D., 'Establishing Bureaucracy: Clarity in Organisational Life: Managers', Sociological Review, Vol 28, No 4, Nov 1980; pp 763-782, for a view of the 'abstraction and simplification' process by which this is often accomplished.

15. Willis, P., 'Notes on Method', in Hall, S, Hobson, D., Lowe, A., and Willis, P., eds., Culture, Media, Language, London, Hutchinson, 1980, p 90, discusses the theoretical 'confessional' with approval. Neither he nor Watson, in stressing that theory is inseparable from their accounts, makes a justification for their attempts to separate it from themselves. There is no reason why we should not leave 'theory' where it is, and allow it to speak through our accounts, to be considered within them, rather than as an external constraining influence. The key ideas, certainly in Watson, would appear to be 'evaluation' and 'the world as object', both of which are characteristic of a positivist approach. Willis attacks the positivistic notion of the 'world as object' but nevertheless fails to expunge the shade of 'evaluation' from his account.


18. Blum, A.F. et al, op cit, p 51. 'Taking seriously the statements that no guarantees are available and that observer effects cannot be eliminated we can begin to see the auspices we set out to depict: bias exists in every study, but do not act as if it does. This is necessary because if bias exists

in any study, it also exists in any 'solution', thus converting any solution into an icon of its insolubility'.

19. ibid, p 52 and Chapter 4, 'Evaluation'.
22. op cit.
23. op cit, p 92.
24. ibid.
25. ibid.
26. This bears some similarity in the recognition of the value of 'interruption' with Garfinkel's method for investigating common-sense. See Garfinkel, H., Studies in Ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1967. An interesting comment on this method is given in Cuzzort, R.P., and King, E.W., 20th Century Social Thought, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960, (3rd Ed.), p 313: 'The building blocks of social reality are examined by a process of subjecting them to collisions that reveal their nature - such as the collisions between particles in a cloud chamber give clues to the nature of matter'. Where Garfinkel sets out to cause these collisions, Willis would appear to be content to wait for them to occur naturally.

30. Willis, op cit, p 92.
31. cf Garfinkel, op cit.
32. Brian Moore was discussing the ending of his novel, An Answer From Limbo, London, Secker & Warburg, 1962, in a BBC Television Interview, 4/3/60.
38. ibid, p 5 'In fact (and this, I suggest, is perhaps the mark of the truly accepted observer) I had far greater problems in getting out'.
39. ibid, p 9, 'In December 1973, I returned to Durham with a total of 4560 hours of participant observation and thirty-four taped and typed interviews under my research belt'.
40. ibid, p 10, 'If something that was said seemed important but likely to be swiftly dropped if I took written interest in it, I immediately interjected a wholly spurious question on job preferences or something and, under the guise of noting the answers, was able to make the notes that I wanted'.
41. ibid, p 5.
42. Kinkowitz, J., op cit, p 85.
43. Elum, A., et al, op cit, use this term which it would seem is an active expression of 'positivism'.
44. Dutton, op cit, p 11. This seems incongruous when placed alongside his description of his questionnaire, p 6. 'Although initially designed purely as a blind - so that attention would be drawn away from the participant side of things, and so that the workers would be able to divide my time into 'actual research' (distributing questionnaires) and just 'getting ready' to do it (all the rest of the time) - to side-track any deliberate attempts to mislead me from the research proper the first questionnaire grew into a Frankenstein monster. Greedily, because I thought that I would have to spend a lot of time designing, producing, distributing and collecting it, (even finally to throw it away as I had originally intended) I thought that I might as well try to extract a bit of research value from it...'.

The ideas which dominate in the above quotations are those of the separability of data; the analysis of otherwise inert and unintelligible experience; the discrete time separation between analysis and experience; and the only disqualification to the idea of analysing 'all this data' being the human impossibility of handling the quantity, would seem to strongly support the interpretation of Dutton's 'method' as being implicitly positivist. One wonders what his result would have been if he had fallen foul of circumstance, as did Edmund Leach, who writes in Political Systems of Highland Burma, London, Bill & Sons, 1954, p 312: 'My Hpalang field notes were all lost as the result of enemy action'. Leach wrote his seminal work from memory.

47. ibid, p 9.
48. ibid, p 9.
49. ibid, p 6.
50. ibid, p 12.
52. ibid.
54. See Silverman, D., op cit, p 23, 'the explanation of events as, for all social scientific purposes, the outcome of inadequate socialisation (or whatever), can itself only be a persuasive version (which precisely devoids the characters of those events (as events)). It is an account which, in this case, speaks the language of the community of social scientists - a language which constitutes the character of both what they look for and what they find'. And p 32, 'Scientific explanations, works of art, everyday accounts, are all persuasive because, in understanding them as they wish to be understood, we sustain our communal mode of existence'.
55. Willis, op cit, p 91.
57. Dutton, op cit, p 12.
58. ibid, p 10, 'The research was done intuitively, without text books clutched in the left hand...'
59. Heidegger, M., On the way to Language, New York, Harper & Row, 1971, p 74, 'The sciences know the way to knowledge by the term method. Method especially in today's modern scientific thought is not a mere instrument serving the sciences, rather it has pressed the sciences into its own service'.
60. 'In an important sense, in the world there is no value and there are no murders, tables, houses. But our language is not about that world in which there is no value or no tables... that world, the world of raw data, cannot be described for the sense of that world also lies outside of it and the very description of it, likewise, lies outside it. There is, one cannot really speak.' J. Kovesi, Moral Notions, London,
CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF SYMBOLISM WITHIN THE CORPORATION
AND THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: THE "TRUE PROFESSIONAL TYPE"

Vincent DEGOT

I - The link which exists between the characteristics of individuals and those of the organisations to which they subscribe or belong has gained recognition from the standpoints both of the practical management of those organisations and of the theory of organisation processes and development.

Among the observations concerning the practical side, we feel it appropriate to single out - not for the first time - the empirical works of K. Elias (1), for their demonstration of the connection between:

- the emergence of the Modern State, with its central administrations enabling it to monopolise judicial violence (the Law) together with fiscal and monetary control;

- and the assimilation by the Citizen of rules of civism which lead him to shape his behaviour by reference to the foreseeable future consequences, and thus to repress certain reactions which formerly ended in individual acts of violence, such as conducting vendettas, provoking armed duels, and so on.

The necessity for this connection derives from a structural particularity: given the length and complexity of the interdependent chains through which they work, the administrations of the modern state must be able to call on a body of servants whose behaviour is both well-ordered and predictable, and on whom they can rely to form the links in the chains of command. The empirical observation of this practical aspect of this relationship which is referred to above was based on the period going from the 13th to the 18th centuries, mainly in the context of France.

In our times, the corporation - of which the largest representatives undoubtedly have structural ramifications just as complex...
as those of any 17th-Century administration - displays a
definite distaste for relying on the putative abilities of
its employees as the foundations of its efficiency, at least
without the safety-net of close surveillance. This is quite
understandable when we realise that a corporation does not
exercise the same degree of control over its "servants", since
the latter are largely the products of an external social en-
vironment which the corporation affects only marginally. As
a fairly general rule, corporate structures are designed by
reference to a rather restrictive image of the individual.

Over recent years, some isolated corporations have started to
introduce deliberate policies for motivating their work force
with a view to determining behaviour patterns oriented towards
certain objectives. This tendency - reminiscent of the notion
of "civism" in N. Elias - has been described under the name
of "corporate culture".

The long-term evolution of the corporation displays features
comparable to those studied by Elias: the development of
corporate structures in response to changing attitudes of a
labour force increasingly penetrated by the tenets of what
might be called "Industrial civism". However, unlike the
corporate culture tendency, this evolution has followed a
natural, or random, course which cannot be attributed to the
deliberate action of any one agency concerned to achieve that
particular objective.

On the theoretical plane, many authors writing of the contem-
porary scene have laid stress on the link which could be estab-
lished between a "model of the individual" and various structure
characteristics of the organisations to which individuals of
that model belong. In the case of business organisations, this
model has changed with the times, due notably to the fact that,
when describing and analysing it, the theorists have referred
to an ever-widening range of disciplines from which individual's
characteristics can be drawn. These disciplines, virtually
all of which have a "Psychology" component, refer to the idea
that human nature can be more accurately circumscribed as the
conceptual framework of investigation becomes more comprehen-
sive, while recognising that a degree of simplicity must be
retained to suit practical management needs (2).

This theoretical view is thus that of an individual whose basic
attitudes remain unaffected by cultural influences which tend to
fit him into a common mould. Owing to corporate management's
very cautious assessment of the "self-regulation" potential of
the work force, this theory is expressed in the form of "local"
as opposed to "structural") applications of the new worker
models: these stress the importance of qualities of leadership
and the advantages to be gained by promoting worker participa-
in decision-making as a factor of enrichment and motivation.

Placing all these local initiatives end-to-end, one may gain
the impression that different organisational structures are
emerging, based on a more complex model of the individual.
However, a closer look reveals that any structural changes as
may take place (not to be confused with those resulting from
the general long-term trend mentioned earlier) are due much
more to improved management techniques: tighter controls,
breaking down overall objectives into more appealing fractions,
and the like. The impression of greater worker autonomy is
mitigated by the evidence of more subtle forms of control which
owe nothing to a revised model of the individual.

The two points just raised can be summarised as follows:

- on an overall (State, or national economy) level, there
  appears a slow transformation of the structures of the
  organisations involved in that level, in response to

../.
changes in the characteristics of the individual as a result of his assimilation of the rules and constraints of the industrial society. But nobody has control over - or even, for the most part, notices - this process.

- Furthermore, the organisations concerned have adopted (in our opinion) a restricted model of the individual, this being to some extent supported by current theory. At all events, there are no signs of any structure which represents a "trust" in workers' self-ordering capacities, except very locally and under close inspection (Quality Circles are a recent and striking example of this).

II - In the process studied by Elias, certain features of civism (for example, those concerning social behaviour) are more outstandingly developed, but are not sufficient to constitute a specific type of individual capable of attracting the imagination of a large fraction of the population and sparking off a train of imitation such as would contribute to sustaining the tide of civic development. During the period covered by Elias, typical models were described, usually in literary essays and works of fiction with limited audience, but applied only to very small groups (even if, as in Elias's own thesis, these were the most sociologically significant ones); for example Castiglione's "Courtisan", Griciani's "Universal Man", and the "honest man" of 17th Century French literature.

This paucity of exemplary types is explained, as we just noted, by the fact that only a few individuals went to make up that section of the community which influenced the course of events (political, economic or cultural), and also by the similar paucity, in all respects, of what we now call "media coverage". From the latter standpoint, it can now be considered that the modern society is sufficiently well-provided for the imposing of new standards of civism to be founded principally on putting over certain desired characteristics that are typical of a given model of individual. This model may exist (or at least be reconstituted) on two levels:

- firstly, as the model which comprises, according to Weber's definition of the ideal type, characteristics that are observed only in incomplete or embryonic form in concrete situations. However, these fragments or symptoms carry a symbolic meanings whose roots cannot be understood except by reference to that modal-type itself, which belongs to a kind of collective cultural unconscious;

- secondly, as depicted in fictional works or myths, where the characteristics are displayed in unreal contexts, mainly because they assume extreme situations of an ephemeral or hermetic nature.

It is the intention of this paper to identify the characteristic of this typical individual, the symbolic meanings which he may convey through some features of everyday behaviour, and his relationships with the ideology and organisational constraints of the industrial society. The name given to that individual is: "the True Professional".

1 - The "true professional" type

Here, we will not explore the origins of this type of model,
but merely identify a few fictional illustrations (films, novels, myths) which may be seen as successive signs of its emergence. The genesis of the type involves the assumption that it has a part to play in transforming the civic ethic - a hypothesis which will be only partly examined under a later heading. We will thus put forward an in abstracto definition, while showing that the type characteristics are not a mere juxtaposing of different qualities, but add up to form a whole which could well be incarnated by a real individual. With a view to retaining this holistic representation, we will start off with the most general features of the true professional and imagine, by association, his behaviour in different kinds of situations.

As a first approach, we define the true professional, independently of any particular area of activity, as an individual whose personal feelings are not a factor of his behaviour in reaction to circumstances. This means that, when faced with rather untypical situations with no clear guidelines (at least for the non-professional observer) to follow, he will react with little or no interference from his own psychological or sociological make-up. His reactions, however, are not the mechanical responses of the robot, and it is in the most unexpected situations that he in fact displays those qualities which draw the comment: "he's a real pro!"

Two typical but different situations are to be considered within the activities of our true professional: routine and emergencies:

- in the most routine and apparently normal circumstances, he remains constantly on his guard. As we shall see...

in due course, this results from a kind of experience which has taught him that routine is not a real state of things, but a relative lowering of awareness which makes things seem the same as ever. Also, to retain his awareness intact, the true professional is constantly on the alert for signs of something unusual which escape the attention of others. Thus, he is in a permanent process of learning, using the most ordinary situations as a testing ground for marginally different ways of behaving in them;

- in an emergency situation, the true professional can immediately call on a greatly varied store of knowledge relevant to his field of proficiency. This store may include some theoretical items, but is above all of an action-oriented kind: on the basis of his knowledge and experience, the true professional can produce an infinite variety of responses.

It might thus be said that the true professional is in fact just a specialist of sorts, but his speciality cannot be described in terms of one-dimensional technical know-how:

- this is primarily because his field of "competence", or "qualification" is usually horizontal, cutting across those of technical specialists, and is defined in relation to a whole reality, rather than to its fractions as separated by science and technology;

- this link with reality is explained by the fact that the true professional, even if not intrinsically a man of action, has to take relatively unaided decisions, making a rapid choice of the best solution in relation to the interests he represents and in the light of what information is available to him;
the technical specialist, on the other hand, forms part of an organised process through which the product of his specialised work is combined with that of other individuals to achieve a given result.

In his own field, the true professional thus has a more overall "vision", to use Schumpeter's term (3), for which he is fitted by his training and experience. In his case, "experience" is of a different kind than that of the technician. The former may learn to recognize some configurations of a problem without having previously met them, but he then breaks these down into basic elements which are familiar to him; if necessary, he may in some cases consult expert opinion. Whereas the true professional is an expert in the art of putting together fragments of information deriving from different disciplines, whose judicious combining requires a variety of experience, such as may be obtained either by special training (case studies, simulation exercises) or through previous types of activity.

The specialist, therefore, is the product of a recognised training curriculum corresponding to a particular field of knowledge with different degrees of competence, going from the man at the bench to the scientist, via the technician, the qualified specialist and the expert. The true professional, by contrast, is the product of an individual process of learning in which he has accumulated - perhaps under the guidance of a seasoned practitioner - a store of knowledge not bound by formal curricular limits. He personally decides that closer delving into a particular area is relevant or not to his own field of activity.

All this might suggest that the true professional emerges from uncharted waters, relying on some kind of personal charisma, and is thus a random occurrence. This is not however true: his appearance is related to, firstly, the existence of a sufficiently prevalent body of problems to be resolved in his area and, secondly, to that of a group of interested parties who need, each in their own fields of activity, to ensure that those problems are settled.

Such a set of problems can be described in many various ways, as will be shown by the examples discussed further on. The main thing is that they arise frequently enough, and are sufficiently troublesome, to cause people affected by them, and disposing of the means required, to promote the emergence of a new type of operator. Then, owing to the relative rarity of his qualifications - similar, as we have seen, to those of an expert - the true professional may acquire some degree of ascendancy over the people whose interests he comes to manage. This may be seen through the high cost of hiring his services and his tendency to go beyond his specific terms of reference - if not actually to take over from the original "patrons".

There are thus both individuals and problems which encourage the emergence of our true professional, usually because he is expected to produce solutions different from those reached through more conventional procedures. As a first stage, the true professional may be drawn from the specialised area most closely related - or deemed by somebody to be the most relevant - to the problem involved. Operators possessing this initial background, with the addition of other qualities such as drive, loyalty, or ability to make decisions, are then given the opportunity of extending their range and carrying out "experiments" on simple examples...
of the problems arising. From among this "short list", a few will emerge to become true professionals, others will carry on careers as specialists with somewhat wider experience or, even, become recognised as experts in their particular fields. In Weberian terms, the frontier between the "pure" true professional type and the ordinary specialist type is not always clearly drawn.

An essential quality of the true professional is his loyalty especially if he works for business or other organisations competing against others who may - being confronted with the same problems - seek to attract him to their own fold. The question then arises as to the true professional's relationships with financial gain, and as to whether the principle of loyalty is not in conflict with the need for him to take an independent stance in exercising his activity. Faced with these questions, it must be considered that he has a "professional conscience" compelling him to do his very best when performing an assignment. Throughout the duration of that assignment, sometimes set out in a formal contract, the true professional remains loyal to his client. If he considers that the means placed at his disposal are insufficient to permit him to perform the assignment with the right degree of quality (often assessed according to his own standards or those of his profession, since he has a reputation to maintain), or that the remuneration offered is inadequate, then he may refuse to accept the terms. But - and this is a further characteristic of his integrity combined with the intermittent nature of his activity - these considerations must not be allowed to interfere with an assignment taken in hand. From time to time, he may apply for the terms of his services to be reviewed, but in that case he is in the position of a salaried employee negotiating the value of a particular contribution and skill.../.

This separation between the two sides of the true professional's activity is of the same kind as that which he imposes between the quality of his work and his personal reactions (which concern events occurring in his private sphere).

These two particularities can be associated: difference of attitude depending on appropriate times and separation of the personal sphere, applying the hypothesis that the true professional has acquired (or developed his innate tendency towards) an ability to take an abstract view together with an aptitude for accurate perception. This enables him, during his periods of activity, to distinguish rapidly and with minimum expenditure of his mental energies between what is important and what is merely incidental, and thus to formulate action strategies likely to be effective in terms of the problem to be solved. These qualities of abstraction and discernment go together (and require) an ability to mobilise a high energy potential very rapidly. In stable and routine situations, this potential remains latent and unseen.

The "technical" characteristics of the true professional can be summarised as follows:

- vigilance based on a developed and cultivated instinct for perceiving signs which escape the attention of others (because the instinct can be developed only by experience, because the perception is related to a specific capacity for action, because the signs themselves are often at the cross-roads of a number of different specialities, and so on);

- the ability to extract the important facts of a situation, not allowing the attention to be distracted by irrelevant.../.
factors, such as those properly belonging to the private sphere;

- strong loyalty within an area defined by the terms of contract, those being negotiated between times of professional relationships. This loyalty requires a very finely accurate perception of the best interests of the individuals or organisations on whose behalf our true professional is called to make decisions;

By contrast, special technical skills are not to be taken as specific characteristics, at least in the stage of determining the basic elements of a professional qualification.

The above characteristics (and others which stem from them) are only rarely to be seen in particular individuals (in the sense of being able to recognise them in the street), in fact only apparent in extreme situations. They go to make up a pure type, but one which is not the mere juxtaposition of separate features; it is the interaction between them which identifies the "ideal individual", as Weber puts it. This ideal model leads to the enhancement of the characteristic features usually encountered in real life; the term "enhancement" refers to the fact that, when somebody recognises one of those features when saying: "that's a true professional", he is thinking more or less consciously of the ideal model and his assessment brings in a host of other related features. From this standpoint the ideal model forms a symbolic nucleus of the kind described in an earlier paper (4). In the third part of this paper, we attempt to make an inventory of some of these characteristic features and the configurations in which they are associated with enhancing the "true professional" image.

However, before going on to explore the symbolic implications of this type of model, we will consider a few extreme situations, drawn from myth or fiction, in which a character is associated with the "true professional" ideal. Still further on, we will examine the question, relevant both to the "sociology of the professional" and to "management symbolism", of the connection between the ideal role-model (as in Weber) and the extreme case (Betelheim), which may concern individuals, situations, or behaviour.

2 - Fictional and mythical incarnations of the true professional type

These incarnations are used here because the examples we are about to quote are known only to us - and probably to most people - through the medium of films and books and so on. This is not to deny that somewhere there may exist, or have existed, real individuals possessing all the characteristics of the type. However - and this is part of the mythical aspect - those individuals are not, as professionals, participants in every-day life.

Before embarking on our description, we will take a brief look at the concept of "the professional" in the ordinary meaning of that word. Several sociologists writing at the start of the 20th century (Elias, Weber, Groth). used the term "professional bourgeoisie" to describe a class forming part of the new social equilibrium which emerged out of the Industrial Revolution (in France, the Revolution). By this, they sought to represent a change whereby business success took the place of birthright as the yardstick of social remuneration. If - as is the object of our demonstration - the true professional type is considered as the expression of a new civic ethic, it must thus be related to the first stirrings of that ethic, i.e. to all appearances in the wake of the industrial revolution.

...
However, the separate qualities which go to make up the type can - in the same way as the characteristics of capitalism according to Braudel - be observed in isolation, and possibly in extreme forms, prior to that period.

It is thus within this framework of a long-term evolution marked by individuals particularly representative of the elements of a type, that we must consider the "examples" we are about to depict. Taking recent years, it can be said that the true professional takes shape in works of popular fiction: crime and espionage novels, science fiction. Here, we will not dwell on the importance of the minor arts (such as popular prints and the decorative arts) in helping to understand the existence of a style, Riegl's "kunstwollen" (5).

The true professional in detective novels tends to be among the criminals rather than the police: his professionalism makes him hard to catch, since his crime does not point to him (no fingerprints or other physical clues, no mark of personality). He must be able to baffle both the science of Holmes and the intuitions of Poirot. A non-professional murder, for example, sometimes known as a "crime passionnel", is committed by someone who has a motive which can identify him; even if he employs devices developed by the professionals and well-publicised (such as wearing gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints), he is no match for the scientific methods of the police. Whereas the professional thief or murderer usually has no personal relationship with his victim; his enemy is the police, and his wits are his main way of preserving life and liberty (Darien's thief (6), an anarchist "doing dirty work in an untidy way", is a marginal case).

The cleverness of the professional criminal consists in a combination of three types of "skills":

- a range of technical accomplishments (picking locks, disconnecting alarm systems, sabotaging vehicles, etc);
- great self-control and gift for improvisation (in case of an unexpected intruder, a faulty device, etc);
- power of anticipation, based on the ability to foresee the reactions of others (victim, police, rival criminals, etc).

These three factors interact and support each other: self-confidence is bestowed by the power of anticipation and the mastery of technical skills (such as un rum combat).

In the final analysis - and this is the characteristic of the model type (in this example) and the charm of the detective novel - the situations arising belong to a well-identified and limited catalogue. If the genre were not so strictly defined, the inventions of the author and his surprise at the reactions of the professional criminal would not be so satisfying.

The hero of the spy novel introduces a number of interesting new characteristics. Although he possesses all the skills of the criminal, he is usually engaged in a struggle against other secret agents, so that there is a distinction between the good and the bad causes; also, being usually in the service of a government, he disposes of a much wider range of resources, especially technological ones.

Here, we are dealing not so much with the obscure gatherer of intelligence data, but with the more spectacular heroes of Ian Fleming, Len Deighton and Robert Ludlum and the like. In this category, a further distinction can be made between
The true professional in science fiction works often attains that status from the fact that he is a member of a team confronted by a hostile (or at least dangerous) environment, which can rely only on itself and the technological armory (sometimes quite considerable) it carries with it. It could be assumed that such a team would be made up of technical specialists as described earlier, but two factors are liable to belittle that assumption:

- firstly, the need for quick action implies that all the members of the team must be familiar with all the techniques available. The particular expert in one of them takes charge of it only if time permits;

- secondly, there is the degree of experience of the individuals in the team: the ones having survived previous missions with success incarnate the true professional type.

In this fictional context, the attention of the individuals is directed to mysterious things and events, whose interpretation requires the deployment of a variety of technical knowledge in an effort to comprehend phenomena quite beyond the bounds of human experience (and thus not foreseen even by those who planned the mission). The conflict between good and evil does not really arise, but the issues at stake go far beyond that of the survival of individuals, and concern the future fate of the whole planet.

Great self-control must be observed by these heroes; otherwise, machines are able to take over running the world despite all human efforts (7). These machines represent an artificial incarnation of the true professional type, but, however sophisticated their construction, finally fail to cope with an environment which is not fully rational (8).
It might almost be said that these three examples from fiction (with mythic overtones) correspond to different stages of development of the true professional type, all of them possessing the same basic characteristics of that type which we described at the start of this paper. We will now consider the most characteristic events and forms of behaviour that can be associated with the symbolic aura of the true professional in some concrete situations.

3 - The symbolic aura of the "true professional" type in everyday life

As stated earlier, our attention was first drawn when we observed that, in many sets of circumstances, an attitude or a performance was described as that of a "real pro" - meaning a mark of excellence with particular connotations. We will now start by describing typical cases in which this commendation is or can be expressed, before going on to examine the symbolic implications: the aura surrounding those situations in which the term "a true professional" is applied.

3.1 - Situational requirements

If the qualities of the true professional are to be both expressed and recognised as such, situations of particular kinds must obtain:

- it must be seen that an individual, or a team, has performed an assignment or a mission in a satisfactory manner (we will return to this notion in a later section). The work involved may be either of a fairly permanent kind, or required for a short-term assignment; but, in either case, the achievement must be capable of clear and separate identification, and of evaluation in other than purely financial terms (as we shall see later, the quality of professionalism in our sense implies more complex considerations, such as promptness of action, domination of problems, and so on). Examples of a long-term assignment include the organisation of an advertising campaign, or for short missions, the negotiation of a contract;

- the implementation of these assignments or missions must require the deployment of a varied range of skills, and usually implies contacts with an equally varied range of other participants. To take the first of the examples just quoted, the true professional must be familiar with the basic techniques (sample panels, etc), be able to discuss things with producers, designers, advertising agents, and financiers, to be capable of managing a budget and working to tight schedules, and so on. In all this, he must show that he knows exactly what he wants, is aware of all the options, and has chosen the most effective way of doing things;

- the conduct of the assignment must leave room for the expression of personal qualities, by which we mean that there must be several possible styles of action and that the observer must be able to distinguish between those where the man in charge - although achieving correct results in purely accounting terms - calls unduly on scarce resources such as personnel time and generates a climate of stress and conflict, and those where he runs a tight ship through a straight and smooth course. The "true professional" is not to be confused, when judging this, with the merely reliable and hard-working administrator. The latter generally proceeds in careful and
gradual steps to a safe but unremarkable conclusion, whereas the former imposes a dynamic style which cuts through much of the routine.

Generally speaking, however, the actual results corresponding to the work of the true professional are those which are least likely to bear the mark of his individual personality. The professional element is his way of resolving problems, which can be reproduced by others possessing the same qualities and will thus give the same results. These results are characterised by a well-rounded finish requiring no further tinkering and fitting smoothly into the existing scheme of things.

It might now be asked where situations displaying these characteristics are likely to arise. In other words, in what type of organisation and in which departments of that organisation can we expect to find them? There are several ways of unearthing the answers to these questions: one is by approaching known and established corporations (but how likely is it that this kind of information will be obtained from them?); or by referring to type-models such as those developed by Mintzberg (9) — but these models are too general to provide precise examples, and this approach amounts to searching for typical models matching with situations that are themselves already typified, with a consequently high rate of wastage. Therefore, we incline to a more modest approach which consists in exercising our imagination and memory on practical field studies in which we have been involved, sacrificing theoretical objectivity to a more tangible object of study.

The activity of the true professional is often associated
families is conducive to the "professional" trend, as are the allocation of sector budgets with wide discretionary spending powers delegated to some management executives, and the development of fairly varied and increasingly specific techniques: market surveys, advertising, merchandising, etc.

In some corporations, this trend has started to extend to the production side, where it is becoming essential to have a coordinator in charge of various activities related to, for example, new product development (Design Office) and factory introduction (O and M department). This extension results both from the complexity of certain products and from the long time-lag between an initial project and the first product to come off the production line (as in the automobile industry). However, this very complexity and the scale of the investment involved (taking again the example of the automobile industry) limit the real freedom of action of the coordinator, with each sub-assembly or main component being surrounded by its own walls of authority. Nevertheless, recent examples such as that of the Saturn corporation (11) point to the lengths to which a trend of this kind may be pushed.

A comparable trend is to be seen in the conglomerates field, where the parent company is a Holding Corporation and there are managers responsible for whole sectors of activity. The latter have extremely wide powers, allowing them to sell off one or other activity for the purposes of building up capital reserves for redeployment. At this high level, the manager must be competent in financial, commercial, technical and other matters.

Finally, mention should be made of all the executives who...

in their respective fields, have the job of negotiating contracts requiring a wide range of knowledge: legal matters, technical implications, customs of partner countries and so on. This applies, for example, to negotiators selling turnkey installations of various kinds such as nuclear power stations and manufacturing plants. As a general rule, such negotiations require a small team of people capable of responding to unexpected demands at short notice and without seeking advice from their management base.

3.2 - The symbolic connotations of the "true professional" image

The "true professional" qualification awarded - increasingly more frequently, it would seem - by some operatives to the style or results of others (the two must be taken separately, since the results are seen independently of their author and recognised by their "well-rounded" aspect) signifies two things:

- firstly, the style itself is recognised, more or less consciously, as displaying some of the characteristics defined in the previous part of this paper;

- secondly, this recognition - in this instance usually unconscious - endows the style or results in question with the symbolic aura surrounding the professional, which we described in the first two parts above.

We thus have a pattern of the following type:
management is often subjected, this factor of confidence (linked to that of reliability) is decisive. More so, for example, than that of the quality of the outcome: in many situations, the important thing is that something just has to be done or said; the "something" must naturally meet certain standards of value, and the solution proposed should be capable of application as it stands – but this is often only one of several possible solutions between which the differences are not apparent in cost-benefit terms.

Another quality much appreciated, for reasons similar to the above, is the ability to achieve results without undue conflict, or at least conflicts extending outside the small team coordinated by the true professional, or resulting from his relationships with other departments of the firm. By contrast with the fictitious situations we have discussed, the corporation is an ongoing human system and the expectation is that it will be left in roughly the same condition after the assignment as it was before. If there is too much rocking of the ship, there is a strong likelihood that some members of the team, or having dealings with it, will appeal to the higher authority, thus disturbing the senior manager who originally gave carte blanche, more or less, to the "professional" he placed in charge.

In other words, the true professional is usually best regarded when he reduces (or does not add to) the pressures prevailing in the corporation.

We thus see that:

- on the other hand, for reasons somewhat related to "psychological" aspects of the corporation (but which may also be influenced by the way it is organised, the priorities assumed for the latter do not correspond to its theoretically rationalistic behaviour patterns.

There is one instance, hardly considered up to now, in which the professional qualities appreciated by the corporation come closer to its theoretical nature, as well as to those emphasised in fiction: the crisis situation. This can arise in any of several areas: social climate (a major industrial dispute with serious repercussions on output), business situation (need to close production plants or absolute necessity of securing a contract), and so on.

The idea of a crisis is usually associated with a rather dramatic atmosphere, which leads to a consensus on the need to overcome it. Furthermore, unusually large resources may be allocated to that end. However, this does not mean that the economic consideration is entirely absent, since the crisis and its solution may set a bad precedent or create durable constraints (such as when a pay rise is unduly granted, or a price wrongly fixed. What might be called the "truly professional" attitude would then consist in sticking to as many management imperatives as possible, trying to avoid the pressure of events even at the expense of attracting direct or indirect criticism: for example, a negotiator who lets things drag in the hope of wearing out the resistance of the unions may be pilloried by the press. In this particular case, the true professional himself takes much of the pressure and may decide, even,
his decision to do so, without the backing of the normal processes of evaluation which generally precede the formulation of an assignment within a corporation, has to be based on the intuition of a solution, which must then be more fully worked out before distributing tasks to the other members of the team and convincing them he is doing things the right way. Consequently, although the true professional does not allow his personal feelings to interfere with his job, he must not appear coldly dispassionate, but, rather, generate persuasive charm.

This personal charisma, accompanied by his reassuring competence and reliability, goes to make up a set of qualities of the greatest value to the corporation employing him, provided that it can make the most of them. However, it cannot do this in isolation, being dependent on the "civil service of professionals".

4 - The true professional and the "industrial civil service"

At the start of this paper, we emphasised the fact that the civic ethic - within the strict meaning defined by Elias - was not based on a model of the individual which could be identified and recognised by the people to whom it was eventually to apply. We now wish to develop the hypothesis that, on the contrary, the true professional - despite his apparently unusual characteristics which explain his rarity in everyday encounters - in fact constitutes a type of civil servant as developed by that ethic.

First of all, we will return to some of the points considered by Elias:

- in the first place, the modern States which started to take shape in the 17th Century (with Henry IV in France) based...
their means of action on increasingly complex, long and specialised chains of individuals. For regular and reliable results to be ensured, it was necessary that the individuals forming the chains follow a relatively uniform pattern of behaviour - not meting out justice themselves, allowing for the consequences of their acts in terms of State policies, and so on;

- secondly, this behavioural consistency at first sight applied only to a small number of people engaged in the business of the State. However, either because one way of making the latter's predictability more effective was to extend the pattern more widely, or because their improved social status (entering the State service was the only means by which commoners could achieve this) made others follow their example, the civic ethic gradually spread throughout the citizenry and finally impregnated everyday life.

The promotion of "industrial civism" required, often using very forcible means of inculcation, a similar pattern of predictable behaviour: punctual attendance at work, conscientious workmanship, obedience to factory supervisors (traditionally owed only to the Lords of the land), etc.

There are factors in common with the evolution described by Elias: authoritarian enforcement and absence of any attempt to demonstrate why a given form of behaviour was justified. Also, there was the same status gulf between the beneficiaries of the system (the manufacturers) and the cogs in the machine (the workers), as between the State functionary and the petit bourgeois under Louis XIV. However, some reservations could be made in this respect: the Protestant English industrialists often subjected themselves to the same discipline as they demanded of their workers, and Colbert exemplified the civic virtues of his day (see Thompson (3) and Ines Harat (14) on these two points).

The industrial civic ethic does not promote qualities that are in themselves a worthy acquisition, at least in immediate terms, for the workers; whereas the civism of Elias refers to practices such as those of hygiene and education that can be considered as of immediate benefit to those adopting them. Industrial civism needs docile armies for the factories, and enforces their obedience by exercising constraints (child labour, 12-hour working day, work-cards, and so on). This repressive system lasted through several generations before becoming more liberal under two main influences:

- worker protests and claims increasingly better organised, and thus more costly to oppose;

- more refined methods of motivation, removing the need for total control of worker attitudes.

It must be added that, in the meantime, the industrial capitalist system came to penetrate the whole fabric of society, until it is now difficult to survive without forming part of it (except for individualists considered as marginals by all the rest: tramps, criminals, artists, etc.).

The servants of the system can thus now be granted greater freedom: they have come to use it, and above all found out the cost of missing it. The times of repressive enforcement are well behind us, and compliance has become
so general as to imply no humiliation. The negative phase being over, a start can now be made on awarding enhanced status to selected employees displaying particular behavioural qualities. The history of industrial civism has always featured the same basic principles:

- imposition on whole segments of society of type of attitudes consistent with the corporation's potential working requirements (up to and including consumption habits);

- once these attitudes are sufficiently assimilated, using them as a basis for developing new and more complex types of organisation (not however excluding decentralisation), not only in the interests of greater efficiency, but also to respond to the new expectations of career-builders with "desirable" potential.

We will now try to show that the true professional type enters into this scheme of things and, even, constitutes an especially important part of its development, to the extent that he is at the crossroads of several trends:

- the evolutionary trend described above;

- the development of means of communication making it possible, for the first time, to impose a dominant ideological model using the covert device of works of fiction that have no apparent connection with the aims of the industrial ethic. This last factor has always been present, it must be said, in that people have rarely perceived the final aims of the process of civilisation in which they were immersed;...

- an industrial crisis (structural or not, but at all events having prevailed for many years past);

- the fact - somewhat of another kind than the above trends - that the evolution of the corporation in relation to the society appears to have become stabilised (15).

For the time being - as emerges from the previous parts of this paper - the true professional type tends to be associated with the notions of marginality and crisis (we shall see later the theoretical problem of the study of extreme situations for defining social types), rather than being a feature of everyday life. But it can also be considered, that these extreme situations in conjunction with the media potential mentioned above enable the development of a type - unrealistic but "complete" - which, in return, will serve as a reference for enhancing everyday situations. To some extent, the true professional constitutes a kind of "derived type" made possible by the new conditions now obtaining. We now look further into this idea.

In terms of the two-stage process described above, the true professional type stands at a pivotal point in the evolution of industrial civism:

- in the first place, he is along the line of past trends: he is constituted - seen as a type - out of basic qualities which are the idealisation and systematisation of those demanded by the corporation (in absolute terms, even though in a Taylorist model they apply only to the fraction of the work force involved in product design and work organisation: autonomy, innovation, reliability, finished workmanship, etc). But this idealisation leads,
through the interaction of qualities hitherto considered only separately, to the emergence of a new profile of an individual possessing properties additional to the norm (essential if the latent qualities are to take on real substance) and who cannot immediately be fitted into known organisational structures;

- the true professional type as such is endowed with relative autonomy, given that it cannot be incarnated within the environment from which it for the most part emanates. This explains the fundamental role of works of fiction, which stabilise the type-outline, simulate its possibilities (especially in relation to organisations) and, above all, provide a basis from which an ideological study - or, to borrow from J.P. Payo (16), an "acceptability test" - can be launched. Nobody (except possibly ourselves, in writing these pages) has consciously taken up such a study, so that the acceptability of the type is being tested by the unconscious forces of social evolution;

- however, perception of the type's existence in everyday life has started with the admiring recognition of certain qualities by many people, as expressed by the remark: "that's a really professional job". This means that the type is becoming a cultural focus acting as an enhancement of, and thus an encouragement to follow, a certain kind of behaviour. At this level, there are thus signs of an assimilation of the corresponding type-values to a sufficient extent to be given expression in the form of appreciative judgements like the one quoted above;

rather

- our hypothesis is that, sooner than later, these values will have gained ground sufficiently for corporations (or other organisations) to start using them as a firm foundation on which to build new structures, thus utilising the full dynamic potential of the type instead of just its separate qualities, which they had already recognised as valuable in themselves.

Via this process, the true professional type is thus seen as an essential stage in the development of the industrial "civil service" which both engendered it and will thereafter be bolstered by it. It might be thought that the "deviation" described above is a merely circumstantial event caused by the development of the mass media. In actual fact it can indeed be fitted into the general scheme, but the latter must first be enhanced in a way which becomes clearer if we refer to the History of styles.

A style, as usually defined in the Art History text-books, is the outcome of tentative stirrings occurring during the period of rupture with the style which preceded it. In the course of a series of experiments, the elements which finally combine to constitute the style are gradually identified. At a given point in time (revealed with the hindsight of the Historian, rather than apparent to the contemporary observer) it can be said that the style has reached maturity and authority, to the point of influencing later works and becoming a yardstick for defining them in terms of an abstract ideal. The analogy between the emergence of the true professional type and that of a style can be seen in this crystallization process.

More relevant, however, are the ideas developed by a number of authors, concerning the links between the style of a period - usually referring only to well-defined artistic works such as religious objects, paintings, sculptures, and so on - and the surrounding cultural climate. This
enables us to relate a style defined by reference to these "prestigious" works, to activities of apparently minor importance, such as decoration, furniture, or clothing, and show that they all belong to the same art-istic climate (Kubiwolen). The demonstration is made in the henceforth classic works of Riegl, Worfinger, Eak, Panoisky, and others.

This allows us to take on board the apparent "deviation" represented by the true professional type, as referred to above, and which is in fact only considered as such in terms of the academic distinction between major and minor trends, concerned more by their contemporary impact than by what they now reveal about the collective unconscious of their day (such different writers as D. Lessing, Calvino and, even, Huxley have mercilessly rehabilitated works of science fiction and detective novels). This error of judgement by the mainstream commentators is due to a lack of appreciation of the rapprochement of the corporation towards the social whole; while the interplay between the latter has caused qualities which were initially significant only in terms of the corporation to gain general recognition and take on almost "civic" values. It is now that the corporation has become ever-present, and the focus of all attention, that it is also less inclined to underlie its own singularities. This is no longer necessary, everything is going its way and the spontaneous creation of fictitious types such as the true professional is, unasked, contribu-tive to its future development prospects. The problem is that, as happened on former occasions, the corporation remains largely unaware of this process and thus makes no deliberate attempt to take advantage of the new organisational avenues opened up by the advent of the true professional type.

However, events external to the corporation may well make up for this. We noted earlier that some of the aura of the true professional came from the fact that he emerged in an atmosphere of economic crisis. Against this background, he is thus seen from short range as the man to handle emergencies, while the frequency and impact of these are increasingly present (again with the help of works of fiction) in the popular imagination. This fully objective connivance between the "artist" and the "beneficiary of the industrial ethic" merits investigation. Either to, the artist was seen as expressing existing cultural values, whereas he now seems to be sowing the seeds of future developments. It may be that this is occurring principally in the commercial and "popular" arts, such as the cinema and television.

We now go on to explore some aspects of the importance of the crisis in forming the true professional image, but from the strictly theoretical standpoint of the possible connections between the "extreme situation" and the "ideal type".

5 - The extreme situation and the ideal type

We owe to Bettelheim the device of using extreme situations as a means of understanding certain phenomena observed in everyday life — even if not of an "ordinary" kind. Bettelheim based some of his theories concerning autistic development on his observation of the behaviour of certain of his fellow prisoners in German concentration camps. Here, we shall be concerned less with the content of Bettelheim's work itself, than with the way in which he used such situations as fields of observation.
The extreme situation has certain characteristic features: unremitting distress, uncertainty of the future, impossibility of escaping. In this context, Bettelheim observed both typical behaviours - turning a blind eye, melting into the mass, etc - and typical individuals: the fatalists who accept with resignation, among whom the mortality rate is well above the average, and the elite fraction who cooperate with the oppressor by assuming an intermediate authority over their fellows. Bettelheim found two dominant attitudes in the face of the camp's permanent and unbearable repressiveness: either one of withdrawal, leading to quick death (the fatalists), or one of extreme attentiveness to the daily routine, deploying a semblance of intellectual activity which permitted survival, but with longer debilitating effects.

The notion connecting the action of the true professional to the extreme situation is that of the latter in crisis. As we have seen, the attitude of the true professional in such circumstances is also one of acute attentiveness. The result is perhaps debilitating to the extent that it strengthens the true professional's concentration, and that the trade of the spy, of the soldier, of the prison warden and such is in itself sanctifying (as compared, for example, with that of the management researcher). As in Bettelheim's examples, the difference between life and death (which may be those of other people) depends in these extreme situations (at least as portrayed in works of fiction) on the degree of attentiveness observed. It is also the perception, the memorisation or the integration of a wide variety of facts which enables the true professional to find a solution.

One characteristic which of course distinguishes the true professional is that, although he cannot escape for so long as

the crisis lasts, he is at least striving to bring an end to it. Independently of the value judgement made of his activity, it is this necessity and this possibility (even if within narrower limits than in an ordinary situation), which enable our professional to preserve his soundness of mind, as we shall see later.

From the observer's point of view, the extreme situation has the advantage of being easy to define, even if the characteristics selected to that end cannot adequately call up the full horror of actually living through it. This is similar to the "convenience" which served Goffman in his accounts of totalitarian institutions: there, it is much easier to pick out the salient features which are likely to cause the reactions typical of individuals than in more open institutions such as corporations and administrations.

These extreme situations or institutions can thus be related to real behavioural or individual types. It is from this standpoint that Bettelheim's approach differs from Weber's reference to an ideal type. In the latter case, observations made in ordinary everyday context are extracted and then brought together to form complete types possessing characteristics which exist only partly, or in embryonic form, in that everyday context. The "ideal type" thus constitutes an extreme model only rarely found to exist in real situations.

It is between these two approaches that the fictional derivation referred to above allows us to throw a bridge. Works of fiction enable the development of situations which, even when extreme, retain an element of credibility and involve characters who,
although approximate types themselves, may acquire a fair semblance of reality. This explains, as already emphasized at several points in this paper, the role of works of fiction (mostly visual, but sometimes printed) in the propagation of values associated with the true professional type.

The above underlines the role and preponderating influence for the researcher of fiction writers (often marginal in literary terms, but not always, e.g. Kafka) in the former’s attempt to understand the processes considered here. We dealt with this point at greater length elsewhere, even going so far as to fabricate fictions of this kind (17).

Works of fiction apart, to what extent can extreme situations throw light on everyday happenings? Earlier, we saw that three cases could be relevant, corresponding to three models of the extreme situation in relation to the individual: Bettelheim’s concentration camp; Goffman’s totalitarian institution; and Elias’s absolutist society. Depending on which case we consider, the transposition can be made on the lines of the critical point (Goffman), of the ideal model (Elias) or of the analogy (Bettelheim). We have chosen the latter as seeming to present (despite the differences already pointed out) an extreme situation and the individual reactions to it (danger of withdrawal) which relate most closely to those of the real professional in an emergency. This analogical transposition is illustrated by the following diagram:

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Thus, the extreme situation is seen as a reference able to explain the everyday situation which can actually be observed. The behaviour of the true professional as described above is influenced by an analogy of this kind. But, as we have also pointed out, it is composed so far of only fragments of behaviour or, rather, behaviours that are only the fragments of an activity and of a personality associated with the notion of the true professional. Even when an onlooker says - usually admiringly: "that chap is a real pro", there is every sign that he is admiring a quality which applies solely to an isolated instance. Thus, the true professional type also functions like the ideal type, insofar as he is the combination of separate qualities which have been idealised when constructing the type.

This dual "functioning" of the professional type (as both analogy and ideal type) comes from the fact that it is involved in both the cases referred to above, precisely because it is a factor of civic behaviour: involved at the individual level because it can be associated with a particular person; and at the social level because it refers to a set of qualities or behaviour patterns which define a civic ethic.
We have just discussed the true professional in crisis situations, when crucial options have to be taken and he stands out from among his fellows. However, crisis is not always with us, and other aspects have to be examined:

- in what way can the true professional’s behaviour in an extreme situation suggest what it would be in normal circumstances?

- how can we identify, outside times of crisis, the individual who possesses the qualities of a true professional (apart from those having already proved their worth)? This is an important point when it comes to choosing executives for key posts.

The next part of this paper will examine certain psychological characteristics which can assist in that identification during routine periods. Here and now, we shall be concerned to see how the true professional’s reactions in emergencies can be a guide to his behaviour in more normal times.

We have already seen how, in the crisis situation, he takes up the centre of the stage through exercising keen perception of the unusual. He possesses most of the elements needed to deal with the crisis as it occurs, and the necessary skills. He thrusts fully into the situation and seeks a central position where he can have a calming influence, with his gift for slowing down the pace of reactions: he knows that there is no point in unruly agitation and that, if he is to be heard and obeyed, he must first impose a degree of relative calm.

It is likely that this attentiveness, authority and gift for reassurance are intrinsic qualities which the professional displays at times other than emergencies, since they would not be so highly developed without regular practice. In maintaining his capacities, the true professional remains constantly on the watch, partly through a kind of game in which he evaluates various elements in the light of situations he has experienced, but also because he knows that some emergencies are foreshadowed by almost imperceptible signs, and that some situations are inherently unstable and liable to become uncontrollable if a crisis occurs. He is thus in a permanent state of readiness—whose dangers will be discussed later, including that of his becoming impelled to spark off a crisis of his own making, like Dr Strangelove in the film (18).

In the final analysis, it might be considered that the periods of “inactivity” are less appealing to the true professional than the extreme situations (an element of his possibly “freakish” personality we will be discussing later). In fact, extreme situations are rare and, in those which endure for some time (such as wars), all kinds of individuals can be trained to act with the same effectiveness as the natural professional type. His most salient characteristic is thus that he can pass without transition from a dormant state to one of efficient hyperactivity.

In other words, here as in other fields discussed earlier (comparison with the technician), each of his separate capacities can be equalled, or even bettered, by other individuals. But he represents a configuration of existing and well-identified characteristics. It is in this way, moreover, that he constitutes a type and the product of the civic ethic: he is adapted to new situations created through the historical evolution of our organisations. Now, by analysing the main psychological characteristics of the true professional, and especially the way
he retains his mental balance, we will consider what
he can tell us about the evolution of our society as
a whole.

6 - Psychological aspects of the true professional type

Several of the considerations developed above present the
true professional as an individual hypersensitive to most
of the elements in his environment. Indeed, he owes some
of his strength and effectiveness to having recognised before
other people, either the abnormal signs presaging a crisis
or, while the crisis is under way, the factors which will help
him to deal with it. This perceptiveness and power of memory
are accompanied by the strict control he has over his own
reactions (needing to avoid causing a panic, and having to act
more rapidly than others). He is thus in a highly-strung frame
of mind.

The fact that he can be seen as an extreme case from the psycho-
logical standpoint justifies an attempt to relate him to other
clinically extreme types in that area. The author does not
claim any real authority on the subject, but the following
considerations are based on concepts that have entered the
public domain:

- at first, if the schizophrenic is defined as someone who
is cut off from the world and who rejects reality (in self-
defence, according to the Bettelheim study quoted earlier),
then the true professional is the very opposite of this
clinical type. On the contrary, he is concerned to perceive

things which the common observer would pass over as being
insignificantly normal. He can thus be represented on
a scale of awareness of reality, showing him to be hyper-
normal as compared with the schizophrenic:

Intensity of
awareness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>schizophrenia</th>
<th>normal individual</th>
<th>true professional</th>
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however, this attitude consisting in surveillance of his
environment so as to detect any undue or hostile signs
makes him vulnerable to association with another clinical
type: the paranoid. Indeed, he may have the idea
that he is in the presence of a threat he reconstitutes
from scattered impressions which he cannot communicate
to others - particularly to the "specialists" who are in
a position to take action. The latter usually take a
one-dimensional view of the professional, and tend to
see him as an amateur meddling in their field of know-
ledge, often adding to this the scientist's patronising
attitude to the man of action. The true professional
is thus sometimes placed under very considerable outside
stress which he must overcome during the time it takes
him to thoroughly verify his "instinctive" impressions,
before proceeding to convince the various associates
whose cooperation he needs.

Despite these internal and incoming stresses, the true
professional is able to maintain his balance due to two
special features of his training and function:

- firstly, his rapidity, the swiftness of which he has
tested through experience. With some professionals,
the body has been trained to react even before conscious awareness reaches their minds. This confidence in his own rapidity assures the true professional that he has the time in which to act - at all events more time than the ordinary run of people placed in the same situation. This "sparse" time can thus be used to confirm his first impressions and plan immediate action. This conviction that he has the time to act stems from experience of his own limitations and potential;

secondly, the strain placed on the true professional is usually soon dissipated and translated into action. This characteristic becomes significant when we remember the hypochondria leading to an autistic attitude to their times displayed by some outstanding minds such as those of Nietzsche and Swift. Their only safety-valve was their writings, and they had no immediate means of action on a world whose perversities they denounced (especially since, by effect of amplification, the more violent their denunciations, the fewer readers they attracted: the sales of Nietzsche’s latter-day works reached only a few dozen copies). The stress borne by the professional piles up like the charge of a condenser and then breaks out in the form of action.

Having ventured into the field of psychology, we feel free to formulate the hypothesis of third source of equilibrium: the pleasure derived from the feeling of being a true professional. This pleasure is by nature ambiguous, a source of either balance or imbalance, to the extent that it is above all a feeling of being able to retain one’s equilibrium where others would be in disarray. It is thus made up of a sentiment of being in sole charge (being left with a free hand in times of crisis; irrespectively of his normal

command status), together with one of self-confidence. As such, it is a relatively narcissistic pleasure and probably one which attracts the true professional type.

The characteristics outlined above reveal the true professional as a hyper-normal personality, or freak of nature. And it is true to say that, in many situations in which he becomes prominent, he is obliged to take on this role when making decisions: such as that ten people must be sacrificed to save a thousand. This appearance is accentuated - in the eyes of the crowd or of the other characters in a fictional situation - when it is a matter of trading certain immediate deaths against a hypothetical disaster some time later. This exerts additional stress, the professional knowing that failure will lead to being pilloried in the media and by the public.

This personality profile may also support a further hypothesis concerning the fascination of many Westerners, over the last decade or so, for certain aspects of Oriental civilisations. These aspects of course reach us in a highly deformed state, but the use made of them by various Western commentators (consultants, journalists, researchers) is thereby all the more revealing of what the latter seek to find there. In the first place, many people associate the very real achievements of Far Eastern countries (Korea, Japan) with a particular collective discipline that cannot exist without an individual discipline observed by each member of the community. The latter is seen against a vague philosophic or religious background usually expressed (as for the true professional type) in extreme or mythical form, such as the literary trappings of Zen Buddhism - telling us that the anchor’s concentration enables him to remain perfectly motionless for hours, before the fraction of a second needed to speed his arrow to the centre of the target.
All this floats in a sea of confused images: Samurai, Mishima (19), the inscrutable face, etc. But it may be asked whether this fascination for things Oriental (in some businessmen, consultants, and so on) does not reflect another fascination, for a world of true professionals, reliable, courteous but distant, often described as cold and cruel (but their cruelty tempered by a very strict code of honour).

The Western true professional (existing only in fiction) does not live in a world of professionals when relations between individuals are governed by codes (whose unfamiliarity makes them seem even more obscure). He is a lonely figure, unable to convey his professional views to others, showing merely some fragments of his personality. For this reason, he has an attitude to the world which, in the absence of a code, is made up of ruse and brutality: he cannot, in practical terms, secure the confidence of those who perceive only his words and pieces of his motivations. He is not on equal terms, and must either seduce or overpower. In principle, these devices are aimed only at a precise objective within the framework of his assignments; but his personal power, like those awarded to him by sudden events, severely tempt him to exercise them on his own account.

To resist this temptation, the true professional must have a highly partitioned personality: not allowing his personal world to impinge on his work; not allowing him to usurp powers granted only temporarily; and not allowing his personal values to take the place of those willed by his employers.

The above characteristics show the true professional as possessing a completely artificial personality (which he is not to be found on every street corner). This gives the ordinary individual the impression that he is looking at a freak of nature, one whose reactions cannot be foreseen in the light of common sense or intuition. From this point of view, the logic applied to role models is no doubt most relevant, making the true professional type a good illustration of the rationalised individual on which classic economic theories are based.

However, even if artificial, the true professional is an entity deliberately designed: following studies and practice reaching down to their deepest roots, he has been taken apart and then reconstituted. This applies only, of course, to the case (unlike that of the mythical vision of the 'orient') where the true professional is not the product of the civic ethic's development.

7 - Conclusions

In course of the foregoing we have identified a type of individual which serves as a reference model when evaluating certain behaviour values within the corporation: reliability, finish, observance of deadlines, and so on. These are some of the traditional attributes of the skilled craftsman (source of the pre-war quality so much missed in those days of plastic junk goods), to which new characteristics are added: ability to take decisions within an assigned framework without reference to higher authority; and skill in combining a variety of factors (individuals, knowledge, objects, etc). These added components are characteristic, more especially, of the adventurous aspect of the type.
By reason of the very heterogeneous origins of the type's components (from the steady petit-bourgeois to the reckless adventurer), it can be understood why it does not exist in everyday life, but is exemplified in numerous works of fiction (e.g. mass-audience films such as the James Bond and Indiana Jones series).

It can thus be said that, when corporate employees describe a performance as that of a "true professional", they are importing into the workplace a cultural model which has no concrete existence there. The metaphorical transfer process is as shown in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporate Universe</th>
<th>Social Universe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>traditional meaning of professionalism in the firm: skilled workers, qualification</td>
<td>social references of the &quot;true pro&quot;: true professional type: adventurers of fiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performance said to be of &quot;real true pro&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conscientiousness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>initiative</td>
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This is a quite classic representation of the way in which the values current in one section of society are transferred into another, such as when someone in civilian life is said to behave in a "military" fashion. In our specific case, however, we have pointed to an increasing interpenetration between the corporate and the social worlds. This means that, whereas in our other example the analogy is used only to conjure up a picture (i.e. of a stern disciplinarian in uniform bullying a squad of raw recruits), the true professional type here evokes an exemplary behaviour consonant with corporate objectives.

The transfer which, in other cases, serves to depict an aberration (the individual with a military attitude is out of place in a civilian world), is here used to call up a symbol of excellence which all should strive to imitate. This is why the true professional model possesses dynamic potential.

As concerns the "military" analogy, it has always been used to indicate a behavioural stereotype (authoritarian, brutal) - with the sole exception of those societies (such as that of Sparta) where there was strong interpenetration between the military and the social universes. Otherwise, the image is not set up as an example to be followed and remains a static device of rhetoric.

In our case, the exemplary overtones confer a dynamic quality to the type-model. At the level of an entire corporate universe, conformity to a model is encouraged, by showing that the most efficient are the most valued and that they possess a given kind of characteristics.

As we have seen, corporate structures have not yet made room for individuals of this new style. Two reasons can be given for this:

- firstly, the population of true professionals must reach a sufficient level within the corporation before the latter recognises, and adapts itself to, the new potential offered by this type of individual;

- secondly, it is quite possible that the true professional type will remain an influence: merely in symbolic terms, encouraging separate behavioural characteristics without taking on a tangible shape.
Whichever of these two trends the professional model follows, there is no doubt that the corporation will have to learn how it can be put to its own purposes, which will require a new attitude in several respects:

- firstly, further development of the corporate policy or strategy concerning worker images, involving recognition of the latter's role and the devising of ways in which they can be influenced;

- secondly, forward planning research, covering the evolution of the corporation's technical requirements (salesmen, engineers), changes in working and social relationships and in life-styles, and certain notions with both symptomatic and symbolic implications, such as that of the true professional;

- finally, the development of methods of action specific to each industrial context (the author sets out an example of this in a contribution to a teaching programme for Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales).

It will have to be realised that the emergence of cross-occupational types like that of the true professional (as opposed to occupational specialists in marketing, engineering, financial and other corporate departments) is making it possible to plan long-term strategies that are much less dependent on short-term business trends - but more exacting in terms of structural planning in that, as said earlier in connection with Elias's civic ethic, those types are of value only insofar as they are related to new structural forms suggested by the very characteristics of the types. However, action on and through symbols is outside the field of this paper and belongs to that of what we have elsewhere called "Management Symbolism" (20).
ABOUT THE REPULSION OF MATURITY

Concerning the conspicuous assessment of unreason

Wolfram Buriach

Despite of Constantine's legendary conversion to Christianity before the decisive battle against the pagan Augustus Maxentius at the Milvian Bridge nearby Rome, the subsequent "Edict of Milan", proclaimed in early 313 p. Chr., marks a point of divergence in regard of a millenium. At first hand this Edict of Toleration guarantees the equality of all creeds, promises to make an end of religious prosecution, and holds out a prospect of recovery of deprived properties. What was meant as a protection of the Christians against the aggressiveness of the declining Roman Empire, however, at long sight became an instrument of suppression at an institutional clericalism's disposal: Since the margins of "tolerance" were destined by a repulsive exegesis of "the very Christianity". The Milanese Edict, in that respect, was an early symptom of a psychotic mentality, which is incapable of a social organization without an "eternal" assertion. And referring to this, till the present time, a vague paraphrase of "tolerance" has remained the suspicious vindication of ultimately barbarian methods, which are afraid of any historical recollection. Confronted with particular experience, that is to say, methodological discretion - like the fashionable "postmodern" one - gets out of its depth and reverts from attraction to merciless brutality. Against this, however, only the entire disappearance of any institutional limitation - and accordingly the absence of any mode of unimpeachable conformation - anywhere could give evidence of a social order, which enables an unrestricted individualization.
Toleration and its deceitful perversion

It stands to sociological reason that religious persuasions are mediated expressions of actual discomfort or permanent dispair and prospect the dawning of deliverance. In this respect they reflect both a contemporary grievance and a supertemporal acclamation. Provided these two divergent moments ever could coincide, then at the instant of one's death only: When a final state - "identity" in a modish term - sweeps away all concrete visions and betrays the unreal logic of "Utopia", where this was simply understood as a prolongation of the present.

Utopia in a critical sense of common realization, however, postulates the practicability of any social experiment without institutional restraints. Accordingly confessional inhibitions, including the ones of sexuality, must be conquerable lest they should not get suspected of precisely such an arbitrary power, against that faith is an indirect protest. At least the self-perception of the Western World argues with that logic whenever it comes to terms with specific modes of spiritual "Fundamentalism": For strict commands prevent the individuals from pursuing their own way to self-perception. "Utopia" is fundamentally outlined by its ends and does not give room to any deflection from the proclaimed course. In terms of a historical concept, a fundamental persuasion does not distinguish between a temporary and an eternal commitment and, in consequence, disposes the idea of subjective conceptualization. Particular prospects - "artifacts" in that sense - are tabooed as long as they bear the ability to obstruct the final extremity, which is the dissolution of transitoriness.

To be sure, these considerations concerning the fictitious constitution of fundamentalism in general must not get confounded with prejudiced incitements of a "Holy War" or the apodicy of a legendary "Armageddon. As a rule, displacements of such a kind stem from a similar unhistorical foundation. It is conclusive, however, that there does exist an inconsistency between a professional inclination to a point of no return and the philosophical arrangement with the ongoing historical process.

Following the comprehension of Sigmund Freud, the distinction is to draw between the fixation on an egocentric organisms and a mature organization of vital impulses. Whereby, however, this disjunction does not obey the simple logic of "take it or leave it". Beyond that, only a constancy of both tendencies would end up with a standstill as it is. A social organization, though, which strives for its own survive, is bound to set free libidinous forces instead of continuously suppressing them. This release, however, must not be conditioned by a definite aim, but by a directive to obscure "origines" anyway. Hence a civilized organization is distinguished by its erotic culture, which incites it to further creativity.

Without any doubt, that notion has accompanied the Western order - namely under the sign of Christianity - from its early beginning till its contemporary performances. Thereby, in all its stages, it was driven by the necessity to demonstrate its superiority to any other creed or "Weltanschauung". The accident could be successful in that respect, as Karl Marx and Max Weber pointed out, because ever and again it managed a countervalance of rational and irrational moments. Prerequisite to what was the collective action of institutional opportunism and collective sublimation, which sustained passing deviations as well. With this "patience", which marked its difference from all other professions, the accidental settlement was able to endure a millennium. Since - more or less tacitly - it took for granted the dialectic of preceding rationality and impulsive sensuality as a profitable process, although it could generate revolutionary movements as well.

In recent times, however, precisely this reasonable dialectic in the mind of many contemporary "theorists" become replaced by a crucial discrimination between "instrumental rationality" and "limping feelings". Without any obvious need, an unbridgeable contrast to all traditional shapes was constructed. The slogan of "postmodernism" is just one of the indications, which altogether prospect two directions of social apathy: One of these "moves onto an even more esoteric plane", the other one presents "the doctrinal justification for an onslaught on all values and motivational patterns of "ordinary behaviour". Although these two tendencies "officially" are hostile to each other, together they simulate an "end to reason" by the refusal of any distinct remembrance of it. Apodetically they fulfill their own prophecy: Following that every confession, including the accidental ones, is equal in the sight of an apocalypse. By its decree of impotence facing the "apocalypse", however, postmodernism unwillingly discloses the traditional ideology's quality, that is its ability to perceive the constraints of the "social contract". Since the means of that contract were mediated by the concept of "toleration", which did not dissect the human into "rational" and "sensible" parts.
Certainly, the ideology of toleration has been suppressive throughout with its Christian version of 313, when it got subverted to a hypocritical allegation of "tolerance". Herbert Marcuse has developed its characteristics excellently in his interpretation of the "regressive desublimation" under capitalist circumstances. An entirely "rational" order cannot permit the release of non-reproductive energy any more. But under these auspices, the perception is endangered, too, that ideologies follow neither a binary logic nor a "germinal dualism". On the contrary, they confirm a present state as well as they reflect the idea of the same and they tend to surmount one of their implications by the other. In concrete, ideologies cannot exhaust unless they are realized. Their extirpation, however, as it obviously occurred to the ideology of toleration under the rule of postmodern rationalization, is nothing else than a self-deception. In that point a brief reminiscence of the millennium Milanese Edict maybe remarkable.

In order to pacify the Empire in the East and the West Licinius and Constantine were in line with the proclamation of the legal toleration, although it was appropriate for divers interpretations. On the secular side, personal integrity and propriety was secured to everyone who believed in nothing but one good. Following Licinius, who returned to the worship of Sol later, toleration was practised on the grounds of any monotheism without regard of its exegesis. Constantine on the spiritual side "expresses the conviction that he owes the triumph over Maxentius to the Christian God" and that "the grace of the same God will bring great blessings on the Empire, whereas neglect of His honour would involve serious afflictions". By that expressed conviction, however, a reciprocity between the helm of the State and the grace of the Christian God already is introduced, which is destined to become the touchstone of quite the contrary to toleration: That is a court of arbitration.

It is the crucial point of "the tolerance" though that it needs an instance of discrimination. It implies its ends with its start, therefore, as it proclaims an abstract principle above the human interests and tends to carry that through in general. In this regard, "toleration" experiences its own dialectic by an arbitrary principle and its consequences of negative sanctions. By the same time, however, it incites historical processes in evoking critical consciousness as well as accumulating social resistance.

The Constantine Era in combination with the early state church has extensively shifted the points in this relevant sense. The decree of monotheism as such still could give room for different idols as hence mental dissent and social collapse. Following an imminent consequence, however, about 313 for the first time a separation between "Catholicism" and "heteresy" appeared. With it the social disciplining by an installant church and the proscription of protest-religions - like the Donatism - was introduced. And when at the Concile of Nicaea in 325 the explanation of creeds passed to the high dignitary exclusively, the impossibility of an enacted tolerance as it were became verified. The interplay of confession and power suffers under the lasting fear to get outstretched by the social development. Against this menace, the existing social order gets confirmed under the threat of the rod of God's wrath on the side of the true believers. But on the other side, the one of the Clerical Institutions, the fight for "truth" inevitably keeps on.

Since this fight is for actual power it can get suspended by submission partly or temporary only. Intellectual and social progress gives evidence of the transitoriness of institutional orders as well as commandements. Power loses its legitimization. For a long time, therefore, the inquisition become the reverse of an apparent tolerance. But from that false ambiguity the opposition against a pretentious charity and a frantic which-hunt emerged as well. Its doubts in conspicuous apologetics run into the process of enlightenment, which shaped the reason of a modern age. Hence a returning to terms of contingency must at least produce the impression of defenceslessness unless of a trim with the time.

Not by chance, a customary "discourse" inclines to mark time at this point of argumentation. It professes not to have found any reason in the present catastrophy. And from this statement it draws the conclusion that it should be up to every "individual" to care for its own "realization". That sounds like a renewal of toleration: Any orientation is allowed except the one towards historical reason. Precisely by this supposition, however, the claim to an irrational option - "decisionism" - is layed. For without an obligation to history, to humanity so to speak, any differences between means and ends disappear. There is no further possibility given to discern the present from the past and the future. Or - in order to echo the resignation of the postmodern terminology - any formula "simulates" only the reciprocal value of the same "dislodgement". Ultimately this does not mean anything else than that one accepts whatsoever the institutionalized market offers. The floating supply, however, sucks up the existing energies by a mysterious power of alluring forces. Since apparently it is not paying to
resist these inviting sedateness, to incite divergent concepts, a regressive apathy sprawls over. A precautious monotony gets dispatched mediatising a deep fear of reason. For the prevailing institutional forces invite to participate with ruling entities and mysterious influences instead. The "absence of reason", then, is not the cause for a regressive convenience but its consequence. With its epi-phenomena of simulation, on that head, the "institutionalized unconstraint" of postmodernism performs an imitation of prehistoric fundamentalism.

This mode of "fundamentalism", that is to say, just can sustain by dispensation with a profound vindication. In regard of this, at a first glance one could assume a simple indolence in the case of neglect of an adopted "theory's" involvement. When it comes to the point of an "inner meaning", however, such an omission must evoke scepticism. For the impact of a theory is to be measured by its implications. And it cannot be merely a matter of laziness to intercept the monstrous consequences of "germinal theories" as the ones of for instance Martin Heidegger and Carl Gustav Jung. There must be a gene in the wake of such a cover, that is to conceal historical responsibility altogether. The ends, therefore, purposely get exchanged with the means in order to make the present an everlasting apocalypsis, which got its destination from a mythical origin whatsoever. Hence anxious apathy and devotion to the idols remains as the only "inner meaning" for the unsusisting individual.  

Without doubt, the instigation of an imminent catastrophe - in connection with the submitted promise of an "entirely new beginning" - is a cunning excuse for passivity and indulgence as well as for manipulation. Who enjoys the instant - including the annihilation - as if it were the eternity, the same time thrusts aside any idea of something being different. Apparently a "lodgement" - or a glimpse of "Sein" - has been found. But although this mechanism of delusion obviously is old as the hills, at present almost never the issue gets raised whether there do exist particular people or institutions, which brutally gain on a propagated mental circuit and the social dependence in consequence. Certainly, the cynic commonly gives example for the unscrupulous. But he is a victim in a sense as well, since he has resigned without pollution and without striving for adherents. Opposite to him but now, the strategy of contracting the present with the grounds and the everlasting in one point is lingering for devotees in permanence. And one of the pertinent allurements, which the contemporary circles are dealing with, is the creation of tolerance.

Confronted with the historical one, however, this "tolerance" is different in its consistency: that is the enlightenment. The historical proclamation of legal toleration intended to introduce one specific order into the chaos of idolatry. But its attendant purpose of regimentation got revealed and obstructed by protest. The intellectual information about mystified domination thus was the dialectic emergence from the ideology of toleration, though, strange to say, the victims of the inquisition were reminders of reason. They refused to submit to a fictitious order, which wanted to be obeyed inspire of a contradictory reality. As against that the affected "tolerance" of postmodernism is unreal, for it does not symbolize to endeavour after a reasonable resistance, that actually needs discontent as a precondition.

But strictly for the contrary to that, "inner collectedness", the contemporary mode is lasting. The change to spiritual matters under the plea of a material disgust, thereby, gets used in order to contest prospective privileges. These privileges, however, whether they are actually given or pretended, can get defended only by averting of reasonable argumentation. That for the formula of the "dualistic character" of things and phenomena gets fatigued: One "tolerates" any interpretation as long as one's - material or mental - matters don't get touched or affected by that.

Such a postmodern construction of tolerance, anyhow, has nothing in common with the ideological one. For it reduces the way of divergence to a point of uncritical estimation and, finally, of fatal indifference to any kind of indoctrination. In contrast to an ideology, which conceives both moments of conservation and of Utopia, the postmodern style reminds of a "Weltanschauung" within the meaning of an intellectual standstill. That explains the irrational attitude. Furthermore, it betrays the pretense to privileges of being a self-deception. For ultimately, the dismissal of reason from the world-picture occurred at the postmodernism's convenience. But history is rather used to the conventional.
The postmodern fury against autonomy

Under the circumstances that historical reason does not get estimated as the balancing instance of concepts and realization, an equivalent of it, or rather a culmination, must be assumed, even though this were a denial of any settling. For after all one could argue that the majority of the hitherto general orientations in a way became obsolete. On the other hand one must remember, apparent cut-outs of several essential constructions did come round repeatedly. In this context, above all the adoration of a cosmical order, star-warship, and the suggestion of a spiritual predetermination is to be mentioned. These two superstitions are complementary on to the other. And, certainly not by chance, both of them enjoy a resurrection in contemporary "post-materialistic" environments. Empirically, this phenomenon used to be an indicator of intellectual decay indeed. If a determination "from outside" once is suggested, inclusive of a conditioning of minds, then the preparedness for conscious commitment recedes.

The postmodern option in appearance does not openly support such a tendency towards inactivity. After all its protagonists are rather eloquent. But it does not prevent from fatalism neither. Of course, a consequent conviction of an over all indifference cannot pass or oppose a deliberate explanation. It just can avoid to get involved generally. But anyway one must ask how such a "view-point of disengagement" can succeed to spread inasmuch as the postmodern one recently did.

Without doubt, one of the chief attractions of it is the attitude of slouchiness: A "superempetual mind" does not care about passing matters. This attitude lends the impress of a prophetic mission with its twofold consequences of amnesia. Whereas actual grievances get calmed on one hand, especially because the "prophets" use the chance to compensate their own ones, they only get postponed on the other hand and are likely to return even worse. The profit of this circuit is quite well known from the professional psychiatry. The postmodern option, however, beyond this takes advantage of the amnesia in order to style their addicts for remote purposes, inclusive of political ones. Prerequisite to these is to re-educate potential personalities to lethargical individuals, who devote themselves to superficial phenomena, which they by way of innuendo take on increased significance.

But the "significances", which the devotee takes for granted, cannot get explained, only accepted, by himself. Inevitably, therefore, he is at the mercy of an interpretation and hence of a subliminal dependency. As in reverse, an order of submission, including a hierarchical structure, ever was insinuated into the "Weltanschauung". Jung, whose apocryphal "individual psychology" not by chance got popular in return with the averting of a responsible historiography, never made bones about his supposed "esoteric doctrine", though this, emerging from a paranoiac racism, at once got carried into the barbarian practice of the "Third Reich". It is the insidiouslyness of such an "esoteric doctrine" to suggest that any individual could decide for a belonging rank within the secret league of initiates. But despite of the fact that the leaders' finally never even dream of sharing their power, the "expectants" of it are prepared to repulse their entire cultural acquirements. Driven by their subsequent primitive idleness, which restricts them to the dualistic mechanism of thirst for power and lust for submission, they omit to remember that they have nothing in prospect unless the end of their existence. On their way to that, however, any human concept has got lost long since.

It is true, the postmodern option as a rule does not directly refer to racism or despotism. One explanation for that maybe a simple lack of literary knowledge as references. Another one could be found with a dissecting mentality, which is unable to conceive the coherence of methodological discretion and professional delumination. Altogether, explanations like these would not admit of no excuse anyhow. But in spite of all that, the postmodern construct bears in mind a conceptual selection as it is: For by neglect of all existential values it depreciates the human according to its own exclusive narcissism.

At the first glance, the game of a postmodern "discourse" may leave the impression to be quite pleasurable. Namely the poker with a phenomenon's doubleness - the reverse of every medal - appears to be convincing. It recalls the fabulous race between the hare and the hedgehog, which lets the tricky hedgehog always come out victor. But though the medal got two sides, it rests to be only a piece of one and the same currency. As well as the hedgehog, measured by the rules of fariness, does not cease to be a fraud. And in regard to this, the postmodern juggling-tricks are not different from the totalitarian ones: For they suggest a "not only - but also" option, a "dualistic vision", whereas "the final decision" already has taken place somewhere "in the beyond".
This way, the method of ambiguity secretly lets pass through only the reinforcement of its own position as such. The subtle instilment of a plausibly told psychoanalytic terminology, at the latest, is due to ascertain the persuasion that real professional knowledge is at work. Thus by the presentation of supposed essential explanations a perfidious intimidation gets pursued. Because on the one side, the postmodern exponents declare an onslaught on the traditional values and motivational patterns with the consequence of an contingent - and eventually redundant - existence. Whereas on the other side, they proclaim a germinal - at, what ultimately is the same, esoteric doctrine, which should trans fuse "entirely new ideas" into the apocalyptically horrified minds. Sine qua non, however, for an "essential being" - perhaps in "transfiguration" - is the unswerving faith in the primary meaning, for which one has to strive in secrete at the instructor's command. Since the spiritual illumination does not occur by itself, but needs the mediation through an initiated member. In this way the institutional order, which the postmodern option pretended to controversial, in fact does not get disturbed at all. On the contrary, the "new doctrine" turns out to be an already rather disastrously experienced one; That is to ignore the subjectivity.

The neglect of subjective influences on history presupposes the domain of an irrefutable law, by that all events are ruled. Or reciprocally, a superior entity destines the countless occurrences the individuals are conditioned by. In both cases the assumption of human consciousness and activity were delusive and a proceeding like the proclamation of tolerance was simply an erroneous idea. But the wonder is that hitherto repeatedly - up to the postmodern persuasion of convenience - the requirement returned to set great value on personal liberty. This liberty, however, actually rests to be a mere proclamation unless it does not get proved by its realization. And with respect to the Catholic "toleration" the dialectic of social enlightenment and institutional inquisition gave the far-reaching proof on proof of it. Following the postmodern prospect, nevertheless, this interpretation of toleration now has come to an end, after the enlightenment expired at any rate.

Curiously enough, this version of interdiction from toleration got a premodern antecedent as well: When Constantine amalgamated the polity with the state church, the urban civilization as well as its ways and means remained concentrated on the population of the metropolis. Accordingly the urbanization of the life-style and the scope of culture got additional impetus.

Against this "refinement", on the other side, large groupings of the rural population, under-privileged anyway, performed the Christian creed connecting to the former pagan ceremonies. These implied as well the savageness of local cults as well as the monastic isolation of puritanism. Thus an unprocessed fundamentalism and a styled civilization not only contrasted, but exposed each other to strained contempt.11 Mutually, therefore, the concept of civic toleration never came to terms with these two divergent orientiations. Fundamentals of the Protestant Reformation, thereby, were already layed a millenium before it occurred.

Most remarkably, the collision of free agency with fundamentalism accompanied the Christian civilization from the first. And, although by long circuits, the contemporary debate on postmodern orientiations is a late resound of that. For it treats the soul of man as if it were subject to instrumental destination. Such an approach to the psychic apparatus, however, is conceivable only against the background of a specific faith in a disposition of the human as the executor of an irreversible instruction. In this regard, above all, the Puritan zealotry against intellectual civilization and the postmodern endavour after a devitalization of enlightenment not by chance come to meet. Both they share the depredation of responsible autonomy and the proscription of cultural self-consciousness. For a particular meaning of man's characteristic mental life would subvert their authorization message.

In particular, this "message" was brought back to Europe by a skindeep psychology of conformity, which soars out of the wind of an overwhelming American capitalist straightness. A straightness in the relevant sense that it never had become acquainted with an idea of antagonisms as the ones between bourgeoisie and proletariat, clearing up and inquisition, or - worth mentioning in connection with the present spiritualism - rationality and the unconscious. Without doubt, the American and European cultural mentality, though both capitalist, traditionally have been deeply divergent. The European culture ever was on embittered atmosphere of hegemonies and resisting movements, but never a conform "superstructure", how it was continuously entailed by the Puritan immigrants on the infinite legend of "New Frontiers" in America. This legendary straightforwardness - untainted by mental reservations - did not cave in regard nature simply as means of exploitation and minds as tools of rationalization. With this consequence, however, even the thoroughly European Psychoanalyse of Freud in America
got dissolved and recast to the grips of a positivistic psychology. The meaningful contents that it was due to bring to light, last but not least the taboo ones, got blocked up in order to instrumentize the souls, not at last on behalf of a spiritualistic fundamentalism.

Somebody may be astonished at the fact that Freud, who really was a literary man, did not stop the "objectifying" English translation of his categories from the beginning. For it is not a neutral "id" as a bloodstream, but a rather personal issue. I neither rests on an operation table, but contains the entire experience of me, instead of standing for a firm "ego". Not represents a "super-ego" a lofty order, but my subjective upper-I reflects the social controversies, that every personality is concerned with in its way. Nevertheless Freud's disregard of "the American shallowness" does not sufficiently explain why he suffered the perversion of his ingenious theory to an artificial method. By that, after all, the vital impulses of culture got corrupted to animal "instincts", with the consequence that the libidinous soul - the wedlock of Psyche and Amor - turns out the restriction of a "mental apparatus" prepared for conditional treatment.  

The background for this treatment, however, did prevent Freud from an intervention against the positivistic misunderstanding of his approach to the soul "The sexual morality as the society defines it, the American in extreme, appears to me rather despicable," Freud neither contemplated confessions as such, nor did he strive for "sexual anarchy", how it gets proclaimed by a specific postmodern mode. But he insisted on the freedom of sexual independence from obstructed controls and sublimely internalized repressive mechanisms. A professional perversion of human ambitions, altogether, he was caused to assume with the Puritan indoctrination of "good conduct": That was the abstinence not to concede the development of libidinous impulses and, even worse, to tie up eternal grace with the renunciation of sensuality.  

Decisively, the pretense of a "germinial" doctrine - and accordingly of an "original" anthropology - is to cancel the process emerging from vital impulses and their resistance against a constraining "super-ego". As a surrogate for enlightenment, a mythical phrase of "efficiency" gets brought forward: That is a vague promise for an "award", the values of which has to be looked for somewhere in the backward or foreward mist of "individualization", unless a dense mind is acquiesced in the passing catches of the present time. Conformably, the majority of the "regularly" trained customers seemingly have no choice but to continue in the display of "the other ones", though these above all may take cynical advantage of a common disposition to mental submission. For both of the Christian instructions, free agency as well as "savage" fundamentalism, as it came to eruption with the Peasan's War, became obsolete since long. But of that capitalist creed, which - following Jean Calvin - connected God's grace with worldly success, the issue of rentability has remained of striking power. With this amen, in any case, it came back from America to Europe under the banner of technology. And obviously it took the European cultural tradition's breath away, somehow or other, till that recovered at least partly.  

Without doubt, the European facets of postmodernity, which by far are not unilateral, pursued attempts of such a recovery. There were too many different styles gathered through a millennium in order to be able to draw one line only from these, though. And on the other hand, simple profiles of "good" and "evil" step by step had lost their unrestrained "official validity". For a - extremely precarious - while, therefore, one assumed that an anti-intellectual fundamentalism could not be of threat to a civilized Europe any more. But by this negligence one apparently had underestimated the economic and institutional forces, which on an underground way - with the signature of "corporate identity" for instance - strive for the degradation of the personality to a "residual-ego". This "residual-ego", euphemistically named "individualists", ultimately is defined by its inability to distinguish between outer and inner mechanisms of control and destination, for it is unaware of a particular self anyway. Knowing commands and constraints only, the so called "limitations to tolerance", a concept of toleration never could come to its unassuming mind. Against the background of unreflected solipsism, however, precisely that fictitious "theory of totalitarianism", by which once one perfunctorily assumed to have grasped the structures of "emotional" systems, makes every effort to become uncontradicted reality in reverse.
A current phrase of the cynical condensation is the one of "the exception that proves the rule". It provides a way out of the difficulty to explain an unforeseen or vexatious event. The same time, one must remember, it entertains the suspicion that "the rule" is grasped at nothing but a speculation. Since too many "exceptions" could finally endanger the "normality", unless they turn it into its contrary. Because the validity of a proposition depends on its usefulness or persuasiveness. And up to this point the postmodernist and the cynic do not differ from other "realistic concepts", which tend to go steady with the actual. But were the other ones, positivism for instance, are - provided they hold their theoretical claim - obliged to admit errors, the cynic and the postmodernist will continue to insist on their "general persuasion" including its "opposite proof". Nevertheless, "aesthetically" they are very different at this decisive point: Since the cynic does not hide his reckless covetousness and his moral indiffERENCE, he concedes that inefficiency sets limitations to his adopted generosity. In this regard, so to say, the conventional cynic retains a last breathing of fairness, which prevents him from condemning the others likewise. Whereas the unrelent postmodernism, a kind of altogether "apocalyptic cynicism", forces even a definite critique in its methodological supremacy in order to get absorbed from any "profane" liability. Devoted to one issue only, although a self-constructed one, it already is disgusted with the mere idea of toleration.

That averting of any conceptual idea, however, cannot get estimated by its surgical expressions only. For its suspicious seclusion tells of a deeply intruded fear of reasonable integrity. The unwillingness to accept the transitoriness of the present is one characteristic of the postmodern option. Its defence against historical recollection is another, more serious, one. Because it fences out not only the reminiscences of different future perspectives but the extraction of ones subjective explanations as well. The precipitate banishment of the past returns as an unconsciously repressing pain in permanence. By a collective levelling process, however, the individual pain experiences a peculiar reversal phenomenon, which produces an apparently "different quality" of the facts. Before, the subsequences of partial repulsion were known to psychoanalysis with their mode of actual diversification. Neurotic persons assigned the causes of their uneasiness for example to distinct "scapegoats". In any case their grievances remained "personal" ones, by which the "neurotics" consciously distinguished among one another. But with a global denial to history, the entire obliteration of particular reminiscences, the contemporary order itself gets a "univalent structure". Beyond all questions, the "functional reality" as such - as it is seemingly final and eternal at once - gets taken for granted as if it were "the best one" at any rate.

Nevertheless that generally accepted "super-structure", despite of its compulsory uniqueness, does not refute hierarchical preferences altogether. On the contrary, especially the postmodernists insist on their privileging ability to comprehend all forthcoming, including the political ones, with their aesthetic categories. Preferences like these, however, must get vindicated by a convincing supposition. For that purpose, horribile dictu, increasingly they fall back upon paraphrases of "germinal forces", which frightened the civilized world not a long time ago. But since history got suspended, means and ends became congruent, the yesterday obscurantism can get resold as if it were a recent and obligatory prophecy. With the promise of salvation, which is as a rule the palliation for numerous fashionable "therapies", a total occupation of minds gets set forth.

Concerning this fatal circuit, one must recall that such a mechanism does not make its way from one day to the other. It is its underhand conduct, however, to make forgotten the day's before experiences in order to restitute them by "advanced accomplishments". By this lingering method reciprocally, one does not yet mention the reversion from moral indiffERENCE to postmodern rigorosity. Precisely if one is anxious to participate with "the spirit of the age", therefore, one is at the mercy of conformable pressure. Under the given subcutaneous premises, so to say, the postmodern approach is predestined to structural dehumanization eventually.

The prerequisites for that turn were already implied with the former "theory of totalitarianism" as it got prepared in order to live down "scientifically" the treat of a barbarian submission. Certainly, some of this "theory's" authors had just escaped from extermination and could not expect that their considerations were apt for misinterpretation. Some others may have been too simple-minded in order to grasp what really had occurred. At least recently it has turned out, nevertheless, that the experienced obstructions of the past may get reversed by foul means: In order to function as a "therapeutical" advice to "corporate" policy.
An effort like this, it is true, lately became ominous in Western Germany, where a specific group of historians tried to suggest a doubtful "historical normality" or, Germany of all countries, a "national identity", which does not differ from other one's, although - respectively because - it emerged from the World War. Precisely the particular background of that war - the other way around - should get minimised by a comparison of "usual warfare" ever since in confrontation with "the Communist disaffection". Without regard to the long-term social implications of the German past the "posthistoire" - side by side with the postmodern "nonchalance" - dissected the historical coherence in order to compile a story at one's convenience. In the specific German case, apart from this, the intention of simply neglecting the "original racism" became obvious: As if it were up to one's "individual decision" whether to call it in question or not.

Anyway, this particular Western German reinterpretation of historical issues was hardly imaginable without some cover of similar tendencies on overlapping levels. For an authoritarian character does not deviate from a trend but overstate it. And, in this respect, the approach to "the roots" is a widely spread phenomenon of contemporary fundamentalism, which consciously or not - obstructs the haste to gain superiority. Not by chance, therefore, the writings of those mystery-mongers, who directly or indirectly obstruct the equivalence of souls, as it was requested by the authentic psychoanalysis, are incredibly quick selling. Who inspire of such a mass of secret indoctrination - or rather because of it - still retains an "inferiority complex" with the understanding of Alfred Adler is a candidate for a psychological treatment of his "ego". When he once will return from the "trip to his past", after all, he may have reached a maximum of adaptation to the "super-structure" for a while; That is what - and however the mystery-mongers will circumscribe it - they call "identity".

Such an "identity", however, is defined by the demands of the self-styled system only, but not shaped by the isolated individual at all. On the contrary, the fashionable contestation of an "origin" is arranged in order to bind a person by an oath to the conditions of the present state. Hence force it will put the "super-ego", which is the same time the conditioning rule of itself, beyond any doubts in its past. Not surprisingly, therefore, quite a number of Western German historians would like to establish a similar mechanism of ignoring as well the recent Holocaust as well as the traditions of scepticism. And under the premisses of some prevailing "Western Goals", in fact, they are not without chances: Since the economic conditions of a presumably liberal "spirit of enterprise" have been introduced for a long time. They supply the material level, which permits the overlap of mutual mental influence upon one another. By that a neutrality of allowed expectations, the indoctrination of a "middle-class-mentality", gets instilled, which conceals privileges just to a small group of proficients but intentionally despises nonconformists, especially intellectuals, as if they were "uncivilized" deviants. This styling, however, bears the consequence that the majority can get induced to a blindfold internecine war for a chimera and against tolerance, inclusive of the annihilation of high-handed "enemies", at any time.

Looking back to the "elements of the totalitarianism" how they were structurally conceived against the background of the political proceedings in the thirties and forties, one must register, in reversion, that their projective marks of distinction got carried through nearly without being noticed on the side of the formerly "liberal instance": In fact arbitrary but according to their doctrine "original" structures of the system as well as the penetrating identification of "the people" - whereby the individual and the "fellow-countryman" figure exchangeable - with the doctrine of the "unique society", instilled into the preconception, were - following the literature on the subject - the prevailing items of totalitarianism. Put to the test of these, one must not forget that the societal concept of the "Western Goals" altered one decisive implementation: Since its value-system got intruded into the subconscious already, reclaimed to an "anthropological rule", the potential ability for a resistant mentality - not to mention a self-assertive I - becomes ignored if not even condemned. Hence no other meaning is ascribed to the unconscious unless an irrational one, this gets strictly overdetermined towards rationalization. The aggressiveness, which gets set free by this repetitive operation, as a consequence gives the theory a slip in the nature of disposal.

By that consequence, now, the "theory of totalitarianism" must be measured after all. During the first period of its application, in the time of the Cold War namely, it got accustomed as a descriptive instrument against Fascism and Communism - represented in the public's mind by Hitler and Stalin - likewise. They both seemed to have in common two items, which were to fight in the name of "liberal positivism" at any rate: The "invention" of a particular historical understanding and a specific method of terrorism in order to set through that "unifying ideology" in the brains and the everyday-life of common people.
This method was signified as terrorist, because it treated political proceedings and emotive sanctions separately in order to let them emerge into one remote "leader" on occasion of his "glorious" performances. The idolatry of "germinal superiority", in reverse, permanently reproduced a mutual tension between institutional control and violent fanaticism. This tension, where it is grounded on an obsession of autocracy, at any time can get transformed into insensitive brutality. The theory of totalitarianism, only regarding this aspect of annihilation, not the possible dialectic of negation and liberation, called the causing of such a tension "ideological". So it did not differ between the indicated monoautocracy, which was characterized by a corporate "lust of rosy power", and a historical concept, which had been initiated precisely against such a myth of "blood-community". Certainly, just under the command of structural abstraction - and, as stated already, still overtaken with fear of one's life - some surfacial similarities between the in those days "strange" systems may have been striking. But with the theoretical equalization of "origin" and "aim" a dramatical - or malignant - error creeps in: The question gets suppressed, whether the "common population" of a "totalitarian system" is the victor or the producer of aggressiveness and permanent violence. For in the meantime the omission of this question should have got conspicuous by the inability of the racists - though they were given the chance again and again - to feel honestly ashamed of their unique genocide.

Against this examination, however, the tendency of "scaling" the humans between "superiors" and "underlings" gets corroborated by more modes but the undisguised racism. Prevaling are the common prejudices on communism and - subliminally enclosed - any other autonomous concepts. These prejudices get insinuated by a rigid institutionalism, which has to conceal its own totalitarian arrangements. The postmodern destruction of reason in favour of a "spiritual revolution", in this respect, just furnishes the repressive professionalism with an artificial cobweb, by which - and this desaster of the intellect already has occured widely - the point gets obscured, where the slave turns into a slave-dealer. For both of these habits appeal to a "spiritual liability" - overestating Weber's "Gesinnungsethik" - in order to repudiate lastly an actual responsibility altogether. The same they comply with the rules of a mental treatment, by which they intend to become reinforced in their settlement. Thus they do not take over their destination but run after it. What gets conjured as an "apocalypse", then, in fact reveals to be the much more realistic menace of "dischronism", that is the catastrophe of getting outdistanced by the actual development.

The by all means irrational confirmation of an "original cause", although it may get rationalized by economic or technological requirements, leads up to regression in permanence anyway. Together with this fixation on a standstill of creativity, which is significant of the common relaps to a Doctrine of Evolution in a sense of an intolerable Social-Darwinist contemptibility, it indicates, why the authentic psychoanalysis has been outmanoeuvred by ever and again "absolutely original" offers of hypocrical "therapies": For it could turn out disquieting - for the individual as well as for the community - to remember oneselfs unconscious impulses and reasonable projections instead of glossing over the actually lingering misery.

Strange to say, but in regard to a dominating mentality the positivistic such as the germinal psychology, how they got constructed under the auspices of an explicit animosity against a theory of libidinous communication and cultural sublimation, adequately reflect the "reality" of an institutionally proclaimed "postmodern age" insosfar. The realty of an even scarcely receptive mind, which - dissected by hasty "informations" - is unable to conceive the given facts different than they got presented and pleas guilty its own "interior" of any apparent "disorderliness". Such an esoteric abasement provided, the imitators of Adler and Jung get invited to make their deal with "inferiority complexes" and "archetypes of individuation". Supplementary to such a disdainful commerce, in this state, it is the "reality" of an in every whole and corner ceeping in "symbolism", which deprieved of historical mediation pretends the present with the eternal in coincidence. Together these issues of mental and spiritual conformity end up in the regression of the "spirit of the age": That is the applied totalitarianism of a "corporate identity".

After the theory of totalitarianism finally failed by the error of compiling historically different causes interchanged means and ends in a way it was given revenge on a postmodern structure refusing a meaningful particularization anyhow. Against a distinction of "institutional power" and "community-spirit", one ideal only gets "incorporated". And for the concrete has got lost in the present "post", anyway, the "residual-ego" is acquiesced in an abstract "symbol" likewise. In return, therefore, its "tertiary narcissism" - the narcissism of one, who become unable to differ between the "super-ego" and the "id" in the sense of a psychoanalytical renegade - can get
"satisfied" easily with a double-tracked "corporate identity". A participa-
tion with the "community-spirit" gets promised under the condition of an
unquestioned abandonment to a down to date tendency on one side, whereby
the massochistic endeavour at punishing any rising of insubordination gets
incited and "honoured". On the other side, the corresponding motions of
sadism get "polished" by threatening with extermination all divergent arrange-
ments competing with the "exclusive logic" of one's own corporation. Thus
"corporate identity" turns out an abstract amalgamation of both dominance
and fundamentalisms: Thereby self-hated returns under the cover of "effi-
ciency", whereas communicational isolation gets sealed up by the neurotic
identification with a "lasting quality". Together they fulfil the suppositions
of the totalitarian indeed, for the "identity" really "assessed" means nothing
else than devotion to the re-projection of a mythical "conspiracy".

With these implementations, however, corporation and culture become anta-
gonistic such as postmodern phrases and the idea of the like alike. Just
an anti-intellectual mentality like a positivistic one, this true, can fall
blindly into the transient mode of unhistorical irritations, especially since
the only "argument" of "the spirit of the age" is reckless repulsion of "the
strange".22 In contrast to such a regressive "identity", nevertheless, the
concept of reasonable integrity pursues the idea of toleration beyond violent
controlls and without being frightened at the thought of an indispensable
unconscious. For historical reason endures dispute of suspect relapses like
the postmodern one. In this sense the late Andy Warhol's "deconstruction"
of Leonardo da Vinci's "Cenacle" may serve as a document of the conven-
temporary mind. But the painting itself therewith does not cease to intro-
duce from the past the reminiscence of a feast of brotherhood still remaining
a real Utopia.

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"The corporation seen as an Arena of Debate and a Shrine of Belief", in:
10 Mats Mosesson ... argued that the very reason for the rise in interest in
corporate culture was nothing other than the postmodernist ethos in con-
temporary society." (Larry Turner, "Postmodernism and Organizational
Culture", in: MDS Work-Shop, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 18.
11 Michael Grant, B.c.e., p. 110.
12 For further details on the misinterpretation of Freud cf. Bruno Bettel-
heim, I read and I love, New York (Holt, Rinehart) 1965.
13 Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud, Band II, Bern - Stuttgart - Wien (Huber)
1974, p. 444 (The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, New York: Basic
Books, Inc. 1938-1942).
14 Cf. Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia. A critique of conformist psychology
15 The obscure anthropological background of "efficiency" gets eventually
more insistent with the German term "Leistung", which for instance Mar-
in Heidegger - still after the Concentration Camps - incisively sharpened
as an Instrument in order to value the "essence" of humans (Einführung
in die Philosophie, Tübingen (Hemeyer) 1953). - Concerning the dubioso-
ness of "anthropological" statements cf. George E. Marcus / Michael M.J.
Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique, Chicago (University of Chi-

17 With that intention recently Georges Bataille's early analysis of fascism ("La structure Psychologique du Fascisme", 1933) was popular interpretations in order either "to diminish" the particular German genocide or "to settle" fears of the increasing "New Right" (e.g. Peter L. Berger, "Democracy for Everyone", in: Commentary 9 / 1953, pp. 31 ff.).

18 Once the intellectual interpretation of "the totalitarian" by Karl R. Popper was leading: Consequently it was to employ for the explanation of contemporary "value-orientations" as well (e.g. The Open Society and Its Enemies, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952).

19 With such a hermetic definition, however, the distinction of a "better ideology" - as the one of the "Western Goals" - appears absurd (cf. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, New York: Free Press, 1960).


21 Footdragging is one special accent of diachronism: It ends with a relapse at any rate. In contrast to that, namely presenting a historical concept, diachronical symbols aim at the reminiscence of a future, which still has to get realized (cf. Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1959, pp. 179 ff.).


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